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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This document reports the results of the activities performed in the Work Package 1 
“Identification and description of Control System Scenarios” of the “CRitical UTility 
InfrastructurAL resilience (CRUTIAL)” project, as described in the Annex 1 to the EC contract 
n° 027513. It represents the outcome of the analysis of new control applications in the Power 
System and the identification of critical control system scenarios to be explored by the 
CRUTIAL project. 
The Work Package 1 plan is structured into three tasks: 
• T1.1, which is dedicated to the definition of requirements for architectural patterns 
including both the Electrical Infrastructure (EI) and the control structures, by emerging 
applications and technological renewal of existing applications. Two important evolutions 
are taking place nowadays. Firstly, the need to exchange process information among 
different operators/departments is forcing the adoption of standard IP based protocols 
over shared/connected wide and local area networks. Secondly, centralised control is not 
sufficient to exploit the opportunities of e.g., Autonomous Electricity Networks based on 
distributed generation, and decentralised control is required. 
• T1.2, in which new control applications were investigated, related to autonomous 
electricity networks with distributed resources and interactions among power operators 
based on regulation and teleoperation hierarchical systems. 
• T1.3, concerned the scenario representation. The UML (Unified Modelling Language) 
standard modelling notation has been selected for describing the infrastructures and 
control scenarios. 
As a working methodology, considerable effort has been devoted in WP1 to collect 
information from existing systems, their renewal plans and emerging evolutions from the 
scientific and technical literature. Considering the largeness and complexity of the amount of 
systems and devices falling under the umbrella of power system control, the acquired 
knowledge is certainly partial and the power system picture derived has the only ambition to 
support the identification of sample control scenarios highlighting critical interdependencies 
among E.I. and ICT (Information, Communication Technology) services infrastructures.  
The specification of the (portion of) Electrical Power System that is of interest for CRUTIAL is 
given in the form of natural language with the support of picture with drawings and symbols 
that are commonly used by electrical people, as well as in the form of a collection of UML 
diagrams, a language with whom computer science people are more familiar.  
In the context of power system control, the ICT applications supporting the remote control of 
the equipments located in both generation stations and transformation substations are 
commonly called SCADA (Supervision Control And Data Acquisition) systems. Recently the 
meaning underlying the term SCADA system has been extended to refer to all the 
information, communication and control devices located in control and (sub)station sites. 
These SCADA systems play a central role in the definition of CRUTIAL scenarios. 
The document is organized into seven chapters and an appendix: 
• Chapter 2 summarises background information and terminology used within the 
electrical system community that help in constructing a common set of concepts 
within the CRUTIAL consortium. For more detailed explanations, the reader is 
referred to specialised literature. 
• Chapter 3 introduces a model of the Operational States and the Defence Plan of the 
Power System. There are summarised the technical and organisational counter-
measures taken to prevent the propagation of a power system incident and the 
degradation of the state of service, and to avoid a collapse. The main regulations 
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constituting the first defence line are presented together with the hierarchical 
structure of the other defence actions. 
• Chapter 4 overviews the identified control system scenarios, their main functions and 
ICT components. Also, it deals with configuration and security issues in current and 
future SCADA systems. 
• Chapter 5 describes a set of scenarios that covers emerging themes involving ICT for 
Power System bulk generation, transmission and distribution infrastructures including: 
o the security of the remote supervision and control functions for grid and 
generation operators 
o the impact of attacks in emergency conditions 
o the possible breaches caused by the interconnections between the corporate 
and the process networks 
o the possible problems related to the ICT Systems’ remote maintenance. 
• Chapter 6 describes a set of scenarios that covers emerging themes involving ICT for 
Power System Distributed Generation. 
• Chapter 7 reports the conclusions of the activities performed in the Work Package 1 
of the CRUTIAL project and finalizes the results to the other Work Packages. 
• Chapter 8 collects in an appendix the UML specification of the (CRUTIAL point of 
view on) Electrical Power Systems: a few UML diagrams are also included in the 
previous chapters, mainly to provide more structure to some concepts and to give a 
flavour of which aspects of the Electrical Power System can be captured through the 
UML diagrams. 
The Italian power grid is used as an example to illustrate throughout the document. 
 
1.1 Abbreviations 
 
ACC Area Control Centre 
AEG Autonomous Electricity Grid 
ATS Area Telecontrol System 
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator 
CC Control Centre 
CCT Critical Clearing Time 
CHP Combined Heat and Power Cogeneration 
CNM Central Network Management 
COTS Commercial Off-the Shelf hardware or software component 
DG Distributed Generation 
DoS Denial of Service 
DSO Distribution System Operator 
EHV Extra-High Voltage  
EI Electrical Infrastructure 
EMS Energy Management System 
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EPS Electrical Power System 
FACTS Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
GENCO GENeration COompany 
HMI Human-Machine Interface 
HV High Voltage 
ICT Information Communication Technology 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IED Intelligent Electronic Device 
IP Internet Protocol 
LAN Local Area Network 
LV Low Voltage 
MC Marginal Cost 
MCD-TU Monitoring Control and Defence Terminal Unit 
MV Medium Voltage 
NIC Network Interface Card 
NTP Network Time Protocol 
NTS National Telecontrol System 
NVR National Voltage Regulator 
OSI Open System Interconnection 
P2P Peer-to-peer network 
PFR Primary Frequency Regulator 
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit 
PQR Reactive Power (Q) Regulator 
PS Primary Substation 
PSAS Primary Substation Automation System 
PSS Power System Stabiliser 
RCC Regional Control Centre 
RPC Remote Procedure Call protocol 
RTS Regional Telecontrol System 
RVR Regional Voltage Regulator 
SAS Substation Automation System 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SFR Secondary Frequency Regulator 
SQL Structured Query Language 
SS Secondary Substation 
TCI TeleControl Interface 
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TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TMI TeleMonitoring Interface 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
TSP Telecommunication Service Provider 
UCTE Union for Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity 
ULTC Under Load Tap Changer 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
WAMS Wide Area Measurement Systems 
WAN Wide Area Network 
WAP Wide Area Protection 
XML eXtensible Markup Language 
 
1.2 Definitions 
Term {Synonym} 
Definition / explanation, cross-reference 
Control System Scenario 
A CONTROL SYSTEM SCENARIO is a reference structure and behaviour of (a portion of) the 
Power System, its related Monitoring, Control and Maintenance Networks and devices, 
including communication, host and server devices, in an environment exposed to threats that 
may jeopardise the operation of the power system services. 
The Control System Scenarios explored in CRUTIAL are derived from state of art power 
control systems and their envisioned evolution. 
Defence Plan 
The DEFENCE PLAN summarises all technical and organisational measures taken to prevent 
the propagation or deterioration of a power system incident in order to avoid a collapse. 
Disturbance 
A DISTURBANCE is an unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condition. 
Electrical Contingency 
ELECTRICAL CONTINGENCY is an unexpected failure or outage of an electrical system 
component such as a generator, transmission line, circuit breaker, switch or another element. 
An ELECTRICAL CONTINGENCY may also include multiple components, which are related by 
situations leading to simultaneous component outages. 
Electrical Power System Electrical System 
The term ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM covers all the electrical, the control and automation, 
information and communication infrastructures and, generally speaking, all the necessary 
devices to produce and to transport the electric power towards the final users. 
Island 
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An ISLAND represents a portion of a power system or several power systems that is 
electrically separated from the main interconnected system (separation resulting e.g. from 
the disconnection failure of transmission systems elements). 
Marginal Cost 
In economics and finance, MARGINAL COST is the change in total cost that arises when the 
quantity produced changes by one unit. The MARGINAL COST may change with volume, and 
so at each level of production, the MARGINAL COST is the cost of the next unit produced. 
Power Grid 
The infrastructure used to transport the electric power from the production plants to the final 
customers is called POWER GRID. The entire POWER GRID may be considered the sum of two 
subsystems: the transmission and distribution grids.  
Regulation {Control} 
The REGULATION of the electrical system is the process to obtain the desired behaviour of a 
continuous variable. In the case of the electrical power the main regulated variables are 
voltage, frequency, active and reactive power. 
Security 
The term SECURITY is used with different meaning in electric, information and communication 
communities. Within the electric power community SECURITY means the availability of energy 
supply in different operating condition in face of contingencies and disturbances. Meanwhile 
in information and communication communities the SECURITY is the resilience to malicious 
threats and attacks. 
In order to avoid ambiguity in the following we will use the term SECURITY when the context is 
ICT and we will specify ELECTRICAL SECURITY in the power context. 
Teleoperation 
The term TELEOPERATION refers to actions performed at a distance and provoking a change 
in the configuration or setting of power components. Examples of teleoperation are the 
reconfiguration of the grid topology or maintenance operations. 
Threat 
The term THREAT refers to a potential violation of security, which exists when there is a 
circumstance, capability, action or event that could breach security and cause harm. 
 
1.3 UML Formalisms 
The UML (Unified Modelling Language) standard modelling notation [OMG 2002a] [OMG 
2002b] [Pender 2003] [Flower 2003] has been selected for describing the infrastructures and 
control scenarios. The choice of adopting UML is mainly motivated by the fact that UML 
graphical notations are becoming widely accepted within some industrial communities like 
those in charge of developing standards for power control systems (IEC 61970, IEC 61850, 
IEEE C37.115 etc.) and UML diagrams normally support the documentation in their standard 
reports. 
Different (meta)classes of UML diagrams have been used to provide a (close to) formal 
description of the control scenarios. 
UML class diagrams are used to represent the structure of the electric power system in terms 
of class stereotypes. Each diagram focuses on particular aspects of the system. The class 
diagrams presented in this document show a static view of the system. Such diagrams may 
be refined and other types of UML diagrams such as sequence diagrams, may be derived 
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from the class diagrams and used to represent the dynamic behaviour of the system in each 
scenario.  
1.3.1 Class Diagrams 
In  UML a system is seen mainly from an object-oriented point of view, and therefore  class 
diagrams play a central role. In a class diagram the system is considered as a collection of 
interacting objects corresponding to the system components. Objects are independent 
entities characterized by attributes and methods: the values of the attributes describe the 
state of the object; methods describe the behaviour of the object, e.g.: the operations that the 
object can perform. 
The class diagram indicates the classes of the system, where a class acts as a template 
defining the common features of a set of identical objects, e.g.: objects with the same 
attributes and methods. An example of class diagram is reported in Figure 2-2.  
A class is graphically represented by a box composed by three compartments containing the 
name of the class, its attributes and its methods respectively. When the attributes and the 
methods of a class are not specified, the class will be graphically represented by a box 
showing only one compartment (containing the name of the class).  
Besides attributes and methods of the classes, the class diagram shows the relationships 
among the classes, in form of arcs; these are the types of relationship used in this document: 
association, generalization and aggregation. 
An association is a logical relationship between two classes and is graphically indicated by 
an arc connecting such classes; if the association is in both directions, the arc has no verse, 
else its verse indicates the direction of the association. For instance, in Figure 8-1, the class 
Application  is associated with the class AutomationFunction; in this example, the association 
holds only in one direction: from the class Application to the class AutomationFunction. The 
label of such association is “performs”, therefore we express that an application performs an 
automation function (not vice-versa).   
The associations of the same class are mutually exclusive when only one of them can hold 
for an object (instance) of the class; mutually exclusive associations are represented by 
using the XOR operator.  
The generalization is used to express that a class inherits the attributes and the methods 
from another class (parent class); this relation is graphically indicated by an arc with a white 
closed triangle pointing the parent class. For instance, in the class diagram in Figure 8-2, the 
class LVLine inherits the attributes of the class Line (parent class).  
The aggregation indicates that the objects of a certain class (container class) are composed 
by objects of other classes; this type of relationship is indicated by an arc with a diamond 
pointing the container class. In the class diagram in Figure 8-4, the objects of the class Site 
are composed by objects of the class PhysicalHost.  
A cardinality can be indicated on each end of an arc, in order to express the number of 
objects involved in the relationship; a cardinality can be a constant or a value varying over a 
certain limited or unlimited range. A range can be defined in this way: a..b, where a and b are 
the lower and upper limit of the range respectively: a must be a constant, while b can be set 
to a constant or to the infinite value. In UML, the symbol * used inside a range indicates +∞ 
(for instance, 3..*). The range 0..* can be indicated simply by *. For instance, in the class 
diagram in Figure 8-4, we express by means of the cardinality 1..* indicated on the 
aggregation arc connecting the class PhysicalHost to the class Site, that a site is composed 
by at least one physical host.  
1.3.2 Use Case Diagrams 
Use case diagrams are used to identify and partition system functionalities. Use case 
diagrams are composed by two types of elements: use cases and actors.  
Analysis of new control applications  Page 7  
 
Actors represents roles that can be played by the user of the system; a user can be a human 
user or another system; in any case, a user is external to the system we are representing, 
and a user must supply stimuli to the system. An actor is graphically represented by the stick 
figure of a man. 
A use case represents the behaviour of the system when a particular stimulus is sent to the 
system by a certain actor. Such behaviour is described textually by a “scenario” associated 
with the use case. A use case is graphically represented by an oval with the indication of the 
name of the use case.  
Associations between actors and use cases are indicated in use case diagrams by solid 
lines. An association exists whenever an actor is involved with an interaction described by a 
use case. Associations are modelled as lines connecting use cases and actors to one 
another, with an optional arrowhead on one end of the line. For instance, in the use case 
diagram in Figure 8-10, the actor LocalOperator is associated with the use case Primary.  
The arrowhead is often used to indicate the direction of the initial invocation of the 
relationship or to indicate the primary actor within the use case. 
There are three types of relationships between use cases: extends, includes, and inheritance 
as well as inheritance between actors.  
An extend relationship specifies that the behaviour of a use case may be extended by the 
behaviour of another use case. The extension takes place at one or more specific extension 
points defined in the extended use case. However the extended use case is defined 
independently of the extending use case and is meaningful independent of the extending use 
case. On the other hand, the extending use case typically defines behaviour that may not 
necessarily be meaningful by itself. Instead, the extending use case defines a set of modular 
behaviour increments that augment an execution of the extended use case under specific 
conditions. An extend relationship is graphically represented by a dashed oriented arc going 
from the extending use case to the extended use case. The label of this arc is. <<extend>>.  
An example of extend relationship is present in the use case diagram in Figure 8-10, from 
the use case SetupParameter (extending use case) to the use case Primary (extended use 
case); this means that the use case SetupParameter is eventually perfomed when the use 
case Primary is perfomed. The condition determining the invocation of the extending use 
case is called “point of exception” and is defined in the “scenario” describing the behaviour of 
the extended use case.  
An include relationship between two use cases means that the behaviour of a use case 
(including use case) includes the behaviour of another use case (included use case). The 
include relationship is intended to be used when there are common parts of the behaviour of 
two or more use cases. This common part is then extracted to a separate use case, to be 
included by all the use cases having this part in common. An include relationship is 
graphically represented by a dashed oriented arc going from the including use case to the 
included use case. The label of this arc is <<include>>. An example of include relationship in 
the use case diagram in Figure 8-11, involves the use case Secondary (including use case) 
and the use case Communication (included use case); this means that the behaviour of the 
use case Secondary includes the behaviour of the use case Communication; in other words, 
the use case Communication is executed whenever the use case Secondary is executed.  
An inheritance relationship between two actors indicates that an actor inherits the use cases 
associated with another actor (pointed by the “triangle-headed” inheritance arc). An 
inheritance relationship between two use cases expresses that a use case is a specialization 
of another (pointed by the inheritance arc); for instance, in the use case diagram in Figure 
8-10, the use case Primary is a specialization of the more general use case 
VoltageRegulation. 
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1.3.3 Interaction Diagrams 
Interaction diagrams model the behaviour of use cases by describing the way groups of 
objects interact to complete the task.  The two kinds of interaction diagrams are sequence 
and collaboration diagrams (communication diagram in UML 2.0). Interaction diagrams are 
used when you want to model the behaviour of several objects in a use case. They 
demonstrate how the objects collaborate for the behaviour. Sequence diagrams, 
collaboration diagrams, or both diagrams can be used to demonstrate the interaction of 
objects in a use case.  Sequence diagrams generally show the sequence of events that 
occur, collaboration diagrams demonstrate how objects are statically connected. Both 
diagrams contain similar elements: the objects and the messages they exchange.  
In sequence diagrams objects are shown as boxes at the top of vertical lines representing 
the object life time. Messages between objects are represented as arcs between vertical 
lines. This diagram is read left to right and descending.  
There are a number of mechanisms that do allow for adding a degree of procedural logic to 
diagrams and which come under the heading of combined fragments. A combined fragment 
is one or more processing sequence enclosed in a frame and executed under specific named 
circumstances. Some of the fragments available are: 
• Alternative fragment (denoted “alt”) models if…then…else constructs; 
• Option fragment (denoted “opt”) models switch constructs; 
• Parallel fragment (denoted “par”) models concurrent processing; 
• Loop fragment encloses a series of messages which are repeated. 
Example of sequence diagrams are present in the appendix. 
In collaboration diagrams objects are listed as icons and arrows indicate the messages being 
passed between them. The numbers next to the messages are called sequence numbers.  
As the name suggests, they show the sequence of the messages as they are passed 
between the objects.  There are many acceptable sequence numbering schemes in UML.  A 
simple 1, 2, 3... format can be used, as the example below shows, or for more detailed and 
complex diagrams a 1, 1.1 ,1.2, 1.2.1... scheme can be used. 
1.3.4 State Diagrams 
A collection of state diagrams can be used to describe the behaviour of a system, of a 
component, or of an object.  State diagrams describe all of the possible states of an object 
(or a component or a system), as events occur.  The nodes of a state diagram are rounded 
boxes representing the states; arrows in a state diagram are used to indicate state 
transitions.  The box representing a state may contain the activity section indicating the 
activities that the object will be doing while it is in that state. A state diagram includes an 
initial state:, this is the state of the object when it is created.  The initial state is identified by a 
black dot connected to the initial state by an arc. For instance, in the state diagram in Figure 
8-24, the state Idle is the initial state.  
The dynamics of the state diagram is determined by the events associated with the 
transitions (arrows). A state transition is triggered by several kinds of event such as a certain 
Boolean condition becoming true, the receipt of an explicit signal, or the passage of a 
designated period of time after a designated event.  
State diagrams can include super-states. A super-state is a particular state containing an 
inner state diagram composed by sub-states. A super-state is useful when the description of 
a single state needs a further state diagram instead of a simple activity. In the state diagram 
in Figure 8-24, the super-state Sending is present; its sub-states are Delivery and 
FailedDelivery; Delivery is in turn a super-state whose sub-states are Normal and Delayed.  
A particular node consisting of a circle containing the symbol H, is used to indicate the sub-
state holding the first time we enter the super-state. The sub-state inside a super-state can 
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change as the time elapses; when we leave the super-state, we implicitly leave the current 
sub-state. The symbol H (history) indicates that if we return in a certain super-state, we 
return in the sub-state we had previously left. Such symbol is present in the state diagram in 
Figure 8-24, and it points the sub-state Normal inside the super-state Delivery.  
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2 POWER SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE AND CONTROL 
We use the term Electrical Power System (EPS) or Electrical System to cover all the 
electrical, the control and automation, information and communication infrastructures and, 
generally speaking, all the necessary devices to produce and to transport the electric power 
towards the final users. Electric power is obtained transforming several kinds of energy 
available in nature by means of machines called generators, situated inside power plants. 
The energy produced by the generators is then adapted, for voltage levels, by components 
called transformers, to be conveyed with minimal dispersion, to the different types of end 
users (civil, industrial, military, etc). 
The infrastructure used to transport the electric power from the production plants to the final 
customers is called Electric Power Grid (or Electric Power Network). The entire power grid 
may be considered the sum of two subsystems: the transmission and the distribution grids. 
From now on this document the term network will be used only to refer to Information and 
Communication Network, in order to avoid any type of misunderstanding with the Electric 
Power Network. 
While the Electrical Power Grid is the most important part of the electrical system, other 
subsystems are necessary to guarantee the continuity of power supply and the structural 
integrity of the components of the electrical infrastructure: the automation and control 
systems of the power equipments and its protection system. The distinction between the two 
infrastructures is not always obvious, because only their combined action ensures the correct 
operation of the electrical system. 
Another important subsystem is the so called Energy Management System (EMS) whose 
function consists in maintaining the correct balance between load and generation. 
The Figure 2-1 represents a simple scheme of the electrical system. As illustrated by the 
scheme, the electrical system is subdivided into three main subsystems: generation, 
transmission and distribution, whose components are physically connected through the 
power lines. 
 
Figure 2-1: Scheme of the electrical system 
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The logical organization of the EPS as UML class diagram (CD) is shown in Figure 2-2, 
where dotted points means that other components are present, but are not relevant at this 
point.  
 
Figure 2-2: Class Diagram of EPS main components 
Each macro-subsystem is equipped with its own components of protection and control that 
constitute the ICT (Information Communication Technology) infrastructure. 
The logical organization of the ICT infrastructure as UML class diagram is shown in Figure 
2-3. The CD also highlights the relationships between the ICT infrastructure and the EPS. 
 
Figure 2-3: Class Diagram of the EPS completed with the ICT scheme 
The major interdependencies among Electrical Power System infrastructures and ICT 
components are depicted in the Figure 2-4. 
 
Analysis of new control applications        Page 12  
 
PLANT
CONTROL
ROOM
AVR
RVR
NVR
POWER PLANT
PFR
SFR
NATIONAL
CONTROL
CENTRE
PQR
REGIONAL
CONTROL
CENTRE
AVR
STATE
ESTIMATOR
NTS
HV
SUBSTATION
EHV
IED IED IED
STATION
COMPUTER
A
S
A
S
IED
P
P
A
SP
A
S
P
A
S
P
Local Power
Plant
Substation
RTS
DISTRIBUTED POWER GENERATION
A
SP
A
SP
HV
MV
Low Loads
SUBSTATION
IED IED IED
STATION
COMPUTER
A
S
P
A
S
P
A A
SP
ATS
AREA CONTROL
CENTRE
NATIONAL
CONTROL
CENTRE
NNM
DEFENCE
MANAGEMENT
MM
METER
CONCENTRATOR
METER
CONCENTRATOR
FVC
FVC
=
~
LV
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OPERATOR
PFR
GROUP GROUP
SUBSTATION
A
S
P
PMU
PMU
S
WAMS
PLANT
CONTROL
ROOM
AVR
POWER PLANT
PFR
PQR
AVR
A
S
IEDPA
S
P
Local Power
Plant
Substation
PFR
GROUP GROUP
SUBSTATION
GENERATION
CONTROL
CENTRE
SCADA
SCADA
SCADA
GENERATION COMPANY
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATOR
EMS
GENERATION COMPANY
S
P
S
ULTC FACTS
SHUNT
REACTOR
SHUNT
CAPACITOR
A A
IED
NNM
FACTS
 
Figure 2-4: Electrical Power System interdependencies 
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In the following paragraphs and chapters we shall detail the single macro subsystems of the 
electrical system and its ICT infrastructure. 
 
2.1 Bulk Generation 
2.1.1 Bulk Generation components 
The generation consists of the transformation of several types of energy present in nature 
into electric power. Natural energy is transformed into electric power by means of the so 
called generation units, located in power plants, which can be typically hydroelectric, 
thermoelectric and nuclear. 
Hydroelectric plants use the potential energy of water, thermoelectric plants derive energy 
from combustion, while nuclear plants use atomic reactions; in all cases, the natural energy 
is first conveyed to turbines providing mechanical energy which is then transferred to 
alternators, the actual electrical generators. 
The Figure 2-5 [Brand et al. 2003] presents a simple scheme of a steam generation system 
and its primary control equipment. The details of the control system are explained in the 
following chapters, while a brief description of the generation components are explained 
hereafter. 
GeneratorTurbine
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Figure 2-5: Scheme of the electric power production and its control systems [Brand et 
al. 2003] 
The turbines are rotating machines that transform the potential, kinetic, or thermal energy 
associated to a fluid into mechanical energy. Depending on the nature of the operating fluid 
three types of turbines can be distinguished: hydraulic, gas, and steam. 
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The alternators are electrical components that convert the mechanical energy produced by 
the turbines in electric power. The electric power is generated in sinusoidal waveform to the 
rated frequency. In Italy and Europe the rated frequency is set to 50Hz.  
Alternators consist of a fixed part, called stator, and of a mobile part, called rotor. On both 
parts there are electrical conductors connected among them so as to form two circuits. One 
circuit has the function to create the magnetic field and the other to induce the 
electromagnetic force. 
The operation of a generation unit can be synthesised in the following way. The first motor (in 
many cases a turbine) supplies the mechanical energy used to keep in rotation a shaft, 
whose rotation generates (according to the law of the electromagnetic induction) 
electromagnetic force in the stator’s windings. The resulting current flow produces the 
electric energy transported by the power grid according to the load demand. 
The generators can also work in the reverse mode, transforming the electric power absorbed 
from the grid in mechanical energy. This function is used for example in pumped 
hydroelectric power plants where during the night hours, when the power demand is lower, 
the water is pumped into the upper reservoir to be again available in peak periods of power 
demand. 
2.1.2 Automation and control of the generation system 
As evidenced by the Figure 2-5 power generation systems comprise not only the power 
production units but also a number of components able to interact with the primary 
components and used to monitor their state. These components constitute the system of 
automation and process control of electric power production. 
The regulation of the electrical system is the process that adapts the production of electrical 
power to the required loads. Regulation requirements are "communicated" by the EMS and 
then carried out inside each power plant and inside each unit of generation. 
Both the generator and its turbine (or engine) are subject to the regulation process, which 
consists mainly in the control of the couple distributed by the turbine (intensity of the exit 
current from the generator), the control of the spin speed of the turbine and of the generator 
(and therefore of the power grid frequency) and the control of the excitation of the alternator 
(amplitude of the exit voltage). 
It is important to notice that the regulations previously mentioned apply to one single 
generation unit, unaware of the presence of other units of generation. The presence of 
multiple generation units introduces another type of regulation: the control of the phase, that 
is the control of the angle of phase-difference between the phasors representing the voltage 
exiting from the generators. In particular, it is not important that this angle is null, but that the 
angle does not vary in time. In fact, the variation in time of the angle generates the 
occurrence of an oscillating phenomenon inside power grids of great extensions (more than 
1000 km). 
A particularly important issue is the regulation of the power grid frequency nominally of 50 
Hz. As mentioned before, there is a precise dependency between the frequency and the 
speed of generator spin; however, this relation is influenced by the loss of balance between 
the generated power and the consumed power. Mathematically the dependency is expressed 
by the following relation: 
mm P
p
T
f
dt
df ∆
=
0
 
where ∆p is the difference between the generated power and the power absorbed by the 
load, f0 is the medium frequency on the power grid before the occurrence of the imbalance 
and Pm and Tm are positive constants that depend on the structure of the power grid. 
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This relation means that when the absorbed power is greater of the generated power, the 
power grid frequency decreases because ∆p assumes a negative value. Vice-versa if the 
generated power is greater than the consumed power, the power grid frequency increases. 
These assumptions stress the importance of maintaining a balance between energy 
production and the effective consumption. In fact, when energy consumption is too high 
compared to energy production, the frequency on the grid decreases because the 
generators, not able to supply sufficient power, use part of their kinetic energy to satisfy the 
demand, diminishing their speed of spin. Beyond the acceptable range, fixed in Italy between 
47.5 Hz and 52.5 Hz, the generators are disconnected from the power grid in order to avoid 
possible breakdowns. 
It’s evident that the control of the generation is a complex problem. The related control 
systems have to provide three orders of functions: specific procedures for the control of the 
behaviour of each single generation unit; synchronisation of multiple generation units; control 
of the interaction between the generation and transmission systems and the connected 
loads. 
 
2.2 Transmission and Distribution 
The electric power produced by generation plants is made available to the final customers 
through the transmission and distribution power grids. 
The electric power grid infrastructure consists of power lines (in air or earth), substations of 
transformation (or interconnection) and protection and control systems. 
The management of the transmission/distribution power grid is under the responsibility of the 
grid operators (Transmission System Operator,  i.e., TSO, and Distribution System Operator,  
i.e., DSO), who have the task to control all the power flowing through the electric power lines 
with the aim to guarantee the quality and the continuity of the service. 
The main differences between the transmission and the distribution grid are the voltage 
levels and the infrastructure topology. 
Based on the voltage level, power lines can be classified in three categories: 
• Extra-high and high voltage lines (EHV-HV): voltage values equal to 380 – 220 (EHV) 
- 132 (HV) kV 
• Medium voltage lines (MV): voltage values equal to 60 - 10 kV 
• Low voltage lines (LV): voltage values equal to 380 - 220 V 
The transmission power grid is operated in extra-high voltage levels (220 kV and 380 kV) 
and constitutes the backbone of the electrical system. The interconnection grid, which is 
operated on 132kV, is connected to transmission level and constitutes the link between 
transmission and distribution level. The substations in the distribution grid transform the high 
voltage levels into medium and low voltage levels for the final customers.  
It is important to note that, while the transmission grid is easily identifiable, the distribution 
and interconnection grids are not clearly distinguishable. To avoid confusion, it is necessary 
to explicitly delimit the border between transmission and distribution grids or, in other words, 
to identify which are the voltage levels under the control of the different operators. 
From a topological point of view, the transmission grid is similar to a meshed graph. A 
meshed graph is a graph in which every node is reachable through more than one line path. 
The nodes of the graph represent the substations, while the arcs represent the transmission 
lines that connect the several substations. The reason for which the power plant and loads 
are connected through a meshed net is because this topology increases the robustness of 
the entire system. We have to remind that the loss of single generators or lines must not 
cause dangerous consequences for the final customers. 
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For what concerns the connection grid (132 kV) it has been agreed to adopt a partially 
meshed operation; in this case the term “operation in island” is used, meaning that the grid 
operates in a stable state in self-sufficient zones from the point of view of the generation-load 
balance. 
The distribution grid is instead mainly operated in a radial topology: the loads are connected 
to their substations in a star or in a ring with the aim of reducing service interruptions as a 
result of a major fault. Its nodes of interconnection are Primary Substations (PS), connected 
to HV lines, which transform and distribute energy to Secondary Substations (SS) and to MV 
customers, and Secondary Substations (SS), which transform and distribute energy to LV 
customers. 
In the following Figure 2-6 a schematic diagram of the power grid is given. Some of the very 
high voltage substations are directly connected to the generation plants by means of set-up 
transformers that raise the voltage from 20 kV (voltage value at the generator terminal) to 
220 kV or 380 kV (operation voltage of EHV lines): in this way the transmission losses are 
reduced. Other transformers, situated in the transformation or interconnection substations 
physically connect two grids with different voltage levels. Another important aspect is that not 
all the loads are connected to the distribution grid; some, typically the large industrial poles, 
are directly connected to the transmission grid, specially to the low level 132 KV. 
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Figure 2-6: Scheme of the power grid 
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2.2.1 Power Grid components 
The main elements that constitute the power grid are the following: 
• Power lines: (lines in the following) they are components which physically connect the 
substations with the power plant and the final users 
• Substations: they are structured components in which the electric power is 
transformed and split over several lines. In the substations there are transformers and 
several kinds of connection components (bus-bars, bays, switches and breakers) 
2.2.1.1 Lines 
The connection between the lines and the power plants or between lines and end users is 
implemented by means of bars, i.e., a set of components that make it possible to perform the 
grid operation in a dynamic and safe way. The length of a line can range from few kilometres 
to some hundred kilometres, and lines can be underground cables or aerial ones. The 
underground cables have the conductors covered by an insulating layer. The aerial (or 
overhead) lines are those supported by towers. The length of the underground lines is 
remarkably shorter than aerial lines. The aerial power lines are essentially made up of 
conductors which physically transport the energy. Every transmission line is composed by 
three conductors. This configuration is typical of a three-phase system allowing a more 
efficient transmission of the energy in a sinusoidal regime. 
The pylons (also known as transmission towers or masts) are tall steel lattice structures used 
to support overhead electricity conductors for power transmission. They are approximately 
50-60 meters high, they support the lines and hold them far away from the ground and the 
persons. Aerial power lines are often equipped with a ground conductor, or a shield wire. A 
ground conductor is a conductor fastened to the top of the towers, which protects the line 
against lightning strikes. 
The insulators are the elements supporting the conductors on the pylons and at the same 
time isolating them electrically. 
2.2.1.2 Substations 
Logically every substation is subdivided into different sections: every section is characterised 
by a different voltage level and two sections are connected by means of transformers. Each 
section consists of a bus-bar and a group of bays, used to dis/connect a group of generators, 
a line or a transformer, a bus-bar or a portion of a same bus-bar from/to a given bus-bar. In 
following Figure 2-7 a simple outline of a substation is represented. 
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Figure 2-7: Scheme of the substation 
2.2.1.2.1 Transformers 
A transformer is an electrical machine that changes the voltage and current values 
maintaining the instantaneous power, i.e., their product, unchanged. The electrical model of 
the transformer (see Figure 2-8) is a double dipole, where K takes the name of 
transformation relationship. 
Kv1 v2
i1 i2
 
Figure 2-8: Electrical model of the transformer 
According to the following equations: 
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the energy may be always available at the convenient voltage level, that is, the lowest 
voltage for the final user, and the highest voltage when it is necessary to transfer it over a 
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long distance. Naturally, the above relations are true in the ideal case, because they do not 
take into account the transformer losses. 
On some type of transformers it is possible to change the number of turns in order to perform 
the voltage regulation of the secondary side. The transformer tap is the connection point 
along a transformer winding that allows the number of turns to be selected. Selection of the 
tap in use is made via a tap changer mechanism. 
2.2.1.2.2 Breakers 
The breakers are components used to interrupt the current flow by opening the electrical 
circuit. They have short closing and opening times (of the order of the milliseconds) and they 
work also in presence of a current flow. 
A breaker is constituted by two electrodes connecting the two ends of the breaker. Normally 
the two electrodes are in contact and the breaker is closed: to open the breaker the 
electrodes have to be separated. During this separation a voltaic arc between the two 
electrodes can be established causing energy dispersion and a current flow. This is normally 
avoided injecting a high pressure gas, the SF6, between the two electrodes while they are 
being separated. This particular gas has a dielectric function and inhibits the occurrence of 
the arc. 
The breakers are commanded by protections and control orders, but they can be controlled 
also for operation and maintenance purposes. 
2.2.1.2.3 Switches 
The switches, like breakers, are devices used to physically separate the connected grid 
elements. Differently from breakers, they cannot work in presence of a current flow because 
they are not able to tolerate the electrical arches established between the two extremities of 
the switch. Their manoeuvring times are longer than that of the breakers (some seconds). 
Consequently they are only used after that the current flow has been interrupted by means of 
the breakers. The combined action of breakers and switches guarantees the complete 
physical and galvanic isolation of the elements they connect. 
2.2.1.2.4 Bus-bars 
The bus-bars are the connection components of the substations to which all the other 
components are physically connected. The substations are the nodes of the grid from the 
topological point of view, the bus-bars are the nodes from the electrical point of view. In 
Figure 2-7 the bus-bars are represented by two horizontal lines. Physically they are 
constituted by three aluminium bars, one for each phase, allowing the transfer of the 
electrical power between the different elements of the substation. They can be single or 
double (also triple sometimes) depending on the requirements of the specific substation (in 
Figure 2-7 a substation configuration adopting a double bus-bar is given). 
2.2.1.2.5 Bays 
The International Standard 61850 [IEC 61850-5 2003-07] defines a bay as a meaningful 
substructure of a substation with some common functionality. Bays are usually constituted by 
a set of breakers and switches used to establish the electrical connections between the 
apparatus of the substation and the transmission lines. They are the elements thanks to 
which it is physically possible to modify the configuration of a substation and to adapt, within 
given limits, the topology of the grid to the requirements stated by the load. The main types 
of bay in the substation are the bus-bar bay, line bay and transformer bay. Bus-bar bays are 
used to dis/connect two or more bus-bars, or also to merge/separate two parts of a same 
bus-bar. Line and transformer bays are used to dis/connect a line or a transformer to/from a 
bus-bar or to change the bus-bar to which they are connected. 
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2.2.1.2.6 Voltage and current meters 
Meters are fundamental grid components used to measure voltage and current of the 
substation components. They play an essential role in monitoring the grid’s electrical state. 
2.2.2 Grid management 
The management of national electric power system highly depends on the strategic 
organisational model adopted by each country policy. 
Up to the early 90s, the entire Italian electric system used to be managed by ENEL (the 
governative power system management operator) on a monopolistic basis, using a three 
level, hierarchical control structure. The subdivision had been made with the aim to simplify 
and to improve the monitoring and the management of the power grid. 
The three levels were the following (see Figure 2-9): 
• Low level: constituted by local area control centres (ACC - Area Control Centres). 
Each ACC controlled from 10 to 20 extra-high and high voltage (EHV - HV) 
substations and had the following objectives: 
o Guarantee the correct operation of substation equipments 
o Reconfigure the substations in case of breakdown of some apparatus 
The reconfiguration of a substation was (and still is) carried out by means of 
commands sent by the remote centre to the substations automation system. 
• Middle level: constituted of regional control centres (RCC - Regional Control 
Centres). Every RCC controlled, through the monitoring of two or three ACCs, a large 
portion of the power grid, the whole Italian territory was subdivided in three regions. 
The main tasks of the RCC were: 
o Monitor their portion of the grid in order to diagnose faults on the power lines 
o In case of breakdowns, choose the more suitable corrective actions to restore 
the functionality of the grid 
Since the RCC were not directly connected to the substations, the corrective actions 
to adopt were communicated to the ACC of reference. 
• High level: this was the national control centre (NCC - National Control Centre) 
having the main function of supervising the entire grid and handling the planning of 
medium and long term operations. Another function of the NCC was to assist the 
RCCs to localise breakdowns on the power lines situated between two regions. 
Analysis of new control applications  Page 21  
 
National Control and
Supervision
Regional Control and
Supervision
Local Control and
Supervision
Acquisition and Control
Equipment
NCC
RCC1
ACC1
RCC2
A S P
ACC1
A S P
ACC1
A S P
 
Figure 2-9: Hierarchical control system 
Figure 2-10 shows the CD of the control centres that build up the control structure of the 
EPS. Each control centre is located in a site, and sites exchange information according to the 
associations among classes. 
 
Figure 2-10: Organization of Control Sites 
Today, also Italy entered into an open power market regime where the service is provided by 
different companies, producing energy on their own or acquiring it from other producers and 
traders. In this new scenario many aspects of the electrical system have changed. Although 
the power grid infrastructure remains substantially the same its management has undergone 
deep modifications, and the hierarchical structure introduced previously has lost most of its 
validity. 
From the functional point of view the power system is still divided in homogeneous areas and 
regions but, in absence of a monopolist, these portions are not managed by the same actor. 
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Different areas of the power grid are used by different generation companies that must act in 
a coordinated way, in order to guarantee the continuity of the service. 
In order to coordinate their actions, all the generation companies involved in the power 
market refer to a TSO (Transmission System Operator, Manager of the National 
Transmission Grid ) who: 
a) publishes the regulation for connecting the power production systems to the EHV-HV 
grid 
b) defines the plans of development of the power grid 
c) manages the energy stock exchange 
d) handles the interactions with foreign countries through collaboration relationships with 
the electric power managers of bordering countries. 
The role that the various actors (stakeholders) play in the management and ownership of the 
EPS can be nicely described through the CD of Figure 2-11. 
 
Figure 2-11: Roles of stakeholders in the EPS 
From a functional point of view, we still have a hierarchical control structure but there have 
been major changes in its management. At the highest level there is the TSO, who 
coordinates the actions of all the companies involved in the energy market while these actors 
constitute the intermediate and lowest levels of the hierarchy. 
2.2.3 Grid Automation and Control 
The main purposes of the power grid control system are: 
• Remote control of the installed equipment: receive alarms and send commands 
• Grant availability of service by reducing out service time of lines and substations 
• Grant reliability of service by optimising substation management 
• Enhance quality of service through real-time monitoring of electrical power system 
parameters as frequency, voltage etc. 
• Collect system statistics 
• Coordinate maintenance: planning the interventions on the lines and substations. 
Analysis of new control applications  Page 23  
 
• Reduce operation and maintenance costs 
This is realized by a set of automation functions, whose classification is given in Figure 2-12. 
 
Figure 2-12: The automation functions of the EPS 
Essential parts of the power grid control system are the Substation Control Systems and the 
communication network that supports the necessary information exchange. 
2.2.3.1 Communication networks 
The prerequisite for the provision of timely information to the actors involved in the operation 
of the power system is an efficient and reliable communication network. 
This must be able to support both remote control from grid control centres and retrieval of 
data on loads, interruptions, voltage disturbances, and other electrical events from all 
substations for operation, maintenance and planning departments. 
There are basically two kinds of communication over the communication network: 
• Real-time communication between grid control centres for supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) and energy management systems (EMS) as well as 
between the various substations for control devices 
• Non real-time communications to transmit data to the back office departments for 
protection engineering and maintenance as well as for planning and asset 
management (e.g. statistics, trends, condition related data) 
Consequently, the communication system itself should consist of two partial networks, one 
for the exchange of real-time information and one for non time-critical data flow, with different 
performance requirements (see Figure 2-13). 
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Figure 2-13: Communication System Overview 
2.2.3.2 Substation Control Systems 
The main functions of a Substation Control System are: 
• Real-time data acquisition 
• Automatic control of substation equipments 
• Monitoring of power grid components with real-time alarm and anomaly handling 
• Human Machine Interface: generation and upgrade of operator synoptic 
• Data collection and storage in databases 
• Generation of statistical reports 
• Data transfer to other systems 
The core of the Substation Control System is the Substation Automation Systems (SAS). A 
Substation Automation System (also called secondary system) is an interaction set of co-
operating Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), connected by a communication system, 
performing all the functions which are necessary to operate, protect and monitor the 
substation’s equipment and switchgear (also called the primary system). The UML object 
model of a power substation reported in the standard IEC 61850-6 [IEC 61850-6 2004] is 
depicted in Figure 2-14. 
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Figure 2-14: Substation object model in the IEC 61850-6 
As previously mentioned the SAS constitutes the interface between the substation 
components and the ACC (or RCC). The automation system’s main objective is to allow ACC 
(or RCC) operators to modify the configuration of a substations, acting on the bay level, 
without having to specify sequences of low level commands; for instance the operator can 
cause the detachment of a power line by emitting a single command and let the automation 
system perform the necessary sequence of elementary steps. Moreover, knowing the 
topology of the substation and the circulating currents, the automation system is able to 
evaluate the feasibility of the operator’s commands and, eventually, provide an error 
message to the operator. Another role of the substation automation system consists in 
recognising breakdowns or anomalies of the components of the substation. If during 
operation an apparatus assumes a state that is different from what was expected, the 
automation system sends an alarm message to the reference ACC (or RCC). Moreover the 
automation system supports the continuous monitoring of the substation by collecting data 
which allows to diagnose undesired behaviours. 
The functions being performed by a Substation Automation System have been identified and 
thoroughly analyzed in IEC 61850-5 [IEC 61850-5 2003-07], and attributed to three logical 
levels: 
• Process level functions 
• Bay level functions 
• Station level functions 
At the process level (which is close to or even integrated into the switchgear) there are the 
functions interfacing the process i.e., basically binary and analogue I/O functions, such as 
data acquisition and issuing of commands. Process level functions are normally related to a 
single component that is connected to a single switchyard object. They provide the interface 
between the SAS and the switchgear. 
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Bay level functions use mainly the data related to one bay and act mainly on the primary 
equipment of one bay. A bay is a meaningful substructure of the primary substation, i.e., a 
set of closely connected subparts with some common functionality [IEC 61850-5 2003-07], 
which requires some local, autonomous functionality in the secondary system. The control of 
the switchgear in such a subpart has some common restrictions like mutual interlocking and 
well-defined operation sequences and bay level functions handle the related local automation 
aspects (for example line protection or bay control). Devices performing bay level functions 
are referred to with the generic terms “bay controller” and “bay protection”. 
Station level functions refer to the substation as a whole. There are two classes of station 
level functions: process related and interface related station level functions. 
Process related station level functions use the data of more than one bay or, eventually, of 
the complete substation and act on the primary equipment of more than one bay (or of the 
whole substation). Examples of process related station level functions can be station wide 
interlocking or bus-bar protection functions.  
Interface related station level functions represent the interface of the SAS to the outside 
world i.e., the local station operator HMI, to a remote control centre TCI (Telecontrol 
Interface) or to the remote engineering workplace for monitoring and maintenance TMI 
(Telemonitoring Interface). 
Station level devices comprehend for instance, the station computer, the operator’s 
workplace, and interfaces for remote communication. 
The logical classification of the substation control functions is not necessarily reflected in the 
secondary system’s physical architecture: despite the similarity of the logical and physical 
levels there is a definite distinction between logical structure and physical implementation. 
The mapping between the two depends on a variety of factors like availability, performance 
and cost requirements and the allocation of logical functions to physical devices is not 
constrained. Process and bay level functions may be integrated into a single device without 
physical separation and bay level functions may be implemented without the need of a 
physical bay controller device. Station level functions may reside in a single station computer 
but may be completely distributed over bay level devices. 
The free allocation of automation functions to devices in a distributed automation system has 
to be supported by an appropriate communication system. 
A more conventional classification of the substation’s control functions is based on the task 
performed by the function. From this applicative point of view functions may be classified in 
the following categories: 
• Process interface functions, used to interact with the process 
• Operative functions consisting of monitoring and supervision functions (used to show 
the state of the process, inform about possibly critical events and archive data for 
later elaboration) and control functions used for normal day to day operation of the 
substation 
• System configuration and maintenance functions 
• System support functions: 
o Network management 
o Time synchronization 
o Physical device checking 
A substation automation application combining protection, supervision & control, and 
monitoring capabilities relies on secure and fast communication and is a good representative 
for most dependability requirements in terms of system integrity, security and availability. 
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In particular, the following security aspects have to be considered: 
• Authentication of message origin 
• Protection against Denial of Service caused by “hostile” components in the Process 
Control Network 
• User identification and authentication, access control, data protection, accountability 
and tracing to ensure data integrity and confidentiality 
 
2.3 Distributed Generation and Microgrids 
2.3.1 Introduction to Distributed Generation 
Distributed Generation (also known as embedded generation or dispersed generation) is the 
deployment of small generators on medium voltage or low voltage distribution level, near to 
the consumers. The exact definition however is a point of debate in the power community 
[Ackermann et al. 2001][CIRED WG04 1999][Dondi et al. 2002][IEA 2002]. Some define DG 
in terms of generation capacity (e.g. < 100MW), while others simply look at DG in terms of 
connection (e.g. to the distribution grid); mostly however, some combination of these is used. 
The increasing use of distributed generation radically changes the traditional hierarchical 
generation and transmission topology. A comparison between the traditional grid topology 
and the emerging topology, and the power flows in both topologies is made in Figure 2-15. In 
the traditional topology power flows exclusively in a single direction from the generation 
plants, via the transmission grid, to the loads in the distribution nets. In the emerging 
topology however, power flow may reverse within the radial distribution grids where DG is 
installed, and ultimately distribution grids may even inject power into the transmission grid. 
 
Figure 2-15: Traditional power grid layout vs. grid with distributed generation  
Figure 2-16 depicts the portion of the EPS class diagram that is added to account for the 
presence of distributed generators in the Grid.  
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Figure 2-16: Class diagram of the distributed generation 
2.3.1.1 Typical DG Technologies 
Distributed generators are mainly devices that are used for harvesting renewable energy 
sources (wind, sun, biodiesel), improving energy efficiency (Combined Heat and Power or 
cogeneration or CHP), or providing some local services such as increasing availability of 
supply or providing peak power. The most notable examples of DG are presented next, some 
of which are already used extensively, while others are promising but still quite experimental.  
• Reciprocating engines fuelled by diesel, oil, biodiesel for emergency services (e.g., 
UPS system) or gas (also for CHP). 
• Gas turbines fuelled by gas used for CHP and peak power supply. 
• Microturbines fuelled by gas, possibly with CHP (e.g., in house water boiler). 
• Fuel cells fuelled by hydrogen, natural gas or methanol. 
• Photovoltaic cells get their power directly from the sun. Renewable but unpredictable 
energy source. High price per kW installed power, only low power application. 
• Wind turbines harvest wind power. Renewable but unpredictable energy source. 
Relatively expensive per kW installed power, but is starting to become profitable. Also 
large power applications, possibly combinations of multiple turbines in wind parks. 
2.3.1.2 Reasons for DG Deployment 
Of course, DG installations did not appear out of the blue. Recent years we have seen 
several incentives that lead to the increasing use of these technologies. We sum some of the 
most important reasons for the deployment of DG. 
• Liberalization of power markets allow for small producers to enter the generation 
market without an all too big initial investment. 
• Increased environmental concerns lead to the use of renewable energy sources, such 
as wind and solar power, which are intrinsically distributed power sources. CHP 
devices are also used as to improve the efficiency of primary energy resources. 
• A good DG installation can defer investments in the power grid infrastructure, by for 
example giving voltage support near a large consumer or injection of power in a 
distribution grid with a nearly overloaded supply. 
• Dispatchable DG units may provide several ancillary services, such as voltage 
support or provision of balancing reserves. These DG services can contribute to grid 
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stability. For this, however, the DG must be directly or indirectly controllable by some 
regulator, possibly the TSO or DSO.  
• Bringing generation close to consumption may decrease transmission losses, if DG 
installation point are chosen properly. This has to be weighted however against the 
relatively lower energy efficiency of small generators in comparison to centralized 
large generation facilities (except for renewable sources and some CHP). 
• A high degree of DG penetration may lead to the point where distribution grids are 
able to form energy islands or microgrids disconnected from the main grid in case of 
severe grid problems or blackouts. This kind of technology would of course increase 
local electrical security in terms of a higher grid reliability and availability. Yet many 
technical problems (automated frequency and voltage support, system inertia 
concerns, load shedding ability…) have to be overcome before these microgrids are 
operational in the real power grid. 
2.3.1.3 Problems Concerning DG Installations 
Next to the presented -sometimes theoretical- advantages, several problems come with the 
practical installation of distributed generators. The most notable, both economical and 
technical, are presented next. 
• The economic efficiency of most DG systems is quite low, leading to a high cost per 
kWh produced, compared to large generation facilities. This is mainly due to economy 
of scale for power generation based on fossil fuels, or large capital investment and 
maintenance costs for renewable energy sources. 
• Availability of supply may be endangered due to less fuel diversification, because 
most fuelled DG use gas, which increases the dependency of the power market on 
this single commodity. 
• The influence a large amount of small scale distribution will have on power system 
frequency and power system stability is unknown. Especially when the TSO has no 
means of controlling DG output directly or indirectly. 
• DG is seen as a means of postponing investments in distribution nets. Yet, injecting 
power in a distribution net may disturb local voltage levels seriously, especially when 
the grid is relatively weak. Many installations of DG lead nowadays to extra 
investments to reinforce the distribution grid, instead of postponing them.  
• Distribution grid protection systems are based on a power flow in a single direction, 
which is not always true with large DG penetration. This may lead to both spurious 
tripping in case of short circuits in a nearby distribution grid and failure to trip in case 
of short circuits in the distribution grid itself. Protection systems have to be adjusted 
to allow large DG penetration in distribution grids.   
• Most traditional generators have rotating elements, which have a considerable inertia. 
This inertia serves as a buffer when power consumption suddenly increases or 
decreases. The kinetic energy stored within these rotating masses will serve as an 
immediate power source when production is lower than consumption. This 
decreasing rotation speed and thus system frequency will be detected and production 
will be increased (primary control).  Many DG are connected to the grid through 
power electronic converters, which have virtually no inertia. This means a power grid 
with lots of DG does not have this buffer (or a much smaller buffer) and could become 
unstable due to minor grid faults or unbalances. 
• Unpredictable generation 
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2.3.2 Control of Distributed Generators 
2.3.2.1 Traditional Control Paradigm Issues 
The shift in the power generation topology also imposes a change in the control 
infrastructures of the distribution grid. The amount of small scale generators increases 
almost exponentially, where in the traditional system only a limited number of power plants 
and substations had to be accounted for. Centralized control becomes infeasible in the new 
scenario, due to the enormous processing power and high communication bandwidth 
requirements for the large amount of DG components. Also, the cost of using the dedicated 
communication lines for supervising and controlling these distributed generators would be 
way too high. Therefore, new solutions are needed. 
Nowadays, most DGs are installed and controlled locally as passive elements, merely 
providing active power to the net, for which they receive a fixed price per generated kWh. 
When the transmission grid which they are connected to fails or large voltage dips occur 
these devices just disconnect themselves from the grid (possibly worsening the voltage dip 
even more, leading to cascading failures). However, DG could provide services to improve 
system service quality, reliability and availability. Extra functionality and flexibility in their 
control could make them able to function without a connection to a strong grid providing 
voltage and frequency stability, or let them ride through short voltage dips. Also, using power 
electronic equipment, most distributed generators can be used as VAr (reactive power) 
compensators for local voltage support. 
2.3.2.2 Emerging Control Paradigms 
More and more research in power grid control focuses on new control paradigms [Amin & 
Wollenberg 2005][Lund et al. 2006][Kato et al. 2005][Huang et al. 2002], to step away from 
the traditional centralized control paradigms to a more distributed supervisory control system. 
This applies especially to distributed generators, or more generally, distributed resources 
(which also incorporate manageable loads, such as air-conditioning or household devices 
like washing machines). Various schemes are proposed to manage distributed resources 
based on for example a power market connection [Tsikalakis et al. 2006][Kok et al. 2005]. 
These distributed control schemes are often based on the autonomy of a single user, who is 
trying to fulfil some goal, for example economical profit. This is probably the reason why the 
multi-agent paradigm is applied in many of these new control schemes [Dimeas & 
Hatziagryriou 2005][Vanthournout et al. 2005][Kok et al. 2005][Kato et al. 2005]. An agent is 
in fact an autonomous entity, possibly in software and/or hardware, which gets inputs from 
this environment and from other agents in the same environment, and acts on its 
environment as to pursue his own goals in the most optimal way. 
The control system for distributed generators forming an Autonomous Electricity Grid (AEG) 
or microgrid which is studied in the CRUTIAL project is also based on this agent based 
paradigm, in which agents controlling DG output cooperate as to optimize voltage levels, 
frequency and production costs both during grid connected and islanded operation. 
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3 POWER SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFENCE PLAN 
 
3.1 Modelling the operational states of the Power System 
In order to allow a better understanding of the cascading effects in the Control System 
scenarios described in the following chapters, an operative states model of the Power 
System is provided [Fink & Carlsen 1978]. 
In this model a state is an operative asset of the Power System. It is characterised by 
attributes which are related to the following adequacy constraints: 
• Equalities of the system (E): when the integrity of the system is respected: 
o structure: all the grid connected, without separate islands (an island 
represents a portion of a power system that is electrically separated from the 
main interconnected system); 
o loads: all loads are supplied (loads should not be confused with demand, 
which is the measure of power that a load receives or requires).  
Example of equalities are: 
o P = Loads (balance between Total Active Power and Total Active Loads) 
o Q = Reactive Loads (balance between Total Reactive Power and Total 
Reactive Loads) 
• Inequalities of the system (I): the limits of some system variables must not exceed 
maximum and minimum levels representing the limitations of physical equipment: 
o Voltage: all voltages (Vni and Vgi) in each grid node and eacg generator are 
within the controlled range,  
e.g.,  350 KV  Vni  450 KV 
0.9 pu  Vgi  1.1 pu 
o Frequency: unique grid frequency (f) is within the controlled range, 
e.g.,  49.5 Hz  f  50.5 Hz 
o Current: all currents (Ilk) in each connection line are within controlled range, 
e.g.,  Ilk  500 A 
o Angle: all generator angles (δi) are within the stability range, 
e.g.,  α  δi  β 
Any adequacy constraint violation is represented with a not symbol (¬E or ¬I). 
The electrical security criterion N-1 means that, under all operating conditions, the loss of 
any given element (line, transformer, generation unit, compensation facility etc.) will not lead 
to abnormal operating constraints in adjoining operating zones (as results of limit values 
being exceeded for current, voltage, stability, etc.) and will not cause interruption in supply. 
Although under these conditions it will not be necessary to interrupt the grid operation as a 
result of the loss of one element, the structure of the system concerned will need to be 
reorganised in order to comply with the “N-1” criterion within the shortest possible time. In the 
intervening time, the loss of a further element might indeed jeopardise continuity of operation 
[UCTE Handbook]. 
According to the attribute values the Power System operative states are classified into five 
meta-level states [Fink & Carlsen 1978]: 
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• NORMAL (E, I): Situations in which all constraints are satisfied. All load requests are 
satisfied (Equality), there are no limits violations (Inequalities) and the electrical 
security criterion N-1 is satisfied. This state indicates that the generation is adequate 
to supply the current total load demand, and no equipment is being overloaded. 
• ALERT (E, I): Situations in which all load requests are satisfied (Equality), there are 
no limits violations (Inequalities) but some electrical security criteria are not satisfied 
(Insecure) for instance the N-1 security criterion is not satisfied. 
• EMERGENCY (E, ¬I): Situations in which all load requests are satisfied (Equality), 
but at least one limit is not satisfied (¬ Inequalities) (A-secure). 
• IN EXTREMIS (¬E, ¬I): Situations in which not all load requests are satisfied (¬ 
Equality) and some limits are not satisfied (¬ Inequalities). 
• RESTORATIVE (¬E, I): Situations in which after load shedding the restorative 
procedures are executed to re-satisfy the load requests (¬ Equality) and limits are 
satisfied (Inequalities). Formally this situation is a “Black-out” restoration. 
The operating states are also classified on the basis of their accomplishment level: 
• Secure: if an electrical contingency happens in the Normal State, the system remains 
in this state. The reserve margins (for transmission as well as for generation) are 
sufficient to provide an adequate level of electrical security with respect to the 
stresses to which the system may be subjected. This attribute is verified statically. 
• Insecure: if the electrical security level falls below some thresholds of adequacy, or if 
the probability of disturbances increases, then the system enters in the Alert State. All 
constraints would still be satisfied, but existing reserve margins would be such that 
some disturbance could result in a violation of some inequality constraints (e.g. 
overloads). In this state, preventive actions can be taken to restore the system to the 
normal state. 
• A-secure: if a sufficiently severe disturbance takes place before preventive actions, 
the system enters the Emergency State. The system, however, would still be intact, 
and emergency control action (corrective) could be initiated in order to restore the 
system at least to the Alert State. If these measures are not taken in time, or are 
ineffective, and if the initial disturbance or a subsequent one is severe enough to 
overstress the system, the system then starts to disintegrate and move to the In 
Extremis State. 
In the Figure 3-1 the finite-state diagram of the Power System is depicted. 
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Figure 3-1: Power System finite-state model [Fink & Carlsen 1978] 
A contingency is the unexpected failure or outage of a system component, such as a 
generator, transmission line, circuit breaker, switch, or other electrical component. A 
contingency also may involve multiple components, which are related to situations leading to 
simultaneous component outages [UCTE Handbook]. 
A disturbance is an unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condition [UCTE 
Handbook]. 
The main electrical disturbances or contingencies could be summarized in: 
• Unexpected increase of demand 
• Tripping of large generation groups 
• Transient or permanent overloads of lines or transformers 
• Low dumped or unstable inter-area oscillation 
• Low dumped or unstable electromechanical oscillation 
• Instability or voltage collapse 
• Important cascading (EHV) line tripping with consequent grid separation 
One of the objectives of the identification of control system scenarios is the extension of such 
power system model by considering, in addition to power contingencies, also the possibility 
of ICT threats and control actions that may happen when the power system is in a normal 
state or during the management of a power contingency. 
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Such extension can exploit the state model proposed in [Laprie et al. 2006] also reported in 
Figure 3-2, Figure 3-3 and detailed in deliverable D3 produced in the contest of WP2 
[Kaâniche et al. 2007]. 
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Figure 3-2: EPS State Model when considering accidental failures [Laprie et al. 2006] 
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Figure 3-3: EPS State Model when considering malicious attacks [Laprie et al. 2006] 
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According to this model an a EPS state is an aggregate concept described in terms of EI and 
ICT characteristics. A global view of an aggregate EI/ICT state is given in Figure 3-4. 
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Figure 3-4: Detailed EPS State Model: a-components, b-states 
The definitions of the states are as follows see Table 3-1: 
EI states ICT states 
Up: Service ensured in normal condition Working: ensure normal control of EI 
Partially Down: Due to disruption, service 
in degraded conditions 
Passive latent error: Part of ICT 
infrastructure is failed, which prevents 
monitoring of the electric infrastructure: 
disruptions may remain unnoticed 
Lost: Service interruption, partial black-out 
Active latent error: Part of ICT 
infrastructure is failed, that may lead to 
unnecessary, and unnoticed configuration 
changes 
Weakened: Failure of ICT component 
influence the service 
Partially Failed: Part of ICT infrastructure 
are knowingly failed 
 
Lessened: Part of ICT infrastructure can no 
longer implement their functions 
Table 3-1: EPS State Definitions 
This representation does not take into account explicitly the quantitative relationships of 
equality and inequality of EPS state model of Figure 3-1. 
A possible mapping between the abstract model presented in [Kaâniche et al. 2006] and the 
detailed EPS model which takes in to account all the main Equalities and Inequalities is 
summarized in the following Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-5: Extended EPS State Model 
It may be noted that in the extended model each state is also characterised by ∆(E,I) which 
expresses a global electrical security margin one for each Equality/Inequality constraint. 
In the propose mapping there are both alert and emergency states in which the EI assumes 
the Partially Down state value, i.e. the power service is degraded due to some disruptions. 
However, as the degradation is very different in the two cases taking in to account the 
composed states of the electricity and ICT infrastructures. Further investigations are needed 
to refine this model. 
 
3.2 Defence plan and defence line concepts 
A defence plan summarises all technical and organisational measures taken to prevent the 
propagation of incidents or the deterioration of a power system state of service in order to 
avoid a collapse of the Transmission Grid. 
Hereafter a typical four level defence plan is shown. Its defence strategy is implemented 
using procedures, equipments and systems that are installed on the Transmission and 
Distribution grids. 
• The first line of defense is made up of the regulation systems, which try to keep the 
Normal state of the Power System (electrical security criterion N-1) by voltage and 
frequency regulation systems and other control systems. This line of defence implies 
also the coordination with the neighbouring foreign TSOs because the Power Grids of 
some European countries are interconnected in wide regulation areas which 
constitute the UCTE interconnected system. 
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• The second line of defence is represented by the protections which quickly exclude 
any grid element out of order (line, transformer, generation unit, compensation facility 
etc.). 
• The third line of defence is performed by the systems that ensure the preventive and 
corrective control of the interconnected grid in order to avoid the grid separation. 
Among these systems there are the Anti-oscillations devices for line protection 
damper and the manual load shedding. 
• The fourth line of defence acts in situation of islanding (system not intact or not 
interconnected). It is made by all the automatisms that guarantee the balance among 
demand and generation in the disconnected grid. 
The systems used to implement the defence plan are called defence systems. They may be 
classified depending on the State of the Power Grid (see Figure 3-1): 
• Defence Systems used when the Power System is intact, that is when the Power Grid 
is meshed: 
o Control of critical sections of the Grid 
o Generator trips through telecontrol commands 
o Automatic load shedding for minimum frequency 
o Automatic load shedding for minimum voltage 
o Manual load shedding 
o Manual set-point of tap changer transformer 
o Manual activation of shunt reactance 
o Anti-oscillation damper 
• Used in case the Power System is not intact, that is when the Power Grid is in 
islanding 
o Under-frequency load shedding 
o Automatic Grid separator 
Depending on the response time to the contingencies the defence systems may also be 
classified in: 
• Based on automatic actions 
o Control of critical sections of Grid 
o Under-frequency load shedding 
o Automatic load shedding for minimum voltage 
o Generator trips through telecontrol commands 
o Anti-oscillation damper 
o Automatic Grid separation 
• Based on manual actions 
o Manual activation of shunt reactance 
o Manual load shedding, of selected users 
o Emergency manual load shedding (distribution areas) 
• Based on programmed actions 
o Manual set-point of tap changer transformer (ULTC) 
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o Planned load shedding 
The direct measures for emergency conditions are based on a certain extent on the 
philosophy that in the event of major disruption (short-term and where possible) selective 
restrictions in the energy supply (load shedding) are more acceptable than the 
consequences of an extended grid breakdown resulting in a power cut lasting for several 
hours [UCTE Handbook]. 
When the situation reaches the island operation state (disconnection of part of the grid) the 
procedure is [UCTE Report 2003]: 
• Stopping the pumps (reserve hydroelectric generation) 
• Shedding part of the load (corresponding with the balance of lost import) on medium 
voltage level 
• Keeping all running generation capacity in service. 
In the following sections we will enter into details about defence systems belonging to levels 
one and three. 
 
3.3 The main regulations of the Electrical Power System 
The electrical power system needs a lot of different regulations and control systems. The 
main regulated variables are frequency, voltage, reactive and active power, etc.. These 
systems act in all the possible operation conditions that the process under control must cope 
with. 
The main controls used in the electrical system are briefly described hereafter. 
3.3.1 The primary and secondary frequency regulations 
The primary frequency regulation has the goal to regulate the frequency of the single 
generators. The secondary frequency regulation has the goal to regulate the frequency of the 
transmission grid. 
3.3.1.1 The primary frequency regulation 
The general scheme of the primary frequency regulation of a thermal plant is shown in Figure 
3-6, in which different types of turbines are represented, namely: 
• LP low pressure turbine 
• MP medium pressure turbine 
• HP high pressure turbine 
with the other fundamental apparatus of a thermal power unit, that is the condenser, the feed 
pump, the evaporator, the SH Super-Heater and the RH Re-Heater. 
The mechanical power supplied by all the turbines to the generator shaft gives energy to the 
alternator, which in turn transforms the mechanical energy in electrical energy to be sent to 
the transmission grid.
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Figure 3-6: Frequency-power regulation of a steam thermal plant 
The following symbols have been adopted for the various quantities of Figure 3-6: 
pi = internal pressure of the boiler 
Qi = mass steam flow at the input of super-heater (SH) 
ps = pressure at the regulation valve 
Qs = steam flow in the HP high pressure body of the turbine 
pa = pressure downstream of the regulation valve (input of the first HP stage) 
pr1 = pressure at the input of the re-heater (RH) 
pr2 = pressure at the output of the RH 
Qr = steam flow at the output of RH 
pc = pressure at the output of the turbine and input of condenser 
Qc = steam flow at the output of the turbine 
In Figure 3-7 there is a schematisation of primary frequency regulation in closed loop; in this 
diagram, the meaning of the variables is: 
fref = frequency of reference 
f = frequency of the group 
Pm = total mechanical power 
Pe = electrical power 
f = frequency error 
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Figure 3-7: Schematisation of the primary frequency closed loop control and its 
linearization 
The second scheme shown in Figure 3-7 represents the linearization of the controlled 
system. Here each block represent a linear transfer function and the variables are the 
variations in respect to the values around which the linearization was made. 
3.3.1.2 The secondary frequency regulations 
The secondary frequency regulation has the goal to control the frequency of an 
interconnected power system. In Europe the national power systems are coordinated by the 
UCTE. This coordination is obtained keeping the exchanges of energy among neighbouring 
countries to prefixed values. 
Each member of UCTE realises this secondary frequency control using a different kind of 
control scheme. In the case of the Italian grid that has a longitudinal structure with only one 
area in direct contact with the European electric system, the grid, as shown in Figure 3-8, is 
subdivided in one actual control area and other two virtual areas, which are organised inside 
a decentralised adaptive scheme. This solution allows to employ the energy reserves in a 
different way among the virtual control areas, every time the energy exchanges overcome 
the congestion values. It is up to the real control area to regulate the global exchanges of 
energy compensating the deviations of active power of the virtual areas, and to control the 
frequency of the whole electric power system. 
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Figure 3-8: General scheme of the secondary frequency regulation 
The secondary frequency control has been implemented by a secondary frequency regulator 
(called network regulator in the Figure 3-9), which decides the reference frequency value (fref) 
to be sent to all the primary frequency controllers of those generators under the secondary 
frequency regulation. This is done in order to guarantee a right division of the load among the 
generators. This function which is described in the Figure 3-9 through the primary frequency 
regulators, changes the mechanical power for each generator in order to guarantee a good 
value of the grid frequency. In the Figure 3-9 the secondary frequency regulator is called 
“Network Regulator” and modelled as a PI (Proportional Integral) type regulator. 
It must be stressed that not all the generators of the grid are submitted to this secondary 
frequency regulation. There are some groups with only the primary frequency regulation, 
others with no regulation at all because they work at fixed load, and other with both primary 
and secondary controllers. 
The secondary regulator is installed in a (national or regional) control centre. 
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Figure 3-9: The secondary frequency regulation system 
3.3.2 The hierarchical voltage regulation system for a national transmission grid 
The electrical power supply grid is a complex structure of significant strategic importance to 
modern society. To meet the quality of supply and voltage regulation objectives a hierarchical 
control structure has been developed and this is shortly presented hereafter. 
Three voltage control levels: primary, secondary and tertiary are used to regulate voltages of 
the transmission grid in order to supply to the customers (privates, publics institutions and 
companies) a voltage with good quality without interruptions. 
Figure 3-10 shows the Use Case diagram (UC) of the Voltage regulation system. The 
diagram emphasizes the different players and how secondary and tertiary control requires 
communication, while the primary control is local and does not require communication. 
 
Figure 3-10: The Use Case Diagram of the Voltage regulation system 
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This hierarchical control system is widespread along the nation, with the different 
components placed in different facilities: the power stations, the regional control centres and 
the national one. 
The global idea of the hierarchical control system is shown in Figure 3-11, in which the main 
components are the following: 
• AVR – it is the Automatic Voltage Regulator which has the goal to make the primary 
voltage control, at the level of the single generator 
• PQR – it is the reactive Power (Q) Regulator of a single power plant, and it is a 
component of the secondary voltage control 
• RVR – it is the Regional Voltage Regulator, it has the goal to control the voltages of 
the pilot nodes of its electrical region, receiving the measurements from the pilot 
nodes and deciding the values of the reactive power level, called q-level, for each 
power plant under its control 
• NVR – this is the National Voltage Regulator at the top level, it receives the data from 
the field and, on the basis of an optimal voltage pattern computed by an optimisation 
algorithm, decides which are the voltages to be achieved for each controlled node of 
the grid. 
 
Figure 3-11: The scheme of the hierarchical voltages control of a National 
Transmission Grid 
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Figure 3-12 Class Diagram of the elements involved in the Voltage Regulation 
Figure 3-12 depicts the CD of the elements involved in the Voltage Regulation, making 
explicit the links between the elements of the Power Generation and the Power Grid (Pilot 
Node, Power Plant and Generator) and the voltage regulation automation function. The 
cascading flow of information between NVR, RVR, PQR and AVR, and, finally, to the 
generator is described in the Voltage Regulation Activity Diagram of the appendix Figure 
8-12. 
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Figure 3-13: Summary diagram regarding the time responses and the flows of 
measurements for voltage regulations 
A different schematisation of the voltage control is shown in Figure 3-13, in which the 
following important aspects of the voltage regulations are outlined. 
First of all the time responses of the entire closed loop system are: 
• 2-5 seconds for the AVR (UNIT CONTROLLER in figure) placed in the power plant 
one for each generator 
• 20-50 seconds for PQR (POWER PLANT CONTROLLER in figure) 
• 100-200 seconds for the RVR (REGIONAL CONTROLLER in figure) placed in each 
Regional Control Centre 
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• 400-500 seconds related to the last hierarchical control level, that is the NVR which 
has the goal to optimise the values of the Pilot Node voltages along of the grid. 
In the Figure 3-13 the word References indicates voltage references or reactive power 
reference values determined by the upper level regulator and sent, as reference, to the lower 
level regulators. The reference received by a regulator is the value which must be satisfied 
through the regulation. 
The State Estimator indicates an algorithm used to compute the estimation of the state of the 
transmission power system that is necessary for the optimisation algorithm in order to 
determine the optimal voltage patterns. 
After the overview of the hierarchical voltage control structure, in the following each single 
level of the voltage control system will be detailed. 
3.3.2.1 The primary voltage control 
The primary voltage control regards the voltage of the single alternator and it is realised by 
the AVR, the Automatic Voltage Regulator, whose control loop is shown in Figure 3-14. 
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Figure 3-14: Classical AVR Controller 
The following remarks must be underlined: 
• The lowest and possibly the most critical level of the hierarchical voltage control of 
the transmission grid is the excitation control of a single alternator unit 
• The main voltage loop includes a PI controller (that is a Proportional and Integral 
controller which plays two actions on the control signal, just a proportional one and an 
integral one) and provides a zero-steady-state-error tracking of the reference voltage 
• The so called Power System Stabiliser, with the acronym PSS, is constituted by the 
additional stabilising - feedbacks from the variables: P the active power and  the 
angular speed, with respective gains Kp and K. It is used to improve the stability of 
the alternator-grid system 
• In conclusion the complete voltage controller of a generator is a MISO regulator, that 
is a Multi - Input Single Output controller 
The Figure 3-14 outlines the main voltage loop and the additional feedback (the PSS), from 
active power Pe and rotor speed ω , because they are essential to guarantee the stability of 
the generator connected to the grid for different operation points, in presence of disturbances 
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of different nature. Here, the terminal voltage V of a (large) power generating alternator is 
controlled via the strength of the magnetic field of the alternator, which is determined by the 
excitation voltage Vf of the exciter, that is the input variable to control the alternator. 
It is also necessary, independently of the type of power plant, to introduce the limits of the 
capability curve with the maximum and minimum value of the active and reactive power 
produced and absorbed (for the capability curves defining the operation area for the 
generator see the Figure 3-15). 
The voltage regulations of the generator verify if the generators are violating the reactive 
limits and if the option of the generated reactive power control is active. The values of the 
capability curve can be automatically modified depending on the state of each generator with 
the following relations: 
1. Overexcited generator: 
for 0  PG  P = (P2APP – Q2MAX)1/2 results QG  QG MAX 
for (P2APP – Q2MAX)1/2  PG  PMAX results QG  (P2APP – P2G)1/2 
2. Under-excited generator: 
for 0  PG  P MAX   results QG  QMIN 
where: 
PG : generated active power 
QG : generated reactive power 
PAPP : generator rated power 
PMAX , QMAX : generator maximum active and reactive power (capability curve limits) 
PMIN , QMIN : generator minimum active and reactive power (capability curve limits) 
Q (p.u.)
P (p.u.)
V=1 p.u.
V=1.05 p.u.V=0.95 p.u.
V=0.95 p.u. V=1.05 p.u.
P°=0.95 p.u.
V=1 p.u.
Xe ExternalNetwork
 
Figure 3-15: Machine operating range in parallel with the grid 
The alternator operating conditions change during normal operation, for example from day to 
night and vice versa, due to various reasons, for instance: 
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• The external reactance Xe varies with the configuration of the grid and with the 
location of the power station, normally its value can change between 0.1 p.u. and 0.4 
p.u. 
• The active power P, generated by the alternator can vary between 0.9 p.u. and 0.3 
p.u. (technical minimum) 
• The reactive power Q, generated can change from -0.35 p.u. in under-excitation to 
+0.4 p.u. in over-excitation 
• The voltage V, of the alternator is normally limited between 0.95 p.u. in under-
excitation and 1.05 p.u. in over-excitation 
All these different operation points of the electrical generator are easily recognised in the P,Q 
planes of the Figure 3-15. As a result of these changes in the operating conditions the system 
can become unstable or with a very low stability margin, so it rises the need for adaptation to 
guarantee stability. At present this adaptive solution is put to the test through prototypes and 
it will probably represent the future development in voltage regulation of the alternator, 
especially taking into account the liberalisation of the electric market which pushes forward 
operation conditions varying very quickly and frequently. 
Nowadays the AVR regulator is an intelligent component with 1 or 2 CPU, a man machine 
interface, a LAN, etc. The human machine interface is used to set-up the regulator, to tune 
the parameters, etc. It is very fast and so it is not possible for the operator to interact with it to 
change the actions or operate to re-define the set up or the parameters. Just to give a clear 
idea of the time constants of this controlled system it may be considered that a response to a 
step variation of the voltage reference takes around 2-5 seconds and no more than 10 
seconds. 
3.3.2.2 The secondary voltage control 
The secondary voltage control level of a transmission grid is constituted by two different 
kinds of regulators as shown, in a schematic way, in the Figure 3-16: 
• The PQR - the Reactive power regulator - is placed in those power plants which were 
chosen to regulate the voltage in some defined nodes (called PILOT NODES) of the 
transmission grid. The PQR receives the reference value of reactive power from the 
RVR, the Regional Voltage Regulator, and on the basis of this consignment the PQR 
controls the reactive power produced by each generator 
• The RVR - Regional Voltage Regulator - has the goal to define the reference values 
of reactive powers necessary to satisfy the constraints of PILOT NODE voltage 
levels. These reference values are sent to the PQRs of the power plants which are 
under secondary voltage control. 
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Figure 3-16: The Secondary Hierarchical Voltage Control Structure 
3.3.2.3 The tertiary voltage control 
The highest level in the hierarchical voltage control is the TERTIARY or NATIONAL level that 
has the goal to optimise the values of the voltages in the pilot nodes of the entire National 
grid in order to minimise the losses of energy along the transmission grid. Of course this 
hierarchical voltage control system that is widespread along all the national territory is quite 
important for the management of the system. 
In Figure 3-17 there is the general schematisation of the centralised tertiary voltage control 
system. The regulator in charge of this regulation is the NVR (National Voltage Regulator). 
In order to define the optimal voltages profiles of the pilot nodes with the objective to 
minimise the losses on the transmission grid, the National Voltage Regulator uses different 
algorithms such as a state estimator, an optimisation algorithm, etc. 
This regulator has a rich man machine interface through which the operator is able to monitor 
the evolution of the grid and to make some actions to counteract dangerous situations with 
possible fatal failures. 
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Figure 3-17: The general schematisation of the hierarchical voltage control system 
3.3.2.4 The system improvements achieved by the hierarchical control 
The global voltage control system allows to achieve the following main improvements: 
a. VOLTAGE QUALITY 
o Improved voltage profiles across the whole electrical power system 
o Reduced voltage variations around the decided values (set-points) 
o Bus-bar voltages maintained inside the limits 
b. ECONOMIC OPERATION 
o Reduction of the total power system losses 
o Minimization of reactive power flows through a better utilization of the reactive 
power resources, available at each generators under secondary voltage 
control 
c. ELECTRICAL SECURITY 
o The generators reactive power reserves made available for emergency 
conditions 
o Increased active electric power transfer capability 
o Voltage collapse prevention 
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3.3.2.5 The implementation of the hierarchical voltage control system in the Italian 
transmission grid 
The implementation of the hierarchical voltage control in the Italian transmission grid is 
ongoing since at least ten years. Its huge structure is widespread in the whole country and it 
is represented in Figure 3-18. 
The approximate numbers of components needed for its implementation are the following : 
• Over 200 AVR - Automatic Voltage Regulators  
• 70 PQR - Reactive Power Regulators  
• 3 RVR - Regional Voltage Regulators  
• 1 NVR - National Voltage Regulator 
Of these components those already installed are: 
• 50 PQR apparatus already activated and under operation 
• 2 RVR Regional Dispatchers already activated and under operation in North and 
South of Italy 
• The NVR for the National Control Centre is under operation and some updates are 
ongoing. 
 
Figure 3-18: General schematisation of the Italian hierarchical voltage control system 
 
Analysis of new control applications  Page 51  
 
3.4 Multi Agent Microgrid Control Systems 
In this section the multi agent DG control system which is studied in the course of the 
CRUTIAL project is introduced. We focus on its design motivations, the physical level, the 
middleware level binding together a virtual agent community and the different control loops 
implemented by this multi agent system with different functionalities and criticality levels. 
3.4.1 Control System Objectives 
While designing a control strategy for Distributed Generators in a distribution net, one has to 
envision some important goals. First of all the control system has to be robust, since we are 
controlling physical generators injecting power into the power grid. Failures of the control 
system leading to a failure of the generator or even failures of a power distribution segment 
are mostly unwanted. Secondly, the capital investment cost and the operational cost of the 
control system has to be kept as low as possible, since it controls relatively small generators 
with relatively low financial gains.  
Because of the cost limitations a fully distributed system, which does not need a centralized 
supervision and control system, is used. This distributed architecture has the advantage that 
no expensive servers and backup servers with large bandwidth requirements are needed. 
Also, no trusted third party is needed to provide and maintain this centralized infrastructure. 
The local generator controllers are designed as agents, which receive inputs from the 
generator (power output, voltage, frequency, production cost) and communicate with other 
agents in the system to optimize their behaviour. Based on the cost argument, the 
communication infrastructure used among agents is an open IP-network, possibly a public 
one such as the Internet. The Internet has the advantage that it is generally accessible and 
relatively cheap. A large disadvantage is the reliability of the Internet since one depends on 
an unknown underlying communication infrastructure and third party network providers. Also, 
the Internet has unpredictable communication delays and may suffer from IP-packet losses. 
Since the Internet is a publicly available communication infrastructure, it also may come with 
some security issues. 
Following previous discussion, we can conclude that the agents must not rely on the 
communication channel for their operation. Therefore, communications are used for 
optimization purposes only. The control loops using communications are soft real-time 
(because of unpredictable network delays), and the agents are able to function in the 
absence of communications, be it in a less optimal way. 
3.4.2 Agent Communication 
The agents in the control system need some kind of middleware system which binds the 
agent population together. They need a way of finding other interesting agents and fixed 
protocols for communication and interaction among participating agents. The middleware for 
agent interaction presented here is designed to function in the absence of centralized 
coordination; it must cope with dynamic behaviour of agents and the unreliable underlying IP-
network. This section presents both the use of overlay networks within this system and the 
communications patterns among the agents. 
3.4.2.1 Structure of the Overlay Network 
Agents in a power distribution net set up an overlay network (or virtual network) on an 
underlying network, forming peer-to-peer (P2P) connections between agents (comparable to 
systems such as Gnutella or Napster1) [Vanthournout et al. 2004b][Vanthournout et al. 
2004a]. In such an overlay network, an agent has the address of a number of other agents in 
the network, called the neighbours of that agent. If these neighbours are chosen with a 
proper degree of randomness, a network will be formed where a path exist between every 
                                                     
1
 Although Napster is generally not seen as a pure distributed peer-to-peer system because of the 
centralized listing of nodes and indexing of resources (music files) on these nodes. 
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two agents in the system. The amount of agents passed on such a path between the agents 
is called the number of hops. It must be clear that the virtual connections (neighbours) are 
independent of the underlying physical network, which is treated as a black box. 
An illustrative example of an overlay network is shown in Figure 3-19. Four computers A, B, 
C and D are connected by an IP-based network. Each of these computers (or at least the 
software agents running on these) has a limited number of neighbours as is shown with the 
red arrows. Although each agent only knows a few other agents, there exists a path between 
every two agents in the overlay network. For clarity, the overlay network is shown again in 
Figure 3-20, without the underlying physical connections. One can see very clearly that the 
overlay network topology is logically independent of the underlying physical network 
topology. While node A and node B are for example in the same physical LAN (on the same 
switch), there exists no direct path between them in the overlay network. 
 
Figure 3-19: Illustrative layout of IP-network with four computer nodes attached. Both 
the physical connections and the virtual overlay connections are shown. 
 
Figure 3-20: Overlay network formed in Figure 3-19. 
Now we have shown what an overlay network is, but how is it constructed? This is done in a 
fully distributed way; no server listing of its members is needed. An agent joining the overlay 
network must know only one current member, which it will contact. This member will pass on 
other members with whom the new agent can form a limited number of peer-to-peer 
connections. The choice of these new neighbours is based on certain rules, which are 
different in different types of overlay networks. It are these rules that determine 
(stochastically or deterministically) the topology of an overlay network. In the overlay network 
used for the multi agent control system a semantic distance metric based on XML 
descriptions of the agents is used. The smaller this distance between the descriptions of two 
agents, the higher the probability that one agent will choose the other agent as a neighbour. 
Consequently, an agent will tend to connect to similar agents. Additionally a limited number 
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of neighbours with a very large semantic distance are chosen, as to avoid the P2P network 
splitting up in clusters of similar agents and to limit the diameter of the overlay network 
(maximal number of hops to go from one agent to another). Finally, to improve robustness of 
the overlay network, an agent keeps a list of former neighbours, which can be used as 
access points after the agent has been disconnected from the network. 
This overlay network forms an ideal structure for communication over unreliable packet 
switched networks; agents can join, leave and re-enter at will, there is no need for central 
coordination and scalability is high. The topology is random enough to avoid an accidental 
partitioning of the network, but also has some logical structure to allow quick resource 
discovery without too much communication overhead. An example of such an overlay 
network connecting generators in a power distribution grid is shown in Figure 3-21 and 
Figure 3-22. 
 
Figure 3-21: Power distribution segment with large DG penetration, and an agent 
deployment. 
 
Figure 3-22: Example overlay network topology between agents controlling the 
autonomous electricity grid of Figure 3-21. 
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3.4.2.2  Gossiping Based Communication 
Basic Algorithm 
For the exchange of information over such an overlay network, there are multiple options. 
Flooding or multicasting of messages could be used. The former has quite high network 
demands, while the latter is not supported by most routers on the Internet. The method we 
use here is called gossiping; every agent exchanges information at fixed time intervals with 
one of its neighbours (chosen randomly). If that neighbour exchanges this new information 
with one of its neighbours (and so forth), the news spreads in the network. This also explains 
its name; the way information is spread is very similar to how gossips are spread in a society 
from person to person.  
As an example of this gossiping process, have a look at Figure 3-20. Suppose agent A has 
some news to spread in the overlay network. Now, the following steps occur in given order 
on some discrete instances in time: 
 A has news to be spread in the overlay network 
 A does a gossiping step, randomly choosing neighbour C as gossiping partner. C learns 
the news. 
 D does a gossiping step, randomly choosing neighbour A as gossiping partner. D learns 
the news 
 C does a gossiping step, randomly choosing neighbour B as gossiping partner. B learns 
the news 
This way, every agent has learned the news. Notice there are many other possibilities in 
which the news could have spread in this network. 
Distributed Averaging Using Gossiping 
Using this basic communication paradigm, some basic functions can be implemented over 
overlay networks. One of these basic functions using gossiping based communication is 
distributed averaging. In this, every node has a certain value (any real number) and using 
only gossiping, an overlay network wide average can be calculated. Since this distributed 
averaging algorithm is used in the control scheme, we explain the algorithm here. 
To understand why, we should have a look at the algorithm which is used for secondary 
control, namely gossiping based averaging. During such a gossiping step the following 
happens: 
DG Controller C1 DG Controller C2 
send current average Average1  C2 send current average Average2  C1 
receive average Average2 receive average Average1 
calculate and set new average  
Average1  (Average1 +Average2)/2 
calculate and set new average 
Average2  (Average2 +Average1)/2 
 
One can think of this algorithm as a certain amount of money which is divided among a fixed 
group of people. If all people in a group randomly exchange money between one another 
according to above-mentioned scheme, they will all have an equal amount of money after a 
certain time. The total amount of money in the group however stays the same, since they are 
only exchanging money within this fixed group. This leads to the conclusion that the amount 
of money each one has at the end is the average. A graphical illustration of the distributed 
averaging scheme is shown in Figure 3-23. 
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Figure 3-23: Illustration of the distributed averaging algorithm between four nodes 
using gossiping. After four steps convergence is seen in the algorithm on the exact 
average of ‘6’. 
3.4.3 Controlling Distributed Generators in a Microgrid 
The goal of the distributed control system is the coordinated control of small generators in a 
single distribution grid. The basic control loops which are implemented in a microgrid are 
quite similar to the control loops that are found in large generation facilities on transmission 
level, namely: 
• Primary control or droop control, which ensures energy balance for both active power 
P and reactive power Q. Based on local measures voltage and frequency primary 
control will adjust power output as to limit divergence from rated voltage and 
frequency levels. 
• Secondary control, which keeps voltage and frequency within certain bounds of their 
rated values, if possible. Where primary control only limits divergence from rated 
voltage and frequency values, secondary control brings voltage and frequency back 
to the rated values after a divergence. 
• Tertiary control optimizes power production for economical concerns. Power 
production is redistributed among participating generators as to minimize production 
costs. This control loop may also be used to implement a market based mechanism. 
Furthermore, the multi agent system may also aggregate the distribution grid within a single 
agent located on the feeding transformer. This aggregating agent may connect to the high 
level SCADA system as a single logical consumer or producer for supervision or control 
purposes. This might allow a limited level of control over DG and smart loads by the TSO or 
DSO. The connection on ICT level between the microgrid and transmission level can also be 
used as the link between the power spot market price and the price within the distribution 
net. Another function for this aggregating agent could be the (re)synchronization of the 
microgrid with the transmission grid to allow reconnection after an islanding of the microgrid. 
3.4.3.1 Primary Control 
Primary control thus only needs local measurements, namely local voltage and frequency, to 
control the generator’s active and reactive power outputs [Marwali et al. 2004][De 
Brabandere et al. 2004]. In resistive power grids, such as low or medium voltage distribution 
grids, voltage is dependent on active power, and frequency on reactive power. Figure 3-24 
shows how active power output is adjusted using a proportional controller with local voltage 
as its input. A similar controller is used for the control of reactive power vs. frequency, further 
we only look at active power output. In active power control, P0 is the setting for the desired 
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active power output when voltage is at its rated value U0. P is the actual power output at the 
current (divergent) voltage and P is the difference between these two. 
 
Figure 3-24: Droop graph controlling active power output vs. locally measured 
voltage. 
The primary control loop can maintain power balances and react quickly to changes in the 
distribution grid, without need for communications. When the distribution segment is 
connected to the transmission grid, distributed generators equipped with this fast reacting 
droop control can give support to the power grid in case of severe faults, such as quickly 
decaying frequency or voltage collapses. When the distribution segment is disconnected 
from the power grid and keeps operating in islanded mode, primary control is indispensable 
for controlling frequency and voltage in the distribution grid, since these are no longer 
externally controlled by the large transmission grid. Maintaining frequency and voltage in an 
islanded distribution segments essentially means maintaining power balance in the segment 
(= equalize consumption to production). 
Many installations of DG nowadays are not equipped with droop control or automatic voltage 
regulators, so they merely provide a fixed or stochastically varying (wind, solar or CHP) 
amount of active power. This lack of primary control poses no problem as long as DG 
comprise only a small amount of the power generation in a power grid, and the DG units are 
installed in a strong portion of a distribution grid (e.g. cabling with sufficiently high power flow 
capacity). The first condition means large power plants can maintain frequency and voltage 
stability, the second ensures voltage drop/rise along a distribution grid does not reach 
unacceptable limits due to increased current flows caused by local power production.  
Although primary control as implemented in our scheme counters large voltage or frequency 
variations as to minimize divergence from their rated values, the proportional controller alone 
can’t maintain rated values. For this we need a proportional-integral controller (PI). 
Unfortunately, implementing a local PI-controller in all DG units may lead to unwanted and 
possibly dangerous oscillations. That is why there is a need for a secondary control loop 
using communications for coordination between DG controllers. 
The primary control implemented in our AEG has been adjusted a little to allow economical 
optimization. A dead zone is defined in which power output is not adjusted although voltage 
and frequency may diverge from rated values. This primary control curve looks like the one in 
Figure 3-25. 
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Figure 3-25: Droop graph with dead zone to allow for economical optimization. 
3.4.3.2 Secondary Control 
In this control scheme, secondary control controls both voltage and frequency. It is used to 
maintain rated voltage and frequency levels. When the microgrid is connected to the power 
grid, the frequency is controlled by this external grid. The most important factor to control 
locally is the voltage level. For this, the DSO draws up a voltage planning for the classic 
radial power distribution grids. In a traditional low voltage distribution segment, there are only 
passive elements. At the feed in point there is a single transformer that keeps the voltage 
around a certain value. Along the radial low voltage distribution line there is a voltage drop 
which is dependent on the fixed line impedance and the variable power consumption. The 
voltage at the feed in point is determined in function of this minimal and maximal voltage 
drop as to keep the voltage within a certain range of the rated voltage. All this is illustrated in 
Figure 3-26. 
If a DG unit is installed in such a distribution segment, the voltage level is raised near the 
generator due to the extra active power fed into the line (see Figure 3-27). In current 
applications of DG the voltage near the DG should stay within small bounds of the locally 
rated voltage as to minimize the influence on the voltage profile along the line, if this is not 
possible, power line reinforcements or an automated voltage regulator (AVR) are needed. 
 
Figure 3-26: Voltage profile along a low voltage (LV) and medium voltage (MV) 
distribution line 
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Figure 3-27: Local voltage boost near DG unit (IP) raises voltage level above allowable 
limits in certain parts of the distribution grid 
The voltage control scheme implemented in the microgrid application presented, does not 
simply try to keep rated local voltages, but instead tries to optimize global divergence over 
the whole distribution grid. As mentioned in previous paragraph, one needs the functionality 
of a PI-controller to maintain these rated voltage and frequency levels with some 
coordination among the DG units in the distribution net to avoid oscillations, or sub-optimal 
solutions. For this, the average divergence from power output setpoints P0 and Q0 are 
calculated system-wide, which are an indication for the divergence from rated voltage and 
frequency. Adjusting the active and reactive power outputs as to regulate this average 
system-wide divergence to zero, should optimize the distribution system voltage and, to a 
lesser degree when the system is grid connected, its frequency. So, using the distributed 
averaging algorithm as presented in section 3.4.2.2, we calculate the system-wide average 
∆Pk (and similarly ∆Qk) for all generators k in the distribution net:  
1
( ) /
n
i
i
P P n
=
∆ = ∆  
And then, when this value calculated locally in generator k converges, the setting P0,k for 
generator k is adjusted (and so for each generator in the system): 
0, 0,k kP P P= + ∆  
This way, divergence from rated values is not necessarily eliminated near each DG unit, but 
at least the divergence is minimized and equally spread along the distribution grid. 
3.4.3.3 Tertiary Control 
Tertiary control optimizes generator output for economic criteria. Traditionally, a central 
controller knows the marginal production costs of all generators and aggregates these2. 
Based on these curves and the total power demand, power output settings for all generators 
are calculated so as to minimize costs, and dispatched to the generators in the field. 
In our control scheme however, tertiary control is performed in a distributed way. Agents 
controlling generators communicate only with their direct neighbours (see section 3.4.2.2), 
                                                     
2
 Nowadays, this kind of centralized tertiary control is abolished and replaced by power market 
mechanisms. It is however still used internally by large generation companies to optimize their 
production. 
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exchanging their marginal cost (MC) curves. Next, the two gossiping generators adjust their 
power output as to make their MCs equal, while the total power production remains constant. 
Continuing this gossiping process ultimately leads to the point where all generators in the 
distribution grid produce at the same marginal cost, which is the theoretical economical 
optimum. Figure 3-28 shows the marginal cost curves of two generators, their production 
setting before a gossiping step, and the resulting power output of both generators after the 
gossiping step. 
 
Figure 3-28: Marginal cost curves of two generators (1, 2) and an illustration of the 
algorithm used to equalize their marginal production costs while keeping the total 
production constant (3). 
The voltage regulation in the distributed generation system is represented by the class 
diagram in Figure 3-29. In such diagram, the class representing the general voltage 
regulation (or control) is DGVoltageControl. This class specializes the class Regulation 
representing the generic function of regulation (or control). The class DGVoltageControl is 
the aggregation of three classes: DGPrimaryVoltageControl, DGSecondaryVoltageControl, 
DGTertiaryVoltageControl; these classes represent the primary, the secondary and the 
tertiary voltage regulation respectively, and they are specializations of the class Function 
representing the generic function.  
The class OverlayNetwork represents the network composed by the agents exploited in the 
distributed generation system in order to perform the secondary and tertiary voltage 
regulation. For this reason the class OverlayNetwork is the aggregation of instances of the 
class Agents. Agents exchange information so the class Agents is associated with itself.  
The class OverlayNetwork is associated with the class DGSecondaryVoltageControl and with 
the class DGTertiaryVoltageControl because the overlay network performs the secondary 
and tertiary voltage regulation.  
An agent can be hosted on a regulation component; therefore, the class 
Regulation&ControlComponent is associated with the class Agents. Moreover, a regulation 
component may regulate a distributed generator present in the distributed generation 
system; so, the class Regulation&ControlComponent is associated with the class 
DistributedGenerator.  A regulation component may also perform the primary voltage 
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regulation; this is represented by associating the class Regulation&ControlComponent with 
the class DGPrimaryVoltageControl.  
A distributed generator is an element of the distribution grid; this aspect is represented by 
connecting the class DistributionGrid with the class DistributionGenerator by means of an 
aggregation arc.  
 
Figure 3-29: Voltage regulation in the distributed generation system. 
The state diagram in Figure 3-30 shows the possible states of a non malicious agent. In such 
diagram, the agent is initially in the state Created, then it turns to the state 
UnderRegistration; in this state, the agent has been recently created and its neighbours are 
being informed of its presence. At the end of this process, the agent turns to the Active state; 
in such state, the agent is known by all its neighbours and is performing its activity. If the 
agent decides to leave the overlay network, then the agent turns from the Active state to the 
RemoveRegistration state; during such state the agent is removed by the overlay network by 
informing the neighbours of the agent about the fact that the agent is being excluded from 
the network. At the end of the removing activity, the agent turns to the final state Removed. 
 
Figure 3-30: State diagram of a non malicious agent 
3.4.3.4 Timing Constraints for Control Loops 
The primary control loop controls in real-time the power output of the generator, based on 
local real-time measurements of voltage and frequency. This control loop has hard-real-time 
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requirements, which can be guaranteed since no external communication channels are 
needed, all measurements are done close to the generator. We will not go any deeper into 
this embedded local control system, since timing parameters and system parameters are 
case specific and variable for different kinds of measurement devices, embedded controllers, 
generators, or inverters connecting the generator to the power grid.  
Given both secondary and tertiary control loops are merely meant for optimization, and the 
functionality of the critical primary control loop is independent of their functionality, there are 
no timing requirements for secondary or tertiary control loops in the sense that a generator 
may exhibit faulty behaviour when messages between generator controllers are delayed or 
communication is down totally. Yet when communications are slow or totally down power 
generation may be suboptimal, which may have an impact on power quality or production 
costs. Given some form of timely behaviour is expected from the secondary and tertiary 
control loops, but failure to stay within these limits has no severe consequences, these may 
be considered soft-real-time systems. 
 
3.5 Emerging ICT system architecture for the Power System 
A possible architecture of the ICT systems involved in Power System infrastructures is 
depicted in the Figure 3-31 that shows the Stakeholders (GENCO, TSO, DSO, TSP), and 
their interconnections. 
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Figure 3-31: ICT infrastructure in the Power Systems 
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In the following paragraphs a description of the ICT infrastructures adopted by the major 
Stakeholders is summarised. As a reminder of the points interfacing the ICT and the power 
components the reader may keep an eye on the Figure 2-4. 
The main characteristics of all these infrastructures are summarised hereafter: 
• Use of standard communication protocols (IEC-60870-5-104, RPC) between centres 
and Terminal Units 
• Use of IP Networks for the regulation and teleoperation functions, owned and 
operated by Telecommunication Service Providers (TSP)  
• Presence of different logical networks on the same physical support 
• SCADA system based on Commercial Off-the Shelf hardware or software 
components (COTS) 
• Centralised ICT monitoring, control and maintenance functions for the whole ICT 
infrastructure (communication devices, IEDs-Intelligent Electronic Devices, etc.) 
• Interaction between TSO/DSO, GENCO/TSO, DGSO/TSO ICT infrastructures to 
carry out emergency actions 
• Integration of Process and Corporate networks. 
Different study scenarios will be identified involving several stakeholder infrastructures. 
ITC for Distribution System Operator - DSO 
The main  UML class diagrams that accounts for the ICT infrastructure of the DSO are the 
description of the ACC and of the substation automation site given in Figure 3-32. 
 
Figure 3-32: UML Class Diagram of ACC and Substation Automation Site 
ICT for Generation Company - GENCO 
The CD of control aspects of a power plant are summarized in the CD of Figure 3-33. 
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Figure 3-33: The automation aspects of a Power Plant 
 
ICT of Transmission System Operator - TSO 
The CD of the control aspects of TSO are summarized in the CD of Figure 3-34. 
 
 
Figure 3-34: The automation aspects of TSO 
3.5.1 Security issues 
The descriptions of the vulnerabilities and the threats incurred by the system are the two 
pillars of any security analysis [Dondossola & Lamquet 2006], [Dondossola et al. 2006b]. 
Vulnerabilities are flaws or weaknesses in a component or in the system's design, 
implementation, or operation and management, which could be exploited to violate the 
system's security policy. 
The vulnerabilities under consideration are selected with reference to their relevancy or 
priority, in order to identify which are likely and which not. Relevancy means not only the 
likelihood aspect but also the severity one. Combining the two indexes of severity and 
likelihood, it should be possible to evaluate the relevancy of each vulnerability for the whole 
subsystem.  
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Threats act at a higher level than vulnerabilities and represent menaces to the system or 
subsystem services. A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely 
impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 
organizational assets, or individuals. In case of malicious threats if acts through an 
information system via unauthorised access, destruction, disclosure, modification of 
information, and/or denial of service. Also, the potential for a threat-source to successfully 
exploit a particular information system vulnerability. [CNSS I4009 2006], [FIPS 200 2006] 
Each threat is characterised by the type of agent (human, environmental, etc.), the objective, 
the motivation (malicious, accidental), etc. 
The combination of two threat indexes of likelihood and severity provides an evaluation of the 
relevancy of each threat for the whole system. 
In principle the choice of a set of threat hypotheses to investigate on a given control scenario 
should be based on the results of a risk assessment activity. As an initial proposal the 
following classes of malicious faults will be used: 
• DoS attacks e.g. those towards the teleoperation communications, generated by 
enemies located on the Telecom IP backbone (e.g. connection requests on the port 
used by the IEC protocol) 
• Intrusions like those into the Centre/Substation communication flow followed by 
authentication violation or the execution of faked commands 
• Malicious logics faults (viruses, worms, Trojan horses, ..) e.g., by hostile use of 
maintenance activities by means of a portable PC in the Substation Networks. 
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4 CONTROL SYSTEM SCENARIOS 
 
4.1 Summary of the features addressed 
With the advent of the liberalised markets an increasing number of different actors (TSOs, 
DSOs, GENCOs, DGSO, Power Exchange, Energy Authority, etc.) are involved in the 
electrical system’s management and there can be a necessity to exchange power system 
status information and control data over public and shared networks (see Figure 4-1) [Brand 
et al. 2003]. 
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Figure 4-1: Communications between Electrical System actors 
In order to maintain their infrastructures the stakeholders use to buy maintenance services 
from external providers [Schainker et al. 2006]. These providers mostly use public 
communication networks to receive up to date status information about the equipment to be 
maintained. 
In the evolving context depicted above the following technical issues have been identified to 
finalize the analysis: 
• How to guarantee availability and information security requirements for the remote 
control adopting third party communication channels? 
• How to support the development of highly resilient corrective control actions for 
emergency management? 
• How to protect ICT networks including SCADA-operational functions and corporate-
maintenance functions, characterized by different levels of security and risk? 
• How to support flexible operation of the power grid and remote configuration of its 
substation automation systems? 
• How to prevent ICT threats provoking cascading phenomena due to 
interdependencies between power and ICT infrastructures? 
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The set of control system scenarios has been conceived in view of the development of a 
global national defence plan involving all operation and control infrastructures of the different 
stakeholders at generation, transmission and distribution levels. 
The scenarios focus on threat hypotheses, having either external or internal sources, such 
as: 
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on control systems by enemies located on the 
Telecom IP backbone. 
• Intrusions into Centre-Substation communication flow and execution of faked 
commands (spoofing attacks/man-in-the-middle attacks). 
• Exploitation of standard application layer protocols’ vulnerabilities. 
• Accidental or malicious infections by worms or viruses in the Substation or Centre 
Networks caused by maintenance (e.g. an infected lap-top connected to the network) 
or non allowed activities of control personnel (e.g. unanticipated direct Internet link 
between PC used for control system supervision). 
• Intrusions and viral infections through ICT devices for the Primary, Secondary and 
Tertiary voltage and frequency regulations of generation power plants. 
4.2 Overview of scenarios 
The identified scenarios are divided in two groups: 
• a first group of scenarios is related to hierarchical regulation and teleoperation system 
• a second group of scenarios deals with distributed generation applications or 
microgrids. 
The list of scenarios with their main characteristics are summarised in Table 4-2: 
• Identifier: short description of the scenario composed by: the Power System 
Infrastructural identifier (G = Generation, T = Transmission, D = Distribution), the ICT 
identifier (ICT) and an increasing index. 
• Stakeholders: the owners of services involved (GENCO = Generation Company, 
DSO = Distribution System Operator, TSO = Transmission System Operator, TSP = 
Telecommunication Service Provider, DMO = Distribution Maintenance Operator, 
ICTM = ICT Maintainer). 
• Information Control Systems: the control systems and applications that are 
involved in the scenario. 
• Power Contingencies: the initial electrical event that changes the status of the 
Power System. In most cases this event is managed by Defence Systems and 
Procedures. 
• ICT Threats: ICT threat sequence which, if successfully carried out, may compromise 
the control function and provoke cascading or escalating effects. 
• Cascading Effects: list of possible worst cascading effects depending on the 
escalation of situation. 
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Table 4-2: Control System Scenarios 
Scenario description 
Case Identifier Stake 
holders 
Information Control 
Systems Power Contingencies ICT Threats Cascading Effects 
Scenario 1 – DSO Teleoperation 
1 D-ICT-1 DSO 
TSP1 
MCD-TU (DSO) 
ATS (DSO) 
Load shedding plan 
Insufficient production 
Generation trip 
HV line unavailability 
DoS 
Intrusion 
Viral infection 
Authentication 
violation 
Lack of measurements 
Lack of signals 
Loss of automatic local control 
Loss of remote monitoring 
Loss of remote control 
Discrepancies with other monitoring functions 
Lack of operator awareness 
Lack of operator actions 
Substation level protection trip 
Scenario 2 – Interaction between TSO and DSO in emergency conditions 
2 TD-ICT-1 
TSO 
TSP2 
DSO 
TSP1 
MCD-TU (TSO) 
NTS (TSO) 
ATS (DSO) 
MCD-TU (DSO) 
High voltages on the 
transmission grid 
DoS 
Intrusion 
Loss of Circuit Breakers arming/unarming requests 
Loss of commands 
Scenario 3 – Integration of DSO Operation and Maintenance functions 
3 D-ICT-3 
DSO 
TSP1 
TSP3 
DMO 
MCD-TU (DSO) 
ATS (DSO) 
Web Server (Corporate) 
Data Archive (Corporate) 
 
Viral infection 
Intrusion 
Loss of process data 
Decreasing of maintenance response time 
Scenario 4 – Maintenance of ICT components of DSO 
4 D-ICT-4 DSO 
TSP1 All DSO systems  ICT failures Loss of remote maintenance functionality 
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Scenario description 
Case Identifier Stake 
holders 
Information Control 
Systems Power Contingencies ICT Threats Cascading Effects 
TSP3 
ICTM 
Scenario 5 – Transmission Grid Voltage and Frequency Regulations 
Case 5.1 – TSO and GENCO interactions 
5.1 TG-ICT-6 
GENCO 
TSP4 
TSO 
TSP2 
NVR, RVR, PQR, AVR 
PFR, SFR 
SCADA 
NTS, RTS 
 
Viral infection 
DoS 
Intrusion 
Loss of remote monitoring 
Loss of remote control 
Lack of operator awareness 
Lack of operator’s actions 
Case 5.2 – Erroneous measurements 
5.2 TG-ICT-5 
GENCO 
TSP4 
TSO 
TSP2 
AVR, PQR 
SCADA 
PFR, SFR  
Erroneous measurements, of 
frequency or/and voltages 
DoS 
Intrusion 
Generators trip (Loss of electrical security N-1) 
Scenario 6 – Instability of Electromechanical Mode of Power Plant-Transmission Grid Systems 
Case 6.1 – Instability of Electromechanical Mode management 
6.1 G-ICT-1 
GENCO 
TSO 
DSO 
AVR, PQR 
PFR, SFR 
SCADA 
MCD-TU 
RTS, NTS 
Instability of Electromechanical 
mode 
Viral infection 
Intrusion 
DoS 
Change of grid configuration (Case a) 
Failure of PSS (Case b) 
Generators trip (Loss of electrical security N-1) 
Spinning reserve power 
Decrement of frequency 
Over-voltage 
Grid Separation (Partial or total Blackout)  
Case 6.2 – Supervision and Control functions of GENCO 
6.2 G-ICT-2 GENCO 
TSO 
AVR, PQR 
PFR, SFR 
SCADA 
 
Viral infection 
Intrusion 
DoS 
Loss of regulation functions 
Lack of supervision and control functions 
Lack of automatic load shedding 
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Scenario description 
Case Identifier Stake 
holders 
Information Control 
Systems Power Contingencies ICT Threats Cascading Effects 
MCD-TU 
RTS, NTS 
Lack of manual load shedding 
Lack of activation of shunt reactance 
Loss of confidentiality 
Spurious activation of shunt reactance 
Spurious manual load shedding 
Scenario 7 – Low damped or unstable inter-area oscillations 
7 TG-ICT-1 
GENCO 
TSP4 
TSO 
TSP2 
AVR, PQR 
PFR, SFR 
PSS 
SCADA 
RTS, NTS 
Unstable inter-area oscillations 
Viral infection 
Intrusion 
DoS 
Inter-area oscillations 
Line Trip (Loss of electrical security N-1) 
Area A: 
Decrement of frequency 
Over-voltage 
Area B: 
Teleoperation trip of generators 
Over-voltage / Over-frequency 
Grid Separation (Partial or total Blackout) 
Scenario 8 – Transmission Grid Short Circuit with loss of Synchronism 
8 TG-ICT-2 
GENCO 
TSP4 
TSO 
TSP2 
AVR, PQR, RVR, NVR 
PFR, SFR 
SCADA 
Short circuit with loss of 
synchronism 
DoS 
Viral infection 
Short Circuit 
Loss of synchronism (Loss of electrical security N-
1) 
Grid Separation (Partial or total Blackout) 
Scenario 9 – Transmission Grid Voltage instability 
9 TG-ICT-3 
GENCO 
TSP4 
TSO 
TSP2 
AVR, PQR, RVR, NVR 
PFR, SFR 
SCADA 
Voltage Instability cases 
Voltage Collapse  
DoS 
Viral infection 
Voltage drop 
Line tripping (Loss of electrical security N-1) 
Grid Separation (Partial or total Blackout) 
Scenario 10 – DG Network Latency 
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Scenario description 
Case Identifier Stake 
holders 
Information Control 
Systems Power Contingencies ICT Threats Cascading Effects 
10 DG-ICT-1 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
TSO 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
 Packet loss Loss of regulation 
Scenario 11 – DG IP-Packet Losses 
11 DG-ICT-2 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
TSO 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
 Packet loss Loss of regulation 
Scenario 12 – DG Agent Control System (or Network) Unavailable 
12 DG-ICT-3 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
TSO 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
  Loss of regulation 
Scenario 13 – DG Critical Control System Failure 
13 DG-ICT-4 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
TSO 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
 
Control System 
Failure Loss of local control 
Scenario 14 – DG Denial of Service Attacks on IP-Network 
14 DG-ICT-5 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
TSO 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
 DoS Communication delay 
Scenario 15 – DG Attack on Overlay Network Topology 
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Scenario description 
Case Identifier Stake 
holders 
Information Control 
Systems Power Contingencies ICT Threats Cascading Effects 
15 DG-ICT-6 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
TSO 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
 Intrusion Loss of confidentiality 
Scenario 16 – DG Overlay Network Partitioning 
16 DG-ICT-7 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
Local Control Systems  Intrusion Marginal Costs variation 
Scenario 17 – DG Economical Tampering Attack 
17 DG-ICT-8 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
 Intrusion Market Price variation 
Scenario 18 – DG Voltage Level Attack 
18 DG-ICT-9 
DG 
DSO 
Loads 
TSO 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
 Intrusion 
Over-Voltage 
Grid separation 
Local black-out 
Scenario 19 – DG Alternative Approach, Centralized Control Architecture 
19 DG-ICT-10 
Servers 
DSO 
Loads 
TSO 
SFR 
Local Control Systems 
Controllers Agents 
Communication Systems 
 DoS Loss of communication 
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4.3 Emerging issues in ICT system for Power System 
A first group of scenarios have been identified starting from the actual situation which does 
not consider DG. 
The main purposes of these scenarios are to assess: 
• the capability of the communication architecture of tolerating the threat hypotheses 
• the security of the communications between operators to evaluate the impact of 
attacks in emergency conditions 
• breaches caused by interactions between the corporate and the process network and 
on innovative functions related to the ICT system’s remote maintenance 
Scenario 1: DSO Teleoperation 
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects of ICT threats to the DSO 
communication channel among Area Control Centres and their supervised Substations in 
presence of Power Contingencies (insufficient production, generation trip or HV line 
unavailability). 
Scenario 2: Interaction between TSO and DSO in emergency conditions 
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects due to ICT threats to the 
communication channel among TSO and DSO Control Centres and MCD-TUs in emergency 
conditions (under-frequency or voltage instability). 
Scenario 3: Integration of DSO Operation and Maintenance functions 
This scenario explores the integration of process control and corporate networks in a DSO 
Control Centre, evaluating the possible cascading effects of cyber attacks on the integrated 
architecture. 
Scenario 4: Maintenance of ICT components of DSO 
This scenario considers the use of a centralized ICT maintenance service assuming the 
presence of a central Control Centre for the monitoring and control of the components of all 
the ICT assets in the DSO process network. 
Scenario 5: Voltage and frequency regulations 
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects due to : 
• ICT threats to the communication channel among TSO Control Centres and GENCOs 
and to Control Systems used for voltage and frequency regulations 
• Measurement failures of TSO and GENCO voltage and frequency regulation systems 
Scenario 6: Instability of electromechanical mode of Power Plant-Transmission Grid Systems 
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects due to : 
• Specific abnormal operating conditions of the system constituted by a Power Plant 
and the transmission grid, which is related to the electromechanical oscillation mode 
• ICT threats to GENCO Control Systems used for voltage and frequency regulations. 
Scenario 7: Low damped or unstable inter-area oscillation 
This scenario takes into account the phenomenon of low damped or unstable inter-area 
oscillation. 
Scenario 8. Short Circuit with loss of Synchronism 
This scenario considers the loss of Synchronism caused by a Short Circuit. 
Scenario 9: Voltage instability 
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This scenario explores the Voltage collapse due to voltage regulation by ULTC – Under Load 
Tap Changer. 
 
4.4 New control scheme for microgrids 
In order to study the behaviour of the microgrid control scheme under certain fault scenarios, 
a series of control system scenarios have been sketched and discussed. Most of these 
scenarios have been simulated on a platform incorporating both ICT behaviour (controller 
agents, communication channels, overlay network) and electrical behaviour (static power 
flows and droop control schemes of DG units) within the microgrid. 
 
Reference scenario 1: Primary control only 
This scenario is inserted to show how the system behaves in the absence of 
communications, and illustrates how only serve optimization purposes. 
Reference scenario 2: Normal behaviour, all control loops available 
This scenario illustrates the normal functionality of the microgrid when all control loops are 
available. It can be seen as a benchmark for the other scenarios.  
Reference scenario 3: Secondary control only 
This scenario illustrates the functionality of secondary control (compared with first reference 
scenario), or similarly, the impact of the lack of tertiary control (compared with the second 
reference scenario). 
Reference scenario 4: Tertiary control only 
This scenario illustrates the functionality of tertiary control (compared with first reference 
scenario), or similarly, the impact of the lack of secondary control (compared with the second 
reference scenario). 
Scenario 10: Network latencies 
This scenario discusses the influence of unpredictable communication latencies over typical 
public IP-networks (or the Internet). 
Scenario 11: IP-packet losses 
This scenario discusses the influence of packet losses over typical public IP-networks (or the 
Internet). 
Scenario 12: Agent control system or network unavailable 
This scenario discusses the influence of isolated agent control system failures (e.g. crash of 
computer or agent software) or the isolation of a small number of agent controllers by a 
communication network failure. 
Scenario 13: Critical control system failure 
This scenario deals with isolated failures of primary control systems, which directly control 
generator outputs (or similarly the inverter outputs). 
Scenario 14: Denial of Service attacks on public IP-network 
This scenario discusses the influence of Denial of Service attacks on public IP-networks over 
which the agents communicate. 
Scenario 15: Attack on overlay topology 
This scenario sketches a typical attack on the middleware level which enables agent 
communication, namely the overlay network. This attack can be a means to achieve a higher 
goals, next to simply change or disturb overlay topology, for example an attack on the 
economical optimization system or distribution net voltage level. 
Scenario 16: Overlay network partitioning 
A dreaded fault in all overlay network types is the partitioning of the overlay network, by 
which nodes are split up in two or more independent groups unable to communicate to one 
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another. It is very hard to detect this kind of faults, but they can have a tremendous impact 
on overlay network functionality, and consequently the application implemented on these 
overlays. 
Scenario 17: Economical tampering attack 
Personal, economical profit is probably the strongest motive for human misbehavior. 
Therefore we can anticipate attacks on the economical control loop by parties hoping to sell 
power at higher prices, or buy at lower prices, or simply trying to harm a competing party by 
disturbing their economical optimization. 
Scenario 18: Voltage level attack 
The single most important aspect locally controllable by distributed generators is the voltage 
level in a distribution grid. Trying to convince a large amount of DG to increase their 
production may lead to over-voltages in the distribution grid, and consequently damage to 
equipment or disconnections. 
Scenario 19: Alternative approach, centralized control architecture  
This scenario discusses what would be the influence on the control system if one would use 
a more traditional centralized control system, implemented by a central server controlling 
active/reactive power output of each single DG unit in the distribution grid? 
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5 CONTROL SYSTEM SCENARIOS: HIERARCHICAL ELECTRICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the scenarios summarised in Table 4-2, 
introducing their common features. 
Network architecture 
The information exchange among ICT automation and control levels is based on IP protocols 
compliant with the standard protocol stacks (Figure 5-1): the OSI (Open System Architecture) 
and the TCP/IP (Internet Protocol Suite) which is the “de-facto” international standard. 
Application
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TCP/IP
Application
Presentation
Session
Transport
OSI
Network
Data link
Physical
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
 
Figure 5-1: Standard information exchange protocol stacks 
Application layer protocols 
Data is exchanged among Centres and Substations using standard application layer 
protocols (Figure 5-2) based on a IP Network: 
• IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 60870-6 (ICCP/TASE-2) protocols, whose access port 
numbers are officially declared in the reference documents [IEC 60870-5 2006] [IEC 
60870-6 2002] 
• ftp 
• http 
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Figure 5-2: Control Centres and Substation exchange protocol definitions 
No encryption mechanisms are used for authentication and message security. 
5.1 DSO Teleoperation (Scenario 1) 
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects of ICT threats to the DSO 
communication channel among Area Control Centres and their supervised Substations in 
presence of Power Contingencies (insufficient production, generation trip or HV line 
unavailability). 
This scenario considers the information flow between DSO-Control Centres (Area and 
National) and their supervised MV/LV Substations, in NORMAL Distribution Grid operating 
condition. The information flow is supported by standard Telecom IP backbones owned and 
operated by an external provider who supplies a virtual, dedicated channel over a 
communication link shared with other customers. The inter-site communication infrastructure 
may be assimilated to a public WAN. 
The communication requirements for the teleoperation traffic are expressed as follows: 
• Bandwidth throughput of 64kbps 
• Network availability 0.99999,  i.e., unavailability3 10-5. 
Due to the strong availability requirements on the communication system, it is supposed that 
redundant communication paths are used, implemented over physically independent carrier 
lines, eventually owned by distinct Telecommunication providers (see Figure 5-3). 
                                                     
3
 The availability attribute is sensitive to both accidental and malicious threats, which may have an 
external or internal source. Therefore it is also affected by all those cyber threats which provoke an 
interruption of the communication service as a whole. No other security requirements are imposed to 
the Telecom provider. 
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Figure 5-3: DSO Supervision and Teleoperation communications 
The scenario explores the effects of ICT threats in case of: 
• load shedding due to insufficient production/generation trip/HV line unavailability 
(eventually originated by the Operator of the Transmission Grid) 
• programmed load shedding plan. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• DSO 
• TSP of DSO 
Information Control System involved: 
The scenario involves a DSO Area Control Centre, its back-up and its n-controlled 
Substations (see Figure 5-4): 
• ATS (DSO Area Control Centre): SCADA for grid management 
• MCD-TU (DSO Substation): substation management 
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Figure 5-4: DSO-ICT systems involved in Supervision and Control 
Information Flow: 
The information flow among Substations, MCD-TU and Control Centres is classified as 
follows: 
• Measurements: of P, Q, V and breakers positions from Substations towards Control 
Centres 
• Signals: alarms and status variations from Substations towards Control Centres 
• Commands: from Control Centres or MCD-TU towards Substations 
• ICT Configuration Commands: specialised configuration commands of ICT 
components (IEDs, Firewalls, …) 
• Information among Control Centres: data exchange in order to align the databases 
and the operation capabilities 
Real-time requirements: 
• Measure update 4 sec.: the refresh time of the measurement on the control system 
HMI 
• Signals update 1 sec: the refresh time for alarm signalling and switchgear status 
variations 
• Commands delivery time 2 sec.: teleoperation requests from Centres to Substations 
• Defence commands delivery time: 
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o Low priority commands delivery time 500 msec 
o High priority commands delivery time 200 msec.: (automatic load shedding) 
necessary to dispatch the load shedding command from Access Point to 
MCD-TU. 
Power Contingencies:  
This scenario explores power contingencies causing load shedding. 
Goals: 
The main purpose of the Scenario 1 consists in the assessment of the security of the ICT 
components involved in the Teleoperation activities i.e.: 
• assess the capability of the redundant communication architecture to tolerate the 
threat hypotheses and evaluate the possible cascading effects in presence of power 
contingencies 
• assess the vulnerabilities of the activities based on standard protocols (e.g. IEC 
60870-4-104, IEC 60870-6 (ICCP), http, ftp) 
• assess the sharing of the same channel for real-time and not real-time activities. 
ICT Threats: 
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• DoS attacks to the teleoperation communications, generated by enemies located on 
the Telecom IP backbone (e.g. connection requests on the port used by the IEC 
protocol) 
• Intrusion into the Centre/Substation communication flow followed eventually by the 
execution of faked commands 
• Viral infections of a Substation component caused by maintenance activities (e.g. by 
means of a portable PC) 
• Authentication violation of a Substation Control System through hostile use of 
maintenance activities (e.g. by means of a portable PC, insider attack) 
Cascading Effects and possible countermeasures: 
In the following we discuss the consequences of the considered threats in function of the ICT 
components involved. 
• DoS attack to the VPN connection a Substation to the ATS (ICT-T1) 
This attack reduces the communication bandwidth causing delay or failure in the 
delivery of status information to the ATS and in the reception of commands from ATS 
with consequent partial or complete loss of remote control functions (ICT-C1), the 
loss of N-1 criterion electrical security and the wrong perception of the system’s 
status at the control level (see Figure 5-5). The local control functions are not 
affected. 
Possible ITC countermeasures (ICT-A1): 
o Firewalling 
o Monitoring of anomalous traffic (increasing amount of packets and proactive 
verification of their contents) 
o Redundancy of communication channel 
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Figure 5-5: DoS attack to VPN - Sequence of Cascading Effects 
• Intrusion into the Centre/Substation communication network (ICT-T2) 
This kind of attack may have far reaching consequences as for instance the  
execution of faked commands on MV/LV Substations (ICT-C2) (see Figure 5-6). 
The local control functions are not affected. 
Possible ITC countermeasures (ICT-A2): 
o Cryptation 
o Authentication  
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Under attack
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Failure
Intrusion in VPN
Execution of faked
commands
Return to
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ALERT
Local control functions are
correctly running
Change of setup
Substation configuration
changes
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(ICT-A2)ICT CountermeasuresSuccess
 
Figure 5-6: Intrusion on Centre/Substation communication network - Sequence 
of possible Cascading Effects 
• Viral infection of Substation ICT components (ICT-T3) 
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Viral infections may cause the total or partial loss of control and monitoring 
functions (ICT-C3) (see Figure 5-7). This kind of attack affects the local control 
system; no information or inconsistent information shall be delivered to the ATS. 
Possible ITC countermeasures (ICT-A3): 
o Antivirus 
o Authentication mechanisms on the firewall 
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Under attack
ICT Countermeasures
Failure
Viral infection
Loss of control and
monitoring functions
Return to
Normal State
ALERT
ICT out of order
Only local protections are
active
(ICT-C3)
(ICT-T3)
(ICT-A3)ICT CountermeasuresSuccess
Possible virus
propagation to
Substation Network
 
Figure 5-7: Viral infection of Substation network - Sequence of possible 
Cascading Effects 
• Authentication violation of the Substation control system (ICT-T4) 
Unauthorised access to the Substation firewall causes loss of confidentiality of the 
Substation (ICT-C4) and opens the way to uncontrolled changes of the set-up 
parameters (ICT-C3) (see Figure 5-8). The local control functions are not affected. 
Automatic application of ITC countermeasures (ICT-A4): 
o Enhanced firewall maintenance authentication mechanisms 
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Figure 5-8: Authentication violation of Substation network - Sequence of 
possible Cascading Effects 
The effects on the Power System of the considered ICT attacks depend on the number of 
Substations involved. 
In NORMAL operating condition, an attack to a single Substation will probably not lead to a 
loss of electrical security N-1 criterion because the control system is intrinsically redundant. 
If the attack is aimed at a group of Substations, operating in a specific area, the effects could 
be the impossibility to withstand the occurrence of an electrical contingency (e.g., line 
overloads). 
 
5.1.1 Representation of the Scenario by means of UML diagrams 
In this section, we propose our approach for the UML representation of control system 
scenarios. Scenarios were initially textually described; their representation in form of UML 
diagrams aims to support the textual description by providing a formal graphical notation 
describing the key aspects of the scenario. The textual description of a scenario puts in 
evidence the following aspects: control systems, information flow, time requirements, 
stakeholders, power contingencies, goals, ICT threats, cascading effects. 
In our approach, we use several kinds of UML diagram, and we focus on the scenario 
aspects whose textual description can be enriched by the corresponding UML 
representation. Each of these aspects is represented by the most suitable form of UML 
diagram: we resort to object diagrams to represent control systems and information flows; 
time requirements are indicated by means of comments inside the object diagrams. At the 
moment, threats are represented as class diagrams. Cascading effects are represented in 
form of state diagrams.  
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5.1.1.1 Configuration 
 
Figure 5-9: Context Diagram 
 
The object diagram in Figure 5-9 shows the elements of the power grid infrastructure 
involved in the Scenario 1. Such scenario deals with a case of teleoperation between an area 
control centre and a couple of substation automation sites; the teleoperation activity is 
performed through the exchange of commands and measures between the area control 
centre and the substation automation sites.  
In Figure 5-9, we have three main objects: City of class AreaControlCenter, City_North and 
City_South of class SubstationAutomationSite. Such objects represent a specific area control 
centre whose area of competence is a certain city, and  two substation automation sites 
concerning the northern zone of the city and the southern zone of the city respectively. The 
area control centre monitors and controls the substation automation sites.  
Two objects of class SharedNetwork represent the redundant communication lines realizing 
the communication between the area control centre and the substations automation sites.  
The object City of class AreaControlCentre (City:AreaControlCentre) is composed by several 
objects: an object of class ATS represents the component dedicated to the teleoperation in 
the area control centre; for this reason, such object is associated with the object 
City_Teleoperation:AreaTeleoperation which is in turn associated with the object City:Area in 
order to indicate that the area control center is involved in the teleoperation activity 
concerning the city area.  
Still inside the object City, the object L1:LAN represents the local network for the 
communication inside the area control centre; such object is associated with the object 
F1:Firewall which is in turn associated with the object R1:Router in order to represent that 
the access to the local network of the area control centre is ruled by the router and the 
firewall of the centre. The object R1:Router is associated with the object of class 
SharedNetwork to indicate that the router of the area control centre is the point of connection 
with the external network.  
In a similar way, the object City_North is composed by several objects; in particular, the 
object of class IED represents the component dedicated to the teleoperation activities in the 
substation automation site. The object SC1:StationComputer represents the computer 
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dedicated to the control of the IED. Finally, the object of class MCDTU represents the 
MCDTU component inside the substation automation site.  
The composition of the object City_South reflects the composition of the object City_North.  
The object of class ATS inside the object City:AreaControlCentre is associated with the 
objects of class MCDTU inside City_North:SubstationAutomationSite and 
City_South:SubstationAutomationSite respectively. This association is due to the fact that the 
ATS in the area control centre sends commands to the MCDTU components located in the 
substation automation sites. Another association links the same objects; in this case we 
represent that the ATS collects information from the MCDTU components. 
In the object diagram in Figure 5-9, we also show the operators acting on the teleoperation 
components located in the area control centre and in the substation automation sites. The 
operators are represented in form of actors (sticked figures) associated with the objects 
representing the components influenced by the operators. In particular, in Figure 5-9, the 
actor DSOTeleoperator represents the operator acting on the ATS component in the area 
control centre, while the actor LocalOperator identifies the operators acting on the MCDTU 
component placed inside the substation automation sites. The communication provider is 
represented by the actor TSP associated with the object of class SharedNetwork.  
Finally, the comments in the object diagram in Figure 5-9 indicates the communication 
requirements that the shared network must satisfy (availability and bandwidth throughput).  
5.1.1.2 Information Flow 
 
Figure 5-10: Activity diagram of the information flow in the Scenario 1 
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Figure 5-11: Threats instantiation 
In Figure 5-11, the scenario 1 is considered as an instantation of the collaboration in Figure 
8-18.  In Figure 5-11, the classes MCDTU, InterConnection, ATS and InformationFlow have 
the role of Sender, Communication,  Receiver and Information respectively. The sequence 
diagrams in the appendix can be referred to this scenario according to such roles. The object 
MCDTU corresponds to the object Sender in the sequence diagrams, the object ATS 
corresponds to the object Receiver in the sequence diagrams, and so on. The 
InformationFlow is composed by basic information instances which can be data or 
commands. 
5.1.1.3 Viral Infection 
In this section, we represent by means of UML state diagrams, the effects of a denial of 
service attack influencing the communication inside the teleoperation activity, as described in 
the Scenario1. The other forms of attack described in the Scenario 1 are represented in 
section 8.2.7 (appendix). 
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Figure 5-12: States of the Teleoperation and of the Substation local control functions, 
in case of viral infection 
 
Figure 5-13: States of the Electric Power System in case of viral infection 
The state machine in Figure 5-12 shows the possible states of the Teleoperation and of the 
local control functions in case of viral infection according to the scenario 1. A viral infection 
and the failure of the corresponding countermeasure cause the state transition by the 
Teleoperation, from the state Normal to the state Loss of Measure & Commands; such state 
belongs to the global state NotNormal  of the Teleoperation. The inverse state transition is 
caused by a recovery action.  
The viral infection influences also the state of the local control functions; their transition from 
Normal to Loss of Functions is determined by the viral infection combined with the failure of 
the corresponding countermeasure. A recovery action enables the inverse state transition.  
The state transitions in the state machine in Figure 5-13 depend on the state machine in 
Figure 5-12. In Figure 5-13, the electric power system turns from the state NORMAL to the 
state ALERT if the Teleoperation is in state NotNormal or if the local control functions are in 
the state Loss of Functions (see Figure 5-12). The transition by the electric power system 
from ALERT to NORMAL, occurs in two cases: the state Normal of the Teleoperation, or the 
state Normal of the local control functions.  
The state transition by the electric power system, from ALERT to EMERGENCY, occurs in 
case of electric contingency.  
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The states NORMAL, ALERT and EMERGENCY compose the global state Intact of the 
electric power system.  
 
5.2 Interaction between TSO and DSO operators in emergency conditions 
(Scenario 2) 
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects due to ICT threats to the 
communication channel among TSO and DSO Control Centres and MCD-TUs in emergency 
conditions (under-frequency or voltage instability). 
This scenario explores the security of the communications between the Transmission and 
Distribution System Operators under emergency operating conditions. 
It is assumed that in emergency conditions the TSO is authorised by the DSO to activate 
defence plan actions consisting in the performance of load shedding activities on the 
Distribution Grid. 
The procedure of automatic load shedding must be executed in 1 second. Some special TSO 
master MCD-TUs arm the DSO MCD-TUs and then automatically send the command of load 
shedding. The operations are monitored by the ATS and NTS. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• TSO 
• DSO 
• TSP of TSO 
• TSP of DSO 
Information Control Systems involved:  
All the telecontrol systems of TSO and DSO are involved (see Figure 5-14): 
• NTS (TSO NCC) 
• MCD-TU (TSO Substation) 
• ATS (DSO CC) 
• MCD-TU (DSO Substation) 
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Figure 5-14: TSO and DSO telecontrol systems 
Information Flow: 
• Measurements from DSO CC to TSO CC 
• Signals from DSO CC to TSO CC 
• Commands from TSO MCD-TU to MCD-TU through DSO CC 
• Arming/unarming requests: from TSO CC to DSO CC. 
Real-time requirements:  
Commands have a maximum response time of 1 sec. This is the reaction time to the 
variation of frequency detected by the MCD-TUs (TSO). It is important to notice that delivery 
time does not exceed 600 ms because the opening of circuit breakers (managed by MCD-TU 
(DSO)) needs hundred milliseconds. 
Power Contingencies:  
This scenario explores power contingencies causing load shedding. 
Goals:  
The main purpose of the Scenario 2 consists in the assessment of the security of the TSO-
DSO communications 
ICT Threats:  
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• DoS attacks to the Substation Automation Systems, generated by enemies located 
on the TSO telecontrol backbone 
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• Intrusion into the Centre/Substation communication flow followed eventually by the 
execution of faked commands 
Cascading Effects and possible countermeasures: 
Cyber attacks carried out under emergency conditions, when defence actions have to be 
performed out under strict real time constraints, can cause severe damages, like inhibiting 
the required automatic load shedding actions. 
As stated in the Scenario 1 the effects on the Power System of the considered ICT attack 
depend on the number of components involved. 
 
5.3 Integration of DSO Operation and Maintenance functions (Scenario 3) 
This scenario explores the integration of process control and corporate networks in a MV 
DSO Control Centre, evaluating the possible cascading effects of cyber attacks on the 
integrated architecture.  
It assumes the use of a DSO corporate intranet to access data for: 
• Maintenance of MV and LV grid. The maintenance manager needs to know both the 
status of the Grid and the availability of the maintenance personnel, in order to carry 
out maintenance plans 
• Access to process information by other Corporate functions (administrative, 
management, metering, …) 
Communications are filtered by a central firewall. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• DSO 
• Distribution Maintenance Manager 
• TSP of the DSO Process Network 
• TSP of the DSO Corporate Network 
Information Control Systems involved: 
All the ICT systems of DSO are involved (see Figure 5-15): 
• ATS (DSO CC) 
• Web Server (Corporate) 
• Data Archive (Corporate): process data, service data 
• MCD-TU (DSO) 
• TSP that has in charge the Process Network 
• TSP that has in charge the Corporate Network 
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Figure 5-15: Integration of Operation and Management DSO functions 
Information Flow: 
The information are: 
• Measurements 
• Signals 
• Metering data 
• Information are exchanged by means of IP Network based standard protocols: 
o Web Services in case of web applications (e.g. http) 
o SQL queries to access the Data Base 
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o Data Exchange protocols (e.g. ftp) 
Real-time requirements: 
Not relevant. 
Power contingencies: 
Not relevant. 
Goals: 
The main purposes of the Scenario 3 are: 
• assess the vulnerability of the central firewall in the Control Centre 
• test the resilience of the most critical control applications  
• assess the possibility of compromising process data 
ICT Threats:  
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• Viral infections propagating from the Corporate Network to the Process Network 
• Vulnerabilities of standard application layer protocols (ex. http and ftp) used for 
power management related communications 
• Intrusion into the databases of the Area Telecontrol System, Metering systems and 
corruption of process data 
Cascading Effects and possible countemeasures: 
The occurrence of the considered ICT threats may cause the reduction of the DSO 
communication bandwidth with degradation in SCADA response time and possible cascading 
phenomena as in the first scenario and the unavailability or wrong perception of essential 
data with possibly severe consequences as for instance economic losses due to wrong 
billing. 
As stated in the Scenario 1 the effects on the Power System of the considered ICT attack 
depend on the number of components involved. 
 
5.4 Maintenance of ICT components of DSO (Scenario 4) 
This scenario considers the use of a DSO Centralized ICT maintenance service. It assumes 
the presence of a central Control Centre for the monitoring and control of the components of 
all the ICT systems of the Power Utility providing: 
• Remote ordinary maintenance activities on the ICT components 
• Continuous monitoring of the ICT equipment status, including security monitoring 
functions 
• Repair actions on ICT network and equipment configurations. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• DSO 
• Distribution ICT Manager 
• TSP that has in charge the Process Network 
• TSP that has in charge the Corporate Network. 
Analysis of new control applications                          Page 93  
 
Information Control Systems involved: 
All the ICT systems of DSO are involved (see Figure 5-16). 
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Figure 5-16: DSO Centralised ICT Maintenance 
Information Flow: 
The information flow interesting maintenance activities includes the transmission of status 
information towards the Control Centre and the delivery of commands and data related to 
functional testing and remote operation of ICT devices (e.g. runtime reconfiguration) from the 
Centre. 
Real-time requirements: 
Not relevant. 
Power contingencies: 
Not relevant. 
Goals: 
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The main purposes of the Scenario 3 are: 
• assess the remote functional testing and operations on the ICT devices 
• assess the remote reconfiguration of the substation automation. 
ICT Threats:  
The remote maintenance system relies strongly on the internet and is exposed to all possible 
cyber threats affecting ICT components (e.g. IEDs, Routers, Servers, Firewalls). 
Cascading Effects and countermeasures: 
The severity of the damage caused by the cyber attacks depends of course on the number of 
components affected and on their role in the operator’s services, with cascading effects 
having as ultimate consequence the loss of the supervision and monitoring maintenance 
functions. 
 
5.5 Interaction among GENCOs and TSO for electrical contingency and ICT 
threats 
The important points are those regarding the critical situations in which the system could 
operate and for which attacks or/and non malicious circumstances could lead to the 
instability of local systems or, in the worst case, instability of large areas and also of the 
whole system, as in the black-out of Italy in 2003. 
1. Possible instability problems 
a- Instability of the electromechanical mode for:  
a1- PSS (Power System Stabiliser) out of order, by the operator 
a2- very critical grid configuration 
a3- mistakes in the tuning of the PSS parameters. 
b- Voltage collapse, due to too much load in comparison with the available electric 
power 
c- Instability of inter-area oscillations of the Electric Power System 
2- Possible problems with protections 
Some problems can be due to protections as e.g.: 
a- mistakes in the tuning of protection parameters (thresholds, time constants, etc.)  
b- misbehaviour of the protection for lack of coordination or for misunderstanding 
among protections and the SCADA system 
3- Problems due to interdependencies among the transmission grid and the information 
networks 
a- Communication problems among the different regulators 
b- Mistakes due to malicious attacks to the SCADA of the control room in the power 
plant 
c- Malicious attacks to the information links inside the Power Plants (AVR and PQR ) 
from power plant to Regional Voltage Regulator(RVR), and the National Voltage 
Regulator (NVR). 
 
5.5.1 Transmission Grid Voltage and Frequency regulations (Scenario 5) 
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects due to : 
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• ICT threats to the communication channel among TSO Control Centres and GENCOs 
and to Control Systems used for voltage and frequency regulations 
• Measurement failures of TSO and GENCO voltage and frequency regulation systems 
 
5.5.1.1 Hierarchical Voltage and Frequency Regulation Systems (Scenario 5.1) 
This scenario (Case 5.1) considers the information exchange among TSO Control Centres 
and GENCO Power Plant under voltage and frequency regulations of Power System in the 
NORMAL operating conditions. It ensures the regulation of the Generation Groups of the 
Power Plant. 
The hierarchical voltage and frequency regulation systems allow the TSO to perform voltage 
and frequency regulations and data acquisition activities of generation groups. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• GENCO 
• TSO 
• TSP of GENCO 
• TSP of TSO 
Information Control Systems involved:  
The Voltage and Frequency regulation systems of TSO and GENCO involved are (see 
Figure 5-17): 
• AVR (GENCO) 
• PQR (GENCO) 
• RVR (TSO RCC) 
• NVR (TSO NCC) 
• PFR (GENCO) 
• SFR (TSO NCC) 
The Teleoperation systems involved are (see Figure 5-17): 
• SCADA (GENCO) 
• RTS (TSO RCC) 
• NTS (TSO NCC) 
Component involved are (see Figure 5-17): 
• MCD-TU (GENCO proprietary Substation) 
• MCD-TU (TSO Substation) 
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Figure 5-17: Interaction between TSO and GENCO regulation systems 
Information Flow: 
• Measurements: from AVR and PQR to SCADA, RVR and RTS; from PFR to SFR 
• Signals: 
o regulation levels from PQR to AVRs; from AVRs and PFRs to generators 
o alarms from AVRs to PQRs; from PQRs to RVR; from RVRs to NVR; from 
PFRs to SFR 
• Commands:  
o frequency and voltage regulation levels from TSO NVR to RVRs; from RVRs 
to PQRs; from PQR to AVRs;  from TSO SFR to PFR 
o inclusion/exclusion of GENCO groups in TSO frequency or voltage regulations 
o variation of transformation ratio (ULTC) 
Real-time requirements: 
Commands have a response time within the time required by PQR, AVR, RVR and NVR and 
SFR and PFR. 
Goals: 
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The main purpose of the scenario is to assess the security of the TSO-GENCO 
communications. 
ICT Threats: 
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• DoS attacks to the telecontrol communications, generated by enemies located on the 
Telecom IP backbone or inside the TSO (e.g. connection requests on the port used 
by the IEC protocol) 
• Intrusion into the Regional Centre/Power Plant communication flow followed by the 
execution of faked commands (sending wrong set-up parameters) 
• Intrusion into the Regional Centres/National Centres communication flow followed by 
the execution of faked commands (sending wrong set-up parameters) 
• Exploitation of the vulnerabilities of the standard application layer protocols 
(e.g., http and ftp) used for supervision and monitoring activities 
• Viral infections of System computers provoked by: 
o Voluntary diffusion/propagation during maintenance of SCADA 
o Involuntary propagation using external PC for maintenance 
Cascading Effects: 
Referring to the ICT components involved in the Control Systems are depicted the 
consequences of each threats: 
• DoS attack on the VPN that connect TSO to a GENCO (ICT-T1) 
This attack reduces the communication bandwidth with consequent partial or 
complete loss of remote voltage control functions (ICT-C1) (due to the 
consumption of communication bandwidth that cause delay or black-out to delivery of 
measurements to RVR, NVR, SFR and ATS and to receive of commands from RVR, 
NVR and SFR) and transition in ALERT situation (with extreme consequence the loss 
of electrical security N-1) (see Figure 5-5). The local control functions are not 
affected, but there are: 
o Lack of measurements from AVR, SCADA, PQR, PFR to the RVR, NVR, SFR 
and ATS 
o Lack of receiving commands from NVR, RVR, PQR and SFR 
The targets of an attack could be: 
o a PQR: in this case the effect is the loss of remote control of some generation 
groups 
o a RVR: this is the worst case in which there is as possible effect the loss of 
remote voltage control of a large area  
Possible ITC countermeasures (ICT-A1): 
o Firewalling 
o Monitoring of anomalous packets traffic (increasing amount of packets and 
proactive verification of their contents) 
o Redundancy of communication channel 
• DoS attack on the VPN that connect the TSO centres (ICT-T1) 
This attack reduces the communication bandwidth with consequent partial or 
complete loss of remote voltage control functions (ICT-C1) (due to the 
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consumption of communication bandwidth that provoke delay or black-out of delivery 
of measurements to RVR and NVR and of receive of commands from NVR) and 
transition in ALERT situation (with extreme consequence the loss of electrical security 
N-1) (see Figure 5-5). The local control functions are not affected, but there are: 
o Lack of measurements from ATS to NTS and RVR to NVR 
o Lack of receiving commands from NVR 
The targets of an attack could be: 
o a RVR: in this case the effect is the loss of remote voltage control of an area 
o the NVR: this is the worst case in which there is as possible effect the loss of 
remote control of the entire nation in term of optimization of pilot node 
voltages. 
Possible ITC countermeasures (ICT-A1): 
o Firewalling 
o Monitoring of anomalous packets traffic (increasing amount of packets and 
proactive verification of their contents) 
o Redundancy of communication channel 
• Intrusion into the Centre/Power Plant communication network (ICT-T2) 
This kind of attack may have far reaching consequences as for instance the 
execution of faked commands on PQR (ICT-C2), as receiving wrong PQR set-up 
parameters (see Figure 5-6) and transition in ALERT situation (with extreme 
consequence in case of generators tripping). The local control functions are ensured. 
Possible ITC countermeasures (ICT-A2): 
o Cryptation 
o PQR/RVR authentication mechanisms 
• Intrusion into the Regional Centre/National Centre communication network 
(ICT-T2) 
This kind of attack may have far reaching consequences as for instance the 
execution of faked commands on RVR (ICT-C2), as receiving wrong RVR set-up 
parameters (see Figure 5-6) and transition in ALERT state (with an extreme 
consequence in case of generators tripping). The local control functions are ensured. 
Possible ITC countermeasures (ICT-A2): 
o Cryptation 
o RVR/NVR authentication mechanisms 
• Viral infection of the ICT components (ICT-T3) 
Viral infections may cause the total or partial loss of control and monitoring 
functions (ICT-C3) (see Figure 5-7). The local control functions are not ensured and 
the Power Plant risks the generation trip. There are: 
o Lack of measurements from SCADA, PQR to the RVR, NVR and ATS, from 
PFR to SFR 
o Lack of receiving commands from RVR, NVR and SFR 
o Lack of signals from PQR to AVRs and SFR to Generators 
Possible ITC countermeasures (ICT-A3): 
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o Gateway antivirus 
o Authentication mechanisms of firewall 
• Authentication violation of TSO network (ICT-T4) 
Unauthorised access causes loss of secure access to the GENCOs (ICT-C4) PQR 
component functions (see Figure 5-8). The local control functions are ensured, but is 
possible an: 
o Uncontrolled changing of some PQR set-up parameters (ICT-C4) 
Automatic application of ITC countermeasures (ICT-A4): 
o Firewall maintenance authentication mechanisms 
o PQR maintenance authentication mechanism 
The effects on the Power System of the considered ICT attacks depend on the number of 
components involved. 
In NORMAL operating conditions, an attack to a single PQR or SFR probably there is not 
lead a loss of electrical security N-1 criterion because the control system is intrinsically 
redundant.  
If the attack is to a RVR or NVR and SFR, that manage a specific area, the effects are the 
loss of possibility to manage other electrical contingency (e.g., line overloads) with transition 
to ALERT operating state. 
5.5.1.2 Protection intervention due to erroneous measurements (Scenario 5.2) 
This scenario (Case 5.2) considers in the NORMAL or EMERGENCY Power System 
operating state the possible measurement failures of generation and transmission systems. 
The protection intervention ensures the second line of defence of the Power System. The 
protection intervention depends on measurements acquired. 
The incorrect intervention of protections mechanism, due to erroneous measurements, may 
cause consequences similar to the electrical contingencies. 
The protections are programmed with thresholds and algorithms. 
The use of digital equipment to acquire measurements and elaborate them using algorithms 
that are tuned using PCs is now widespread. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• GENCO 
• TSO 
• TSP of GENCO 
• TSP of DSO 
Information Control Systems involved:  
All the regulation systems of GENCO and DSO are involved (see Figure 5-17): 
• AVR (GENCO) 
• PQR (GENCO) 
• RVR (TSO RCC) 
• NVR (TSO NCC) 
• PFR (GENCO) 
• SFR (TSO NCC) 
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The Teleoperation systems involved are (see Figure 5-17): 
• SCADA (GENCO) 
• RTS (TSO RCC) 
• NTS (TSO NCC) 
Component involved are (see Figure 5-17): 
• MCD-TU (GENCO proprietary Substation) 
• MCD-TU (TSO Substation) 
Information Flow: 
• Measurements from MCD-TU to SCADA and RTS, from AVR to PQR and RVR, NVR, 
from PFR to SFR 
• Signals from PFR and AVR to Generators 
• Commands from RTS and NTS to MCD-TU, from NVR and RVR to PQR, form SFR 
to PFR 
Real-time requirements: 
Not relevant. 
Power Contingencies:  
The power contingencies considered for this scenario are related with the failure of 
protections in NORMAL and EMERGENCY conditions. 
Goals:  
The main purpose of the scenario is to assess the security of the Protection configuration. 
ICT Threats: 
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• DoS attacks on the telecontrol communications, generated by enemies located on the 
Telecom IP backbone or inside the TSO (e.g. connection requests on the port used 
by the IEC protocol) 
• Intrusion into the National Centre/Power Plant communication flow followed by the 
execution of faked commands (send of wrong set-up parameters) 
Cascading Effects and possible countemeasures: 
Referring to the ICT components involved in the Control Systems are depicted the 
consequences of each threat: 
• DoS attack to the VPN that connect TSO to a GENCO (ICT-T1) 
This attack reduces the communication bandwidth causing partial or complete loss of 
remote control functions (ICT-C1) (due to the consumption of communication 
bandwidth that provoke delay or black-out to delivery of measurements to RVR and 
SFR and to receive of commands from RVR and SFR) and transition in ALERT 
situation (with extreme consequence the loss of electrical security N-1) (see Figure 5-
5). The local control functions are ensured, but there are: 
o Lack of measurements from SCADA, PQR and PFR to the NTS, RVR and 
SFR 
o Lack of receiving commands from SFR 
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The targets of an attack could be: 
o a PFR: in this case the effect is the loss of frequency remote control of some 
generation groups 
o a SFR: this is the worst case in which there is as possible effect the loss of 
frequency remote control of a large area  
o a PQR: only one power plant is affected  
o a RVR: in this case the effect is the loss of voltage remote control of an area 
o the NVR: this is the worst case in which there is as possible effect the loss of 
optimal voltage remote control of the entire nation 
Possibly ITC countermeasures (ICT-A1): 
o Firewalling 
o Monitoring of anomalous packets traffic (increasing amount of packets and 
proactive verification of their contents) 
o Redundancy of communication channel 
• Intrusion into the National Centre/Power Plant communication network (ICT-T2) 
This kind of attack may have far reaching consequence as for instance the execution 
of faked commands on NVR, RVR and PFR (ICT-C2), as receiving wrong RVR and 
PFR set-up parameters (see Figure 5-6) and transition in ALERT situation (with 
extreme consequence in case of generators tripping). The local control functions are 
ensured. 
Automatic application of ITC countermeasures (ICT-A2): 
o Cryptation 
o NVR/RVR/PQR and /PFR/SFR authentication mechanisms 
The effects depend on the number of components attacked. If we consider, in NORMAL 
operating state, an attack to a single PQR and PFR probably there is not a loss of electrical 
security N-1 because the protection system is designed intrinsically redundant. If the attack is 
to a RVR or SFR, that manage a specific area, the effects are the loss of possibility to 
manage other electrical contingency ( e.g., line overloads) with transition to ALERT operating 
state. 
The ICT threats are assumed to happen in presence of the power contingency described in 
the scenario. The magnified effects of ICT threats are strictly depending on the kind of attack 
and the instant in which is performed: 
• during the manual load shedding actions (see state diagram) 
• by provoking a wrong intervention of protections 
 
5.5.2 Instability of Electromechanical Mode of Power Plant-Transmission Grid 
Systems (Scenario 6) 
This scenario considers the possible cascading effects due to : 
• Specific abnormal operating conditions of the system constituted by a Power Plant 
and the transmission grid, which is related to the electromechanical oscillation mode 
• ICT threats to GENCO Control Systems used for voltage and frequency regulations. 
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5.5.2.1 Instability of Electromechanical Mode management (Scenario 6.1) 
This scenario (Case 6.1) considers specific abnormal operating conditions of the system 
constituted by a Power Plant and the transmission grid, which is related to the 
electromechanical oscillation mode (see section 3.3.2). 
The electromechanical oscillation mode can become unstable for: 
a) very high value of the external reactance Xe as a consequence of an abnormal 
network configuration 
b) wrong parameters of the PSS (Power System Stabiliser), that is the additional 
feedbacks of the excitation regulation system 
Another way through which the electromechanical oscillation mode can become unstable is 
by predatory control, this type of control is described in [DeMarco & Braden 2006]. This 
paper evidenced the possibility to destabilise a Power Plant through a special state control 
from another Power Plant. 
Case a: 
In this situation some change in the grid configuration (C1) could bring the 
electromechanical mode of power plant-transmission grid system to be unstable in some 
operating conditions, especially during the night when the reactive power must be absorbed 
by the power plants and the generators are in under-excitation. 
Let us now describe some worst case evolutions of cascading effects taking into account that 
the propagation of the effects happens when a given defence action does not work due to 
some device malfunction. 
Starting from the system in the operation state NORMAL (see Figure 3-1), the system pass 
to the ALERT state. 
If the contingency provoking the alerting condition is removed (the grid configuration is 
recovered (A1)) the system state returns to NORMAL. 
Otherwise the unstable condition has kept so a disturbance on the grid or on the ICT 
system leads to have electromechanical oscillations higher and higher leading to the trip of 
the power plant (C2) under consideration. So probably the electrical security N-1 has 
been lost  and the system shifts to the EMERGENCY state. 
This is a typical case in which the first line of defence (constituted by the regulation and 
control systems) becomes not adequate, because the values of the PSS parameters are not 
adequate for the new abnormal value of the external reactance to face all the variations in 
the operating conditions of the power plant. 
From the EMERGENCY state the system may pass to the ALERT/NORMAL state by means 
of the intervention of the spinning reserve power (A2), depending on the amount of 
available reserve power and on the instability removal. In parallel to the reserve management 
there is the activity of the Secondary Frequency Regulator (SFR). 
In case the regulation performed by means of the reserve intervention and the SFR does not 
succeed the system may observe a decrease in the value of the frequency (C2).  
To react to the decrease in the frequency the TSO puts in operation the normal actions of 
defence that are based on automatic load shedding (A3) in under-frequency conditions, in 
order to achieve the equilibrium between energy produced and the loads. 
However, from statistical data, it has been proved that 15% of the automatic load shedding 
devices do not work correctly once activated. 
If these automatic actions are not able to regain the NORMAL/ALERT state of the system 
then it will be necessary to take additional emergency actions based on manual load 
shedding (A4). 
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In particular load conditions, as during the night and in ferial days, the voltage values could 
be too high (C4) on the HV and EHV grid, which could damage the isolation of the 
components. In the meanwhile the synchronous generators are called to operate at under-
excitation limits with consequently reduction of system wide transmission stability of the 
whole electric grid, generally speaking the stability margin is lower in correspondence of 
negative reactive power production. 
To avoid reductions in the interconnection of the grid it is possible manually introduce some 
shunt reactances (A5), which have the goal to absorb reactive power for: 
• reduce the values of voltage 
• to lead the synchronous generators in more stable operating conditions 
If the situation becomes very critical it is possible to have the reductions in the 
interconnection of the grid (C5). This situation is defined IN EXTREMIS state (island 
operation state). 
Case b: 
This case involves AVR, in particular the additional feedbacks (or PSS), that could receive 
wrong set up parameters (eventually due to some intrusion through the AVR Engineering 
HMI or through the PQR or the GENCO-SCADA system) and/or generate erroneous 
regulation signals (C1). 
The instability of the electromechanical mode will provoke the group trip (C2). The first 
action to compensate the lost power of the group (A2) under consideration is constituted 
by the Primary Frequency Regulators (PFR) of the other groups of the power plant . They will 
try to recover by producing the lost power. In the case that this action is not sufficient the 
spinning reserve power (A3) management will come into action to return the system to the 
ALERT/NORMAL state. It is assumed that this last intervention is sufficient to face the power 
contingency, otherwise it is necessary to return to the evolution of underfrequency (C3) 
contingency described for the case a). 
Stakeholders involved: 
• GENCO 
• TSO 
Information Control Systems involved: 
In case b all the GENCO telecontrol systems are involved (see Figure 5-18): 
• SCADA: Power Plant supervision 
• AVR: voltage regulators 
• PQR: reactive power regulator and bus bar voltage regulator 
In order to manage the load shedding the TSO telecontrol system is involved and also it is 
necessary a direct communication with DSO local Substation management units (see Figure 
5-14): 
• MCD-TU (TSO and DSO Substation): that manage the automatic load shedding 
• RTS, NTS: that manage the manual load shedding 
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Figure 5-18: ICT systems involved in GENCO Teleoperation and Control 
Information Flow: 
The information flows are in: 
• Case a: involves MCD-TU, RTS and NTS: 
o Measures: 
 Vi, Ii, Pi, Qi and δi , with i= 1…..N groups, from the AVR of each group 
to PQR and SCADA 
 Vi, Ii, Pi, Qi and δi, with i= 1…..N groups, from SCADA to RVR inside 
the RTS 
 VBus-bar and VPilot from MCD-TU to RVR inside the RTS 
o Signals: alarms from MCD-TU to RTS and NTS 
o Commands: 
 from RVR to adjust the reactive power reference for the PQR 
 from NVR adjust the pilot nodes voltage reference for the RVR 
 from RTS and NTS to MCD-TU for: 
 manual load shedding 
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 insertion of shunt reactances 
• Case b: involves AVR with PSS, PQR, PFR, SCADA, RTS and NTS: 
o Measures: 
 Vi, Ii, Pi, Qi and δi, with i= 1…..N groups, from the AVR of each group 
to PQR and SCADA 
 Vi, Ii, Pi, Qi and δi, with i= 1…..N groups, from SCADA to RVR inside 
the RTS 
 fref and f from each PFR to SCADA 
 VBus-bar from MCD-TU to PQR and RTS 
o Signals: alarms from MCD-TU to RTS and NTS 
o Commands: 
 from PQR to adjust the reference of each AVR 
 from RVR to adjust the reactive power reference for the PQR 
 from NVR adjust the pilot nodes voltage reference for the RVR 
 from RTS and NTS to MCD-TU for: 
 manual load shedding 
 insertion of shunt reactors 
Real-time requirements: 
Commands have a maximum response time of 1 sec. 
Power contingencies: 
This scenario explores the consequences of an abnormal network configuration due to a very 
high value of the external reactance Xe. 
Goals: 
The main purpose of the scenario is to show the interdependencies among the macro-parts 
of the Power Infrastructure,  e.g., how a power disturbance may propagate from the Grid to 
the Power Plant causing the generators to trip and this situation requires an intervention of 
TSO to avoid an under-frequency situation that could cause a disconnection of a part of the 
Grid. 
ICT Threats: 
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• Viral infections propagating from the PQR and SCADA PCs through the Local Area 
Network. Infection diffuses by PC used for maintenance or other PC on the network. 
• Intrusion into the local Power Plant and TSO Centre/Power Plant communications 
flow followed by the execution of faked commands (like modify parameters settings) 
• DoS attacks to the telecontrol communications, generated by enemies located on the 
Power Plant, Telecom IP backbone or TSO centres 
The effects of threats are strictly depending on the instant in which they are performed: 
• The ICT threats are assumed to happen in presence of the power contingency 
described in the scenario Case 6.1 a). In particular they occur during the manual load 
shedding actions (see state diagram). 
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• The ICT threats are assumed to happen in presence of the power contingency 
described in the scenario Case 6.1 b), by provoking a wrong intervention of the PFRs. 
Cascading Effects and possible countermeasures: 
In Figure 5-19 and Figure 5-20, referring to the state of the Power System (see Figure 3-1) 
are depicted possible sequences of the cascading effects that may collapse into an IN 
EXTREMIS situation. 
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Figure 5-19: Instability of electromechanical mode Case a) - Sequence of possible 
Cascading Effects 
Regarding this sequence (case a) the state transitions are generated by: 
• Change of grid configuration (C1) with consequent changing of grid Xe parameter 
in NORMAL situation, and so the system moves to ALERT state automatic applying a 
set of regulation actions. If the grid configuration is restored (A1) the system return 
into NORMAL state. 
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• Generators trip (C2) with consequent possible loss of electrical security N-1 and 
transition from ALERT to EMERGENCY power system state. Automatic application of 
preventive actions: 
o Spinning reserve power (A2) 
• Decrement of frequency (C3) with consequent maintaining of state of 
EMERGENCY situation. Automatic applying of corrective actions: 
o Automatic load shedding (A3) 
Manual application of corrective actions: 
o Manual load shedding (A4) 
• Over-voltage (C4) with consequent maintaining of state of EMERGENCY situation. 
Manual applying of corrective actions: 
o Manual activation of shunt reactance (A5) 
o Manual load shedding (A4) 
• Separation of grid (C5) with consequent formation of system islands, transition in 
IN-EXTREMIS situation. Automatic application of corrective actions in order to ensure 
the islands are: 
o Regulation of reserve back up generation 
o Automatic load shedding 
In conditions where the Grid is not intact, the restoration actions start. These actions are 
managed by TSO. 
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Figure 5-20: Instability of electromechanical mode Case b) - Sequence of possible 
Cascading Effects 
Regarding this sequence (case b) the state transitions are generated by: 
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• Failure of PSS (C1) with consequent instability of the electromechanical mode of a 
group in NORMAL situation, and so the system pass to ALERT state automatic 
applying of groups regulation actions. If the PSS functionalities are restored (A1) 
the system return into NORMAL state. 
• Generators trip (C2) with consequent possible loss of electrical security N-1 and 
transition from ALERT to EMERGENCY power system state. Automatic application of 
preventive actions: 
o PFRs regulations (A2) 
• Decrement of frequency (C3) with consequent maintaining of state of 
EMERGENCY situation. Automatic application of corrective actions: 
o Spinning reserve power (A2) 
If the contingency of decrement of frequency remain the cascading effects are the same 
that in case a): 
• Over-voltage (C4) with consequent maintaining of state of EMERGENCY situation. 
Manual application of corrective actions: 
o Manual activation of shunt reactance (A4) 
o Manual load shedding (A5) 
• Separation of grid (C5) with consequent formation of system islands, transition in 
IN-EXTREMIS situation. Automatic application of corrective actions in order to ensure 
the islands are: 
o Regulation of reserve back up generation 
o Automatic load shedding  
In conditions of not intact Grid the restoration action starts. These actions are managed by 
TSO. 
The effects presented in Case 6.1 are amplified by the ICT threats. This situation is due to 
the delay in execution of commands. Oscillations may degenerate in an escalation in tenths 
of seconds if the countermeasures are not executed in time. 
5.5.2.2 Supervision and Control functions of Generation (Scenario 6.2) 
This scenario (Case 6.2) considers the possible consequences of ICT anomalies on Power 
Plant supervision and control system not in presence of electrical contingencies. 
In a Power Plant the SCADA system is linked to PQR and PFR and with the AVRs in order to 
collect all the data about the primary and secondary voltage regulation, statistics on 
production, failures, abnormal operations, etc.. On this basis different logical networks are on 
the same physical networks. 
The supervisory systems are based on commercial operating systems. 
The maintenance of systems is made using also external PCs. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• GENCO 
• Software (SCADA, PQR, AVR, PFR) maintenance provider 
Information Control Systems involved: 
(see Case 6.1) 
All the GENCO telecontrol systems are involved (see Figure 5-18): 
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• SCADA: Power Plant supervision 
• AVR, PQR: voltage regulators 
• PFR: frequency regulator 
• MCD-TU (Substation): substation management 
Information flow: 
The information flow involves AVR, PQR, PFR, SCADA, RTS: 
• Measures: 
o V, P, Q and  from AVR to SCADA 
o V, P, Q and  from SCADA to RTS 
o V, P, Q, qref, Qtot and  from AVRs to PQR 
o fref and f from PFR to SCADA 
o VBus-bar from MCD-TU to PQR and RTS 
Real-time requirements: 
Commands have a response time within the time required by PQR, AVR and PFR. 
Power Contingencies: 
Not relevant. 
Goals: 
The main purposes of this scenario are (see also Case 6.1): 
• show the interdependencies among the macro-parts of the Power Infrastructure,  e.g., 
how an ICT problem on the telecontrol system may propagate from the single 
component to the other involved in the Power Plant causing an escalation. 
• show the possibility that a slow down of communication could provoke unexpected 
fault on execution of control or delay in reaction to change of variables. 
• show the vulnerability of the communication due to the use of the same channel for 
different real-time activities. 
ICT Threats: 
In principle the set of threat hypothesis to investigate on a given control scenario should be 
stated on the basis of the results of a risk assessment activity. 
• Viral infections propagating from the PQR and SCADA PCs through the Local Area 
Network. Infection diffuses by PC used for maintenance or other PC on the network 
• Intrusion into the local Power Plant and TSO Centre/Power Plant communications 
flow followed by the execution of faked commands (like modify parameters settings) 
• DoS attacks to the telecontrol communications, generated by enemies located on the 
Power Plant, Telecom IP backbone or TSO centres 
One instance of ICT threat is related to the setting of the AVR parameters, by provoking the 
instability of the electromechanical mode (see the Case 6.1 b)). 
Cascading Effects and possible countermeasures: 
In this scenario are reported consequences related to fault of ICT components related to: 
• The loss of functionality of each ICT component of Telecontrol systems: 
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o Lack of supervision and control (RTS/NTS) 
o Lack of automatic load shedding 
o Lack of manual load shedding 
o Lack of manual shunt reactance 
• The loss of confidentiality: 
o Improper activation of shunt reactance 
o Not adequate load shedding 
 
5.5.3 Low damped or unstable inter-area oscillations (Scenario 7) 
This scenario takes into account the phenomenon of low damped or unstable inter-area 
oscillation. Also the UCTE (Union for Coordination for Transmission of Electricity) considers 
the phenomena of inter-area oscillations – like other large synchronously interconnected 
power systems world-wide, too. This phenomenon has an increasing meaning in extended 
power systems, especially if they are loaded by high power transfers. It has to be tackled in 
an adequate manner as otherwise the risk of instability may arise in certain system 
conditions with serious consequences for the electrical security of the system [UCTE Report 
2002]. 
Inter-area oscillations involve combinations of many machines on one part of a system 
swinging against machines on another part of the system. The characteristic frequency of 
inter-area modes of oscillation is generally in the range of 0.1 to 0.6 Hz for example in the 
case - in UCTE/CENTREL system - two significant inter-area mode can be observed: 0.26 
and 0.32 Hz. 
The interconnected electric power systems under certain operating conditions, through 
increased efforts to transfer electric power across wide geographical and electrical distances, 
shown low frequency oscillations between two specific power plants located in two 
administratively different subsystems. 
These oscillations are known as the inter area oscillations, their frequencies are low and they 
can be excited by any type of disturbance in the system. 
These oscillations could severely restrict system operation by requiring the curtailment of 
electric power transfer as operational measure. 
These oscillations could also lead to widespread system disturbances if cascading outages 
of transmission lines occur due to oscillatory power swings. 
When these oscillations are unstable the situation is very critical because the trip of 
generators could bring us in a very critical situation: when one generator is tripped from the 
network, and the situation could become worse and worse.  
The damping of the oscillation depends on the system loading, the load characteristics and 
generator/turbine control. A poor damping may lead to severe consequence for the whole 
system. Insufficient damping may become a problem especially for systems with such 
oscillation frequencies which are not damped by the generators and their standard control 
systems. Unfortunately, an oscillation frequency (  0.26 Hz ) exists in the UCTE system, 
which lies in this critical range of poor natural system damping. Therefore, damping had to be 
improved by optimising parameter settings of generator voltage control and implementation 
of Power System Stabilisers (PSS). 
The mechanical model illustrates that the supra-regional structure of the system is the main 
factor regarding the basic dynamic system characteristic, whereas the regional grid design 
has only little influence. It is evident that the system dynamics will change significantly in 
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case of interconnection with a further area. The new system configuration may lead to new 
frequencies of possible oscillations. 
This aspect is presently an important issue dealt with by the UCTE Working Group on 
System Development. While the UCTE system has grown more or less gradually in the past, 
UCTE is now faced with requests to extend the synchronous area in relatively large steps 
through interconnection with other existing interconnected power systems. UCTE has to 
investigate carefully the effect on the dynamic system behaviour before synchronising an 
adjacent system. 
To this end, UCTE uses a complete dynamic model for the synchronous area representing 
the 380/220 kV grid and all large generation units including their generator and turbine 
control systems. This model is validated by recordings from the real system. This process is 
also required from the extension area: modelling on the basis of dynamic data and validation 
by recordings collected during isolated operation. The technical requirements are defined by 
investigations of the whole extended synchronous area. Using modern techniques for power 
system analysis and control, UCTE meets its obligation to maintain the electrical security of 
the whole system, and enables the technical means to be optimally used for reliable parallel 
operation with new partners. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• GENCO 
• TSO 
• TSP (GENCO) 
• TSP (TSO) 
Information Control Systems involved:  
Regulation systems of TSO and GENCO involved (see Figure 5-17): 
• AVR-PSS (GENCO) 
• PQR (GENCO) 
• PFR (GENCO) 
• SFR (TSO NCC) 
• SCADA (GENCO) 
• RTS (TSO ACC) 
• NTS (TSO NCC) 
Information flow: 
The information flow is classified as follows: 
• Measurements: from AVR, PQR, PFR and Substation to SCADA, SFR, RTS and RTS 
• Signals: from AVR, PQR, PFR and Substation to SCADA, SFR, RTS and NTS  
• Commands: from PQR, SFR, RTS, NTS and SCADA 
• Information flow AVR, PQR, RVR, NVR, PFR, SFR, Substation and SCADA 
Real-time requirements: 
Commands have a response time within the time required by PQR, AVR, PFR, RVR and 
NVR. 
Power contingencies: 
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The interconnected electric power systems under certain operating conditions, through 
increased efforts to transfer electric power across vast geographical and electrical distances, 
shown low frequency oscillations between two specific power plant located in two 
administratively different subsystems. 
Goals: 
The main purpose of the scenario is to show the interdependencies among the macro-parts 
of the Power Infrastructure, i.e., how a power disturbance may propagate from the Grid to the 
Power Plant causing the line trip and this situation requires an intervention of TSO to avoid 
an under-frequency situation that could cause cascading effects. 
ICT Threats: 
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• Viral infections propagating from the PQR and SCADA PCs through the Local Area 
Network. Infection diffuses by PC used for maintenance or other PC on the network. 
• Intrusion into the local Power Plant and TSO Centre/Power Plant communications 
flow followed by the execution of faked commands (like modify parameters settings) 
• DoS attacks to the telecontrol communications, generated by enemies located on the 
Power Plant, Telecom IP backbone or TSO centres 
Cascading Effects and possible countermeasures: 
In Figure 5-21 referring to the state of the Power System (see Figure 3-1) are depicted 
possible sequences of the cascading effects, that may collapse into an IN EXTREMIS 
situation. 
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Figure 5-21: Inter-area oscillation - Sequence of possible Cascading Effects 
Regarding this sequence the state transitions are generated by: 
• Inter-area oscillation (C1) with consequent low frequency oscillation in NORMAL 
situation, and so the system pass to ALERT state automatic applying of anti-
oscillation regulation actions. If the oscillation is damped (A1) the system returns 
into NORMAL state. 
• Line trip (C2) among the two areas oscillating (Area A and Area B) through 
telecontrol command. This situation provokes two different distinct contingencies in 
each area: 
• Evolution of Area A (blue path in Figure 5-21) with loss of Power Generation 
incoming: 
o Line trip (C2) with consequent loss of electrical security N-1 and transition 
from ALERT to EMERGENCY power system state. Automatic application of 
preventive actions: 
 Spinning reserve power (A2) 
o Decrement of frequency (C3) with consequent maintaining of state of 
EMERGENCY situation. Automatic application of corrective actions: 
 Automatic load shedding (A3) 
Manual application of corrective actions: 
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 Manual load shedding (A5) 
o Over-voltage (C4) with consequent maintaining of state of EMERGENCY 
situation. Manual application of corrective actions: 
 Manual activation of shunt reactance (A4) 
 Manual load shedding (A5) 
• Evolution of Area B (green path in Figure 5-21) with surplus of Power Generation: 
o Line trip (C2) with consequent possible loss of electrical security N-1 and 
transition from ALERT to EMERGENCY power system state. Automatic 
application of preventive actions: 
 Telecontrol trip of generators (A6) 
o Overvoltage/Overfrequency (C6) with consequent maintaining of 
EMERGENCY situation. Automatic application of corrective actions: 
 Intervention of protection (A7) 
• EXTREMIS situation. Automatic application of corrective actions in order to ensure 
the islands: 
o Regulation of reserve back up generation 
o Automatic load shedding (that involves substations of distribution) 
In conditions where the Grid is not intact the restoration actions (A6) start. These actions 
are managed by TSO. 
The effects presented in this case are amplified by the ICT threats. This situation is due to 
the delay in execution of commands. In particular oscillations may degenerate in an 
escalation of them in tenths of seconds if the countermeasures are not executed in time. 
The magnified effects of ICT threats are strictly depending by the kind of attacks and the 
instant when they are performed. 
 
5.5.4 Transmission Grid Short Circuit with loss of Synchronism (Scenario 8) 
This scenario considers the loss of Synchronism caused by a Short Circuit. In Figure 5-22 is 
shown the one-line diagram of the Brindisi area. It is characterised by a strong power 
production and a narrow corridor through which power is transmitted. This determines a low 
Critical Clearing Time (CCT), even if no main lines are lost following the transient. The CCT 
can be roughly estimated to be in between 100 ms and 125 ms. 
Three cases have been considered, namely: 
• stable when the fault duration is 50 ms 
• limit, when fault duration is 100 ms 
• unstable, when the fault duration has length of 125 ms and generators at Brindisi 
South power plant lost synchronism, compared with the rest of Italy - Europe 
generators 
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Figure 5-22: The 400/240 kV diagram of Brindisi 
The angle of generators in Southern Italy can be compared with the angle of "LA CASELLA" 
power plant, located in Northern Italy, that moves in accordance with the rest of the 
unperturbed network. In the Figure 5-23 are shown the generators subdivided in two clusters: 
• the stable cluster in which there are the generators which are in stable situation 
• the unstable cluster in which are the generators which could be unstable in 
consequence of short circuit 
 
Figure 5-23: “Stable” and “Unstable” clusters 
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The evolution of “stable” and “unstable” clusters are presented in the flowing pictures, in 
order to have a simple vision of the behaviour of the generation groups involved in the 
contingency under consideration. 
In Figure 5-24 the angle of the equivalent machines to “stable” cluster and “unstable” cluster 
are shown for the limit case, that is for a Short Circuit of 100 ms. 
 
Figure 5-24: Angles of equivalent machines to “Stable” cluster and “Unstable” cluster 
for the limit case (100ms) 
In Figure 5-25 the angle of the equivalent machines to “stable” cluster and “unstable” cluster 
are shown for the unstable case, that is for a Short Circuit of 125 ms. 
 
Figure 5-25: Angles of equivalent machines to “Stable” cluster and “Unstable” cluster 
for the unstable case (125ms) without any remedial action 
The remedial action to recover the system, must happen by 400 ms from the short circuit 
clearing event. The effectiveness of this action, constituted by the trip of G2 and G3 units of 
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Brindisi Power Plant is shown in Figure 5-26. In this figure are represented the equivalent 
machines angle for the “stable” and “unstable” clusters in the controlled case (trip of G2 and 
G3). 
 
Figure 5-26: Machines angle for the unstable case (125ms) but controlled by tripping 
G2 and G3 Brindisi’s machines 
Some off-line tests show that the remedial action after or equal 450 ms cannot recover the 
system, as put in evidence in Figure 5-27, which shows the system behaviour, when the 
remedial action, due to transmission delay from and to the plant, comes at 450 ms. Figure 5-
25 shows the system transient when no remedial action is taken for the same condition. 
For both the last two cases the Brindisi area lost synchronism. 
 
Figure 5-27: Equivalent machines angle to “Stable” cluster and “Unstable” cluster for 
the unstable case (125ms) when remedial action is taken at 450 ms, by tripping G2 
Brindisi’s unit 
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To verify that excessive and superfluous remedial action does not drive the system to other 
sort of instability, two units are tripped, at the same time. The system is stressed, but it 
survives (see Figure 5-26). 
This condition comes out to be typical for the analysed network. It is real, even if not 
probable, that short circuit of 100 ms up to 150 ms can occur and that areas with 
characteristics like the studied one can temporary be present. 
In Figure 5-28 are shown local machines measures at Brindisi Power Plant, without 
transmission delay, in the “unstable” case but controlled, that is a short circuit of 125 ms of 
duration. 
 
Figure 5-28: Local machine measures at Brindisi power plant with no transmission 
delay. Unstable but controlled case (125ms) 
Stakeholders involved: 
• GENCO 
• TSO 
• TSP of GENCO 
• TSP of TSO 
Information Control Systems involved: 
• Systems of TSO and GENCO involved (see Figure 5-17): 
• AVR-PSS (GENCO) 
Analysis of new control applications                          Page 119  
 
• PQR (GENCO) 
• PFR (GENCO) 
• SFR (TSO NCC) 
• SCADA (GENCO) 
• RTS (TSO ACC) 
• NTS (TSO NCC) 
Information Flow: 
The information flow is classified as follows: 
• Measurements: from AVR, PQR, PFR and Substation to SCADA, SFR, RTS and RTS 
• Signals: from AVR, PQR, PFR and Substation to SCADA, SFR, RTS and NTS  
• Commands: from PQR, SFR, RTS, NTS and SCADA to AVR and PFR 
• Information flow AVR, PQR, RVR, NVR, PFR, SFR, Substation and SCADA 
Real-time requirements: 
Commands have a response time within the time required by PQR, AVR, PFR, RVR and 
NVR. 
Meanwhile the trip of the adequate generators must happen by 400ms. 
Power contingencies: 
The interconnected electric power systems under short circuit can lead to have problems of 
loss of synchronism. 
Goals: 
The main purpose of the scenario consist to show the interdependencies among the different 
power plants of the Power Infrastructure,  i.e. how a power disturbance, as the short circuit, 
may propagate through the Grid to various Power Plants causing the loss of synchronism of 
some generators 
This situation requires an intervention of TSO to avoid the situation that could cause 
cascading effects of loss of synchronism 
ICT Threats:  
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• Viral infections propagating from a PC on the network. 
• Intrusion into the TSO Centre/Power Plant communications flow followed by the 
execution of faked commands (like modify parameters settings) 
• DoS attacks to the telecontrol communications, generated by enemies located on the 
Power Plant, Telecom IP backbone or TSO centres 
Cascading Effects and possible countermeasures: 
In Figure 5-29 referring to the state of the Power System (see Figure 3-1) are depicted 
possible sequences of the cascading effects, that may collapse into an IN EXTREMIS 
situation. 
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Figure 5-29: Short Circuit - Sequence of possible Cascading Effects 
 
5.5.5 Transmission Grid Voltage Instability (Scenario 9) 
This scenario explores the Voltage collapse due to voltage regulation by ULTC – Under Load 
Tap Changer. In order to put in evidence the main characteristics of the control scenario 
regarding the topics of voltage instabilities three cases on Italian network are taken into 
consideration. They deal with the voltage problems that can arise e.g. at Candia station, 
which is placed in Central Italy, see the Figure 5-30. 
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Figure 5-30: The placement of CANDIA station in respect to Italy 
The CANDIA STATION contains three electrical nodes at respectively 400kV, 240 KV and 
132kV., as indicated in Figure 5-31. 
 
Figure 5-31: Neighbouring of CANDIA station 
The three cases about voltage instability refer to a voltage drop at Candia and are analyzed 
by the use of the simulator of electric power system named SICRE: 
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• In case 1, despite the increase in P0 and Q0 which are the references for electric 
active power and the reactive power, voltage drops below unacceptable value but it 
does not collapse. 
• In case 2, the static solution cannot be reached since the load flow algorithm 
performed at each simulation step fails to converge. 
• For case 3 the tap changer, which has its lowest limit set to zero, in order to allow 
voltage to collapse, is acted continuously, with the following integral regulation law v 
the gain equal to 1/10 seconds. 
Case of Voltage Instability due to Voltage Regulation by ULTC. 
Case Description 
In the Figure 5-32 has been shown the one-line diagram of CANDIA area. At Candia station, 
three transformers are regulated to maintain voltage at 132 kV bus-bar constant. The loads 
on these busses are modelled with quadratic voltage dependence. 
 
Figure 5-32: On line diagram of CANDIA Area 
As initial condition, the Candia station is supplied practically by CANDIA-FANO line, where 
380 MW are flowing on 400 kV and the rest on 240 kV lines. The total load is about 500 MW. 
Case 1 
This case refers to load increment at CANDIA when VILLAVALLE-MONTALTO line has been 
tripped at 5 s. After system reached new steady state, ramp up on Candia loads is started at 
100 s. Load reference is incremented at 10 [.]/s 
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Figure 5-33: Trend of voltage and power at CANDIA bus-bar during P and Q loads 
increment (case 1) 
Case 2 
This case refers to load increment at CANDIA 132 kV bus-bar, when CANDIA-FANO and 
VILLAVALLE-MONTALTO lines have been tripped at 10 s. Load references are incremented 
at 10 [.]/s from t = 100 s. 
 
Figure 5-34: Trend of voltage and power at CANDIA bus-bar during P and Q loads 
increment (case 2) 
Case 3 
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This case refers to instability due to ULTC (Under Load Tap Changer) control when CANDIA-
FANO trips at time 30 s. The previous discontinuity refers to Candia’s load set at 5 s. 
 
Figure 5-35: Trend of voltage and power at CANDIA bus-bar during ULTC instability 
 
Figure 5-36: PV and QV curves at CANDIA bus-bar during ULTC instability 
Simulated case of Voltage Instability due to Voltage Regulation by ULTC 
Case Description 
In Figure 5-32 the one-line diagram of CANDIA area is showed. At Candia station, three 
transformer are regulated to maintain voltage at 132 kV bus-bar constant. The loads on 
these busses are modelled with quadratic voltage dependence. 
Analysis of new control applications                          Page 125  
 
As initial condition, the Candia station is supplied practically by CANDIA-FANO line, where 
380 MW are flowing on 400 kV and the rest on 240 kV lines. The total load is about 500 MW. 
The critical event is CANDIA-FANO 400 kV line tripping. 
The critical event is the tripping of the line CANDIA-FANO, in fact following this event, as can 
be observed in Figure 5-37, the voltage drops down from 370 kV to 320 kV. The sub-network 
bus-bars drop consequently from (0.93,0.86) p.u. to (0.81, 0.75) p.u. (voltage reference 132 
kV. In figure the voltage reference is 150 kV). 
The voltage regulation tries to restore the initial voltage condition moving the tap changer. 
During the simulation, the limits on tap changer are removed to emulate the global effect of 
all the low voltage sub-network tap changer regulations. To get more realistic scenario, noise 
is added on system with the following parameter: 
• NVAR = 0.005  noise variance of load demand 
• Pmin = 5.0   minimum power to modify load demand 
• BasV_noise_Var = 0.0001 noise variance on measure 
• delay = 150 ms  transmission delay 
Loads with greater than 5 MW demand, are randomly chosen with 10% of probability, at 
every simulation step with 0.005 p.u. variance. 
On this hypothesis, if no corrective actions are taken, both 132 kV networks reach voltage 
collapse. 
The voltage transient and equivalent tap changers position are also plotted in Figure 5-37. 
Both high voltage and low voltage at Candia station are monitored by VIDA (Voltage 
Instability Detection Algorithm) protection. 
 
Figure 5-37: The one-line diagram of CANDIA area with the plot of the voltages 
The result for “no noise” test is shown in Figure 5-38. 
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Figure 5-38: Transient of voltage at 132 KV bus-bar of CANDIA during the collapse 
In order to implement corrective actions able to avoid voltage instability and possible voltage 
collapse a WAVP (Wide Area Voltage Protection) could be used. One type of these WAVP is 
presented in [Corsi et al. 2006]. 
Stakeholders involved: 
• GENCO 
• TSO 
• TSP of GENCO 
• TSP of TSO 
Information Control Systems involved: 
Systems of TSO and GENCO involved (see Figure 5-17): 
• AVR-PSS (GENCO) 
• PQR (GENCO) 
• SCADA (GENCO) 
• RTS (TSO ACC) 
• NTS (TSO NCC) 
Information Flow: 
The information flow is classified as follows: 
• Measurements: from AVR, PQR and Substation to SCADA, RTS and RTS 
• Signals: from AVR, PQR and Substation to SCADA, RTS and NTS  
• Commands: from PQR, RTS, NTS and SCADA 
• Information flow AVR, PQR, RVR, NVR, Substation and SCADA 
Real-time requirements: 
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Commands have a response time within the time required by PQR, AVR, RVR and NVR. 
Power contingencies: 
The loss of a line without a corrective action could bring the grid to voltage collapse. 
Goals: 
The main purpose of scenario is to show the interdependencies among the different power 
plants of the Power Infrastructure,  i.e. how a power disturbance, as the trip of a line, may 
propagate through the Grid to provoke voltage collapse. 
ICT Threats:  
The most plausible ICT threats are: 
• Viral infections propagating versus PC on the network. 
• Intrusion into the TSO Centre/Power Plant communications flow followed by the 
execution of faked commands (like modify parameters settings) 
• DoS attacks to the telecontrol communications, generated by enemies located on the 
Power Plant, Telecom IP backbone or TSO centres 
Cascading Effects and possible countermeasures: 
In Figure 5-39 referring to the state of the Power System (see Figure 3-1) are depicted 
possible sequences of the cascading effects, that may collapse into an IN EXTREMIS 
situation. 
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Success
Line Tripping
First
Voltage Collapse
Return to
Normal State
Corrective actions
Success
Second
Voltage Collapse
Possible
Loss of
security N-1
Return to
Alert State
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(C1)
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Huge Voltage Drop
EMERGENCY
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Failure
Corrective actions
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Regulation ULTC
Failure
 
Figure 5-39: Voltage instability - Sequence of possible Cascading Effects 
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6 CONTROL SYSTEM SCENARIOS: MICROGRIDS 
In the included scenarios some typical series of events in a distribution grid are presented 
and the control system reaction is estimated using various computer simulations. In the 
scenarios, faults are also injected to see their impact on the system as a whole. Of course 
‘impact’ is hard to define: this could be (in order of importance) the system availability, 
economical cost or power quality problems. These problems are also highly correlated: lower 
system availability will have an economical impact; severe power quality problems lead to 
increased wear out of electrical devices or even trigger protection devices, leading to lower 
system availability, and so on. 
In these control system scenarios the most common operational mode of the system is 
presented, namely the grid connected mode of the AEG. Although the AEG is able to operate 
in islanded mode when sufficient power generation capacity is available, and this capability is 
able to boost the availability of the electrical system, this mode is not dealt with here. This is 
due to the relatively low probability of islanding and the lack of load shedding schemes with a 
fine enough granularities (needed to overcome the inevitable lack of generation capacity of 
DG) in the current power grid. Also other impediments, such as protection issues, will defer 
islanded operation of DG in the near future 
6.1 Simulation Scenario 
6.1.1 Simulation algorithm 
The algorithm used to simulate the behaviour of the microgrid with distributed control, 
simulates both the electrical and ICT level of the application. Since we are working in a radial 
distribution segment, power flow calculations are relatively simple when it is connected to 
transmission level. Primary control will, when the system is grid connected, only control 
active power output based on local voltage levels, since frequency is kept stable by the 
strong external power grid. The agent behaviour (primary and secondary control loop) and 
the overlay network are simulated too. For these simulations we assume that communication 
delays and gossiping intervals are a few orders of magnitude larger than the time needed for 
settlement of the primary control loop (proportional controller and power). This means that 
power flow calculations and the primary control action are calculated first until convergence 
is observed. Only then generators will gossip, and adjust their parameters for the primary 
control loop according to the results of secondary and tertiary control loop. When all 
generators finished gossiping, new power flow calculations are done until convergence, and 
so on. The number of iterations is chosen in advance. 
for(i=0; i<nb_of_iterations; i++){ 
 applyScript(i);  
 for(each agent A){  
  A.gossip(); 
  A.adjustPQ(); 
 }  
while(no convergence){ 
doPowerFlow();  
  for(each agent A){  
   A.applyDroopControl(); 
  }  
 } 
} 
 
Apply script, e.g. fault injection 
Gossiping:  
secondary and tertiary control loop 
Powerflow calculations and  
primary control until convergence 
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6.1.2 Simulation environment: Loads, Generators and Distribution Grid 
Distribution Grid Layout 
The distribution net shown in Figure 6-1 is used in the simulations, the colours correspond to 
the colours used in the graphs resulting from the simulations. There are three branches 
which all contain both passive loads and small generators, of which both active and passive 
power output levels are controllable. It is presumed that the relatively small load changes in 
these scenarios will not influence voltage levels on the high voltage grid. So at point F near 
the feeding transformer 16 will always be at nominal voltage (230V) because of the 
connection to the strong grid. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Distribution net layout used in simulations, containing one feeder 
transformer and three branches with both passive loads and DG units. 
Marginal Cost Curves 
Marginal cost curves of the generators are chosen as a simple monotonically increasing 
linear function with some marginal cost for zero output (which is not necessarily zero) and 
some marginal cost for the generator maximum output. The feed-in transformer has no 
bounds on the amount of power it can inject into the distribution net (which is realistically for 
power levels needed in the presented scenarios). Also, the transformer has a relatively high 
marginal cost curve which increases when injected power increases. This high price 
encourages local generators to produce. 
Power Consumption 
In all scenarios presented similar loads are applied. In the beginning all generators have a 
certain set point P0 for their desired power output and the loads have fixed power 
consumption. Unbalances between local supply and demand are automatically dealt with by 
the transformer. At time (or iteration) 21 several loads increase their power consumption and 
at time 121 several loads drastically decrease their power consumption. 
Following these load changes, one will typically observe three phases during a simulation: 
• t = [1..20]: Steady settlement of initial settings to global Pareto optimum. 
• t = [21..120]: Demand suddenly increased, feeder will resolve unbalance initially, 
some DG units might also react slightly (if local voltage drop is high enough). 
Afterwards, DG units will adjust power output to steadily evolve towards Pareto 
optimum. 
• t = [121..181]: Demand suddenly decreased, feeder will resolve unbalance initially, 
some DG units might also react slightly (if local voltage rise is high enough). 
Afterwards, DG units will adjust power output to steadily evolve towards Pareto 
optimum. 
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Dead Zone 
Unless stated differently, the ‘dead zone’ in which primary control does not react to voltage 
changes extends from 229V to 231V. Obviously, as long as primary control is not active, 
there is no difference between power output set point P0 and actual power output P, and also 
secondary control will not be active. 
Graphical Simulation Results 
Simulation results are displayed using three graphs, showing information on all generators 
and the feeder transformer at every time step. 
1. The first graph shows the active power output P (full line) of every generator, and the 
power offset P0 (dashed line) which is the power the generator should produce at the 
nominal voltage level. If the local voltage level is within certain bounds of the nominal 
value (in the ‘dead zone’), the actual power output P will equal this P0. When primary 
control is activated (thus if voltage levels exceed the dead zone), there will be a 
difference between P and P0, called ∆P. Secondary control will try to decrease the 
overall ∆P, and consequently bring voltage closer to its rated value. 
2. The second graph shows the voltage levels near each generator. Also the dead zone 
is indicated. Mind that as long as voltage levels stay in this zone, no secondary 
control action will be seen. Also notice that voltage level at the feeder transformer is 
always at the rated value of 230V due to the connection with the strong grid. 
3. The third graph shows the marginal costs of the actual power output (P) of each 
generator. In this graph the action of tertiary control should be visible when 
convergence between these costs occurs. Mind here that sometimes a generator 
may seem not to converge, although tertiary control works just fine. This is because a 
generator is producing maximally at its maximum marginal cost, when overall 
marginal cost is higher than this value; or the other way around, a generator is 
producing its minimal output (0W) at its minimal marginal cost (which is not 
necessarily 0), when overall marginal cost is lower than this value. 
 
6.2 Primary Control Only (Reference Scenario) 
In this scenario the AEG is operated without secondary or tertiary controls, and only the local 
primary control loop is used. This will give us a benchmark to show the effect of secondary 
and tertiary control, and their combined effect.  
Stakeholders Involved 
• DG owners 
• DSO 
• To some lower extent: 
o Local loads 
o TSO 
Systems Involved 
• Distributed Generators (+ grid connected inverters) 
• Local control systems (voltage/frequency measurement device + embedded controller) 
• LV/MV Distribution grid 
Resulting Behaviour 
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Following load changes at time t=21, only the power output of the feeder transformer 
increases. This is because the load change does not cause a large voltage decrease near 
the DG units. Primary control increases active power output only if voltage levels go under 
the lower bound of the ‘dead zone’, which is the case for only a limited number of DG. Since 
insufficient extra local power is produced to feed the increased loads at time 21, the 
transformer connected to the transmission grid (indirectly via the MV distribution grid) feeds 
the shortage. Comparing the power output graph (Figure 6-2) and the voltage level graph 
(Figure 6-3), it is easily seen that only generators that are below the lower voltage bound 
diverge lightly from their power output setting P0 (dashed lines in the power graph), and thus 
increase production (full line in the power graph) due to primary control. Looking at the 
economical graph in the figure showing marginal output costs, we see that power production 
is not at an economically optimal level, since marginal production costs are different. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Active power outputs and power output setpoints P0 
Load increase Load decrease 
Transformer covers balance 
Local production +/- constant 
Transformer 
Analysis of new control applications                          Page 132  
 
 
Figure 6-3: Voltage levels 
 
Figure 6-4: Marginal power costs 
 
6.3 Normal behaviour, all control loops operational (Reference Scenario) 
This first simulation shows the behaviour of the AEG under normal circumstances. All 
generators are directly or indirectly interconnected over a random overlay network. Each 
node in the overlay network has five neighbours. Both secondary and tertiary control are 
operational, and no faults have occurred in the system. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• DG owners 
• DSO 
Transformer 
Transformer (always 
at 230V) 
Analysis of new control applications                          Page 133  
 
• To some lower extent: 
o Manageable loads (possibly in economical control loop) 
o Local loads 
o TSO 
Systems Involved 
• Distributed Generators (+ grid connected inverters) 
• Local control systems (voltage/frequency measurement device + embedded controller) 
• Controller agents (PC with agent software) 
• TCP/IP communications over LAN, WAN and/or the Internet 
• LV/MV Distribution grid 
Resulting Behaviour 
Looking at the simulation graphs one sees strong fluctuations in power outputs at iteration 
t=1, t=21 and t=121, which last for about 20 iterations. After that, DG power output remains 
constant. The reason for the fluctuations is the combination of secondary and tertiary control 
converging to the Pareto optimal point that equalizes marginal costs along the system while 
taking voltage levels into account.  
Time period t=[21,120] is the most interesting in this simulation. After the load increase, 
convergence occurs and all generators generate power at the same marginal costs, except 
for generators 9 and 15. There are large loads near generator 15, which pull down local 
voltage. For this, generator 15 generates at a higher marginal cost (higher production) as to 
minimize this voltage divergence. The load on the line containing generators 5 to 9 is rather 
low, causing these voltage levels to be high. Generator 9 produces below the global marginal 
cost as to limit the voltage on that line. Generator 6 also seems to diverge from global 
economical optimum, but this is not the case; generator 6 has a marginal cost below the 
optimum, but already produces its maximum output. The same holds for the feeder 
transformer during the other time periods: its marginal cost is above global optimum (in this 
case it is 30), but its production is 0. 
Another interesting fact to point out is that load fluctuations are instantly balanced by the 
feeder transformer and nothing else. Afterwards, DG units start to adjust their power output 
because they have a different marginal cost than the feeder. Finally, one can also see in 
Figure 6-5 that the feeder transformer sometimes has a negative power production. This 
means it absorbs the surplus power production after the large load decrease. 
In the presented scenario, one observes the ‘normal’ behaviour of the AEG. Convergence 
using the distributed gossiping scheme is quite fast after a sudden power demand change; it 
takes less than 10 gossiping rounds to settle around a global optimum. If we choose the 
gossiping steps to occur every second, optimization takes about ten seconds. If we account 
for inertia of involved DG units, this is more than fast enough, because these units can’t 
adjust their output any faster. In larger overlay networks (and larger underlying distribution 
grid, of course), or overlay networks with a less random structure, convergence might be a 
little slower. 
Bandwidth Demand 
The proposed system has a constant bandwidth requirement, which is dependent on the 
number of nodes in the system and the time interval between gossiping steps. Every node 
makes a single TCP-connection with a random neighbour at a fixed time interval (here an 
iteration step corresponds with a single time interval), and sends a few parameters (∆P, P0 
and its cost graph) to its gossiping buddy. This communication is not all over a single 
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communication line, but distributed over the Internet. The interval between gossiping steps 
can be adjusted in function of the available bandwidth and control system demands. 
 
Figure 6-5: Power outputs 
 
Figure 6-6: Voltage levels 
Secondary control restores 
voltage levels 
Dead Zone 
Tertiary control prevents full voltage restoration 
Transformer 
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Figure 6-7: Marginal production costs 
 
6.4 Secondary control only (Reference Scenario) 
To study the influence of secondary control on the application, or the influence of the 
absence (or failure) of tertiary control, some simulations are presented in which only 
secondary control is enabled. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
When the load increases at time step t=21, we see (as we have seen in previous 
simulations) that the grid mainly feeds necessary extra power. Simultaneously, some 
voltages locally exceed the dead zone which triggers primary control and overall average P 
(= P0-Peffective) no longer equals zero. This in turn triggers secondary control which steadily 
adjusts power output (actually P0) of all generators (by the average ∆P). All DG units 
gradually increase their production, and as a consequence the voltage rises towards the 
nominal value. Due to the distributed gossiping based averaging algorithm the local 
calculation of the average ∆P takes some time (in the algorithm used here, convergence is 
assumed after 10 gossiping steps). This inevitably leads to a trade-off: using a shorter time 
than 10 rounds might speed up the system to adjust to the new situation, but the shorter the 
number of rounds, the worse the local estimation of the system-wide average ∆P. A too 
rough estimation might lead to undesirable oscillations. 
It is easily seen in Figure 6-10 no economical optimization is done, and an economically 
suboptimal situation is created in which generators produce at different marginal cost. In this 
situation opportunity costs are suffered, which does not necessarily mean that real economic 
losses are suffered! 
Economical convergence 
Secondary control prevents economical 
optimization of generator 15 
Analysis of new control applications                          Page 136  
 
 
Figure 6-8: Active power output 
 
Figure 6-9: Voltage levels 
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Figure 6-10: Marginal production costs 
 
6.5 Tertiary control only (Reference Scenario) 
Analogously to previous scenario, in this scenario only tertiary control is enabled while 
secondary is disabled. This shows the influence of tertiary control and the influence of the 
absence (or failure) of secondary control on the application. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
If we compare the results of this simulation with the ones of section 6.3 where both 
secondary and tertiary control are enabled, we see great similarities between these results. 
The main difference is the noticeable larger divergence of voltage levels near generators 14 
and 15 at time t=[21,120] in this simulation. This of course is a result of the purely 
economical optimization policy, while power quality is ignored. 
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Figure 6-11: Power outputs 
 
Figure 6-12: Voltage levels 
Voltage divergence much larger in absence of 
secondary control (compare with Figure 6-6) 
Transformer 
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Figure 6-13: Marginal production costs 
 
6.6 Network latency (Scenario 10) 
Packet switched public networks such as the Internet can’t give any guarantee about latency 
of packet delivery. The reason for this unpredictable and possibly unbounded packet delivery 
latency is because there are no bounds on the amount of packets that can be sent by any 
user at any time over any connection. This may cause contingencies at some routers (which 
have a store and forward mechanism), causing packets to be queued longer in the input 
and/or output buffer of the router. Ultimately this may lead to packet loss if the router input 
and/or output buffers are full. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
In the gossiping based averaging schemes of both secondary and tertiary control, gossiping 
steps are done in a timeframe of a second to a couple of seconds. There is a stochastic 
convergence time of these algorithms of about 30 to 100 gossiping cycles, mainly dependent 
on the overlay network structure. This means that generator control parameters are adjusted 
to a Pareto optimal point in about half a minute to a couple of minutes. Knowing typical 
generator inertia and rate of change in loads (or power consumption) and non-dispatchable 
generators, there is no need for any faster convergence. Now, in the Internet as we know it 
today typical latencies (round trip times in fact) are in the order of magnitude of 150ms, and it 
is gradually improving (see Figure 6-14). Certainly if we are considering short distance 
communication (AEGs cover only a single distribution net) the delays are rather small (about 
30ms) in relation to the time between gossiping steps (about 1 to 2 seconds). From this we 
can conclude the influence of network delays on control system behaviour, even with cheap 
public networks, may be neglected.  
Economical convergence 
Primary control prevents full economical 
optimization of generator 15, yet less 
drastic than when secondary control is 
operational. 
Transformer 
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Figure 6-14: Average round-trip-time in milliseconds between Ghent (Belgium) and 
other parts of the world world (measured by the Department of Information 
Technology, Ghent University) 
 
6.7 IP-packet losses (Scenario 11) 
As explained in previous scenario, packets can get lost on packet switched networks such as 
the Internet, due to routers dropping packets when their buffers are almost full or when 
packets are corrupted during transmission (leading to faulty CRC). How will these packet 
losses influence the functionality of the distributed control system? 
Stakeholders Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
Looking at Figure 6-15 showing typical packet loss over the Internet, we see that nowadays 
only a small percentage of sent packets is lost (especially when sent to a nearby location), 
and this rate is gradually improving. Also, during a gossiping step, a TCP-connection is set 
up between the gossiping partners. The TCP transport protocol will cover packet loss by 
retransmitting lost packets. As a consequence, even when networks are heavily loaded (and 
consequently packet loss is high), this will be seen as a connection with somewhat larger 
delays than usually. Given the low probability of packet losses, this situation is covered by 
previous scenario (section 6.6) and will not be discussed here any further.  
In the extreme, the TCP connection may suffer so many packet losses that subsequent 
timeouts lead to the point where the TCP-connection is closed. From application level this is 
seen as a network failure or a node crash (one cannot distinguish these). This situation is 
discussed later in the following scenario (section 6.8). 
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Figure 6-15: Average packet loss percentage between Ghent (Belgium) and the rest of 
the world (measured by the Department of Information Technology, Ghent University) 
 
6.8 Agent control system (or network) unavailable (Scenario 12) 
By a non-critical control system failure we mean the failure of the non-critical part of the 
control system of a single node, which is responsible for secondary and tertiary control. 
Critical functions, such as primary control, are still functional in this scenario.  
We can distinguish two different scenarios: the node was part of the overlay control system 
and then fails, or the node has never been connected to the rest of the control system. The 
former will always occur due to a failure (computer crash/network failure), while the latter 
may also follow from the fact that not all generators in the distribution net have this kind of 
control system (which is very likely in a deployment in distribution systems of nowadays). 
Mind that in both cases, although there is no connection on ICT-level between the node and 
the rest of the system, they are still connected electrically. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
In a typical real world deployment of this AEG system it would be very likely to have some 
DG units in the distribution net that don’t participate in the distributed control system. 
Coarsely spoken, these are just ‘negative loads’ for our AEG. If these non-participating DG 
are small enough, they will be negligible (they have no influence on voltage levels). Larger 
DG units (which have a non negligible influence on voltage levels) have a mandatory voltage 
regulator (some sort of droop control), and so they should not cause a too large deviation 
from rated voltage. Voltage at the injection point of this DG unit will not optimal, but when 
installed properly, it should be within allowable limits. Of course the system will not be 
economically optimal, since a generator is not taking part in the tertiary control scheme. 
Another scenario in which non-critical control systems are unavailable for a single DG unit is 
the case in which the control system (or the communication link) fails while it is participating 
in the secondary and primary gossiping schemes. At first sight the system degenerates to the 
previously discussed case of a distribution net with a generator that is not taking part in the 
distributed control system. Although there is more to it for what is concerned the secondary 
control. Unanticipated loss of a node which is taking part in the distributed averaging 
algorithm may lead to small divergences in the calculated global average. These errors can, 
even if the crash is discovered or the crashed node comes back online, not be solved easily. 
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Figure 6-16 illustrates this behaviour. The real global average is 6 (in the beginning). In the 
third step a node is lost. This changes the real global average to ‘5.333’. The algorithm 
settles after convergence on ‘5.666’, which is different from both the real current average 
‘5.333’ and the original average ‘6’. These errors may accumulate over time, since they can’t 
be easily detected in a distributed way. 
 
 
Figure 6-16: Consequence of node failures for distributed averaging. 
These general remarks on gossiping based averaging lead to following conclusions: 
When a controller fails when the secondary control is not in a converged state, and 
this controller does not re-enter the system, or is reset when it re-enters the system, a 
system wide divergence of the estimated average value of ∆P will follow, which 
cannot be restored automatically. 
When we are dealing with totally random failures with nodes not re-entering or being reset 
(so typical network failures are not part of these), the divergence should be limited due to the 
fact that the system converges quite rapidly (and thus the lost value will be close to the 
system wide average), and due the fact that faults may cancel each other. A periodic system 
wide reset might however be needed to limit divergence in the long run. 
6.9 Critical Control System Failure (Scenario 13) 
If the primary control system of a DG unit fails, or any other part of the DG unit, local physical 
protection devices should act to decouple the unit from the distribution net. This is to protect 
the rest of the distribution net from a possibly escalating fault. When local protection fails 
after for example a short circuit, a local blackout of a power distribution segment might follow 
when other protection devices isolate the segment from the rest of the grid; but the latter will 
happen only exceptionally, since physical protection devices that protect against 
overcurrents (e.g. after short circuit) are very reliable. The most important consequence will 
thus be the loss of a single production unit. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
In grid connected mode the instant loss of a DG unit will immediately be covered by the 
transformer that connects the segment with the grid. The transformer is dimensioned as to 
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be able to feed the whole low voltage segment and the grid has –seen from distribution level- 
an infinite power supply. Afterwards, secondary and tertiary control can take the microgrid 
back to a Pareto optimal state.  
6.10 Denial of service attacks on IP-network (Scenario 14) 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks try to disturb the functionality of some system or service. 
Since we are using public communication channels, these attacks can be executed on these 
channels. They can be generic (caused by a worm or virus attacking random 
computers/networks) or aimed at this specific control system. An aimed DoS attack may use 
the overlay-network mechanisms to perform the attack; an example may be constantly 
joining and leaving the overlay-network, which triggers a bandwidth consuming algorithm 
searching new neighbours. This may lead to a denial of all communications over one or more 
channels. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
• Telecom Provider 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
Whatever the underlying reason or mechanism for the DoS attack, as a result we get very 
long communication delays, which lead to loss of connection between some or all agents. 
The resulting behaviour is thus covered by previous section 6.8. 
6.11 Attack on overlay network topology (Scenario 15) 
The basic idea of overlay networks is letting nodes connected to some common 
communication infrastructure (e.g. computers on the Internet) organize themselves in a 
distributed way, as to be able to retrieve certain nodes or resources on those nodes when 
needed. The structure or topology of these overlay networks is dependent on the rules for 
these nodes to choose their direct neighbours in the overlay network. The fault tolerance and 
resource discovery ability of overlay networks is dependent on the right application of these 
rules. One attack scenario could be an attack on this topology by some malicious node(s). 
These would send wrong query results to nodes searching for new neighbours as to make 
themselves the new neighbour of these nodes. After some time, these malicious nodes can 
become the centre of the overlay network. 
 
In the overlay network used in the microgrid application, a malicious node can fake its 
identity by sending false XML descriptions to other nodes. These descriptions determine the 
choice of the direct neighbours of a node. If the malicious node chooses this fake description 
in function of the requesting node, it can make the semantic distance to this node very small 
which will mislead the other node in choosing the malicious node as a new neighbour. 
Continuing this process makes the malicious node(s) the centre of the whole overlay 
network. There is no easy way for the other nodes to detect this attack. 
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Figure 6-17: Example of an attack on overlay network topology which makes malicious 
node the sole connection between two groups (group A and group B) of overlay 
nodes. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
This attack on the middleware level (which is the overlay network) does not necessarily 
influence application level (secondary and tertiary control). Yet, it gives the attacker more 
power over the overlay network, and consequently over the applications that use this 
structure. Next two scenarios show how this power can be abused. 
6.12 Overlay network partitioning (Scenario 16) 
An interesting scenario occurs when the overlay network partitions. This may be caused by a 
bad overlay network structure (not enough neighbours per node or insufficient randomness in 
chosen neighbours leading to clustering), by major communication infrastructure failures, 
which may partition the underlying physical network (e.g. failures of routers), or more 
probable, by a malicious attack on the overlay network (see previous scenario). 
In this scenario we have partitioned the overlay network in two groups: 
B
A
Node 
Malicious 
node 
Overlay link 
New link 
New (malicious) link 
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1. Generator 1 to generator 9 controller agents 
2. Generator 10 to generator 15 controller agents + grid connected transformer  
Note that the system remains connected electrically. 
Also, no load updates occur during the simulations; like this one can observe the steady 
convergence from initial generator settings towards some stable point. This makes 
underlying control system functionality much clearer. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• DG owners 
• Local loads 
• DSO 
Systems Involved 
• Distributed Generators (+ grid connected inverters) 
• Local control systems (voltage/frequency measurement device + embedded controller) 
• LV/MV Distribution grid 
Resulting Behaviour 
Figure 6-18, Figure 6-19 and Figure 6-20 show the results of this scenario. The influence of 
the splitting of the overlay network can easily be seen, as two clearly distinct groups are 
observed, especially in the graph plotting the power production (marginal) costs. This is 
clearly sub-optimal behaviour, since marginal costs are equal in the economical optimum. In 
some cases secondary control may also be hampered, where voltage levels are below or 
above the dead zone in one overlay partition, but the generators which are able to mend this 
are in the other partition. 
 
Figure 6-18: Power output 
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Figure 6-19: Voltage levels 
 
Figure 6-20: Marginal production costs 
6.12.1 Representing the Control System Scenarios by means of UML diagrams 
In this section, we represent by means of UML state diagrams, the effects of a network 
partitioning, as described in the Scenario16. The other forms of attack described in the other 
scenarios are represented in section 8.2.8(appendix). 
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Figure 6-21 depicts the possible states of the a malicious agent, i. e. an agent joining the 
overlay network with the aim of performing some kind of malicious attack to the network. 
Such an agent is initially in the state Created, then it turns to the UnderRegistration state in 
order to join the overlay network. When this activity is completed, the malicious agent turns 
to the state Active representing the situation where the agent is performing its malicious 
activity. Actually such state is a super-state whose sub-states represent the possible forms of 
attack that the malicious agent may perform; such sub-states are: VoltageLevelAttack, 
DosAttack, ChangingTopology, ManInTheMiddle. The state ManInTheMiddle is in turn a 
super-state containing the substates PartitionNetworkAttack and EconomicalTampering 
representing the attempt to partition the overlay network and the dispatch of faked 
economical information respectively. Both sub-states are reachable from the state 
ChangingTopology representing the situation where the malicious agent establishes some 
malicious links in the overlay network. This step is necessary to perform both the malicious 
partitioning of the network and the economical tampering.  
When the agent leaves the Active state, it turns to the state RemoveRegistration 
representing the stage where the agent leaves the overlay network. When the agents quits 
this state, it turns to the final state Removed.  
With respect to the state diagram of the non malicious agent (Figure 3-30), the state diagram 
of the malicious agent (Figure 6-21) differs for the malicious activities inside the Active state.  
 
Figure 6-21: State diagram of a malicious agent 
The possible states of the overlay network are shown in the state diagram in Figure 6-22 
where the state transitions are due to the effects of the activity of a malicious agent (the 
states of a malicious agent are described in Figure 6-21).  
The overlay network is initially in the Normal state, and turns to the state 
SinglePointOfFailure when a malicious agent turns to the state ManInTheMiddle (see the 
state diagram in Figure 6-21). In other words, such state transition occurs when a malicious 
agent is able to partition the overlay network or is able to send malicious economical 
information.  
The overlay network turns from the state SinglePointOfFailure to the state Partitioned when 
the same malicious agent has determined the partition of the overlay network.  
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Figure 6-22: State diagram of the overlay network 
The state diagram in Figure 6-23 shows how the voltage regulation in the distributed 
generation is affected by the attack of a malicious agent (the states of a malicious agent are 
shown in Figure 6-21). According to such state diagram, the primary voltage regulation is not 
affected by the attack (the primary voltage regulation does not change its state). The 
secondary voltage regulation is initially in the Optimal state where no attack has been 
performed. From the Optimal state, the secondary voltage regulation can turn to the state 
Degraded if the overlay network is partitioned by the action of a malicious agent. Otherwise, 
the secondary voltage regulation can turn from the state Optimal to state 
DangerouslyOutOfRange if a malicious agent is negatively influencing the secondary voltage 
regulation by transmitting malicious information about the voltage levels. 
The tertiary voltage regulation is initially in the state Optimal where no attack has been 
performed. From this state, the tertiary voltage regulation can turn to the state SubOptimal if 
a malicious agent performs the partition of the overlay network, or if a malicious agent 
performs the economical tampering. The tertiary voltage regulation turns from the state 
Optimal to the state Abnormal if a malicious agent is negatively influencing the secondary 
voltage regulation by transmitting malicious information about the voltage levels. 
 
Figure 6-23: State diagram of the voltage regulation in distributed generation system 
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6.13 Economical tampering attack (Scenario 17) 
The single biggest reason for people to misconduct or to hack into a system like this is 
personal financial gain. Since a power market based mechanism is used, which determines 
the income of the respective DG owners, the economical control loop may be a tempting 
target. Various types of malicious attacks can be expected here: passive eavesdropping, 
altering messages sent from one generator to the other or spoofing another legitimate 
generator. The attacker can try to influence the market price using any of these mechanisms, 
lowering the price if the hacker is a consumer or raising the price if he is a producer. An 
example of a market tampering attack is shown in Figure 6-24 where a malicious node can 
determine all price information flowing from one side of the overlay graph to the other 
following the topology attack described in section 6.11. 
 
Figure 6-24: Market price tampering attack 
Stakeholders Involved 
• DG owners 
• Local loads 
• DSO 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
If one subgroup is connected to a transformer broadcasting the true spot market price, the 
malicious node(s) can fake this spot market price as to decrease or increase the price, 
dependent on the fact whether the attacker is a producer or a consumer. The exact attack 
pattern will of course be dependent on market and metering mechanisms used for these 
kinds of applications. 
6.14 Voltage level attack (Scenario 18) 
The secondary control loop implemented by the multi agent system optimizes the voltage 
level in all points of the distribution grid segment as to minimize the divergence from rated 
values. Since over-voltages are dangerous for all equipment attached to the power grid, 
attacks on the secondary control loop are very tempting for attackers who want to inflict 
physical damage to the system. The most probable course of action would be the injection of 
false values in the secondary control loop (which is based on a distributed averaging 
 
 
True price 
Tampered price 
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algorithm). Over time these errors accumulate and the global average will diverge from its 
true value, leading to too high or too low active power injection in the grid. 
Stakeholders Involved 
• DG owners 
• Local loads 
• DSO 
Systems Involved 
• Same as scenario in section 6.3 
Resulting Behaviour 
If one succeeds in raising the power output of many generators simultaneously, voltage 
levels may become dangerously high. This may destroy certain assets (sensitive loads, 
generators, power cables…) or, more likely, over-voltage switches may disconnect DG units 
or whole distribution segments from the power grid, leading to loss of production capacity or 
even a local black-out.  
The simulation, from which the resulting graphs are depicted in Figure 6-25 and Figure 6-26, 
shows the result of a single agent injecting way too large values for DP into the distributed 
averaging algorithm. A large average ∆P normally means that voltage levels are low in most 
parts of the distribution grid, and this encourages generators to increase active power 
production. It is easily seen in Figure 6-25 that all local generators increase their production, 
and that the feeding transformer has a large negative production. This means that excess 
power flows back to the transmission grid. Large active power injections also increase local 
voltage levels, leading dangerously high voltage levels, and thus a successful voltage level 
attack. 
 
Figure 6-25: active power output 
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Figure 6-26: voltage levels 
 
6.15 Alternative approach, centralized control (Scenario 19) 
The secondary control loop has been implemented in a distributed way. What would be the 
consequences for the system to have a centralized client-server topology with dedicated 
communication lines? This scenario investigates the use of such a centralized architecture. 
Using a centralized architecture radically changes the control system on architectural, 
infrastructural and organizational level. Centralized secondary and tertiary control is a 
common practice in the power grid, where power output of large power plants is centrally 
controlled in order to keep voltage and frequency stable. Tertiary control has somewhat 
changed with the advent of the power markets, but the basic idea can still be applied within a 
single generation company. Consequently, this means that the standard centralized 
algorithms can also be applied on a system like a single distribution grid (radial MV/LV 
segment) in order to optimize voltage and production costs. 
Looking at architectural level of the ICT part of this system, the infrastructural requirements 
are also very different. First of all, we need a single centralized server with enough 
processing power to execute the system wide optimization problem for the two optimization 
loops. This server has to be very reliable, since it forms a single point of failure to this 
system. For this, backup servers may be an indispensable asset. Secondly, bandwidth usage 
is totally different from the distributed system. In the centralized system, all agents (or clients) 
have to send their parameters (current production, marginal cost curve…) to the server, and 
after the server receives all these parameters and has calculated the new settings, it replies 
with to each client once. This process has to be repeated with some fixed time interval. The 
amount of messages sent is thus O(2n) with n the number of agents in the system. In the 
gossiping based system, the amount of messages sent per gossiping cycle is O(n2), but 
these messages are distributed all over the communication infrastructure, while in a 
centralized system they all go over a single communication channel to the server. This 
means that next to a reliable server, a reliable broadband communication channel will be 
needed for the server. 
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Stakeholders Involved 
• Server provider (DSO, third party?) 
• DG owners 
• DSO 
• To some lower extent: 
o Manageable loads (possibly in economical control loop) 
o Local loads 
o TSO 
Systems Involved 
• Server(s) for centralized secondary control 
• Distributed Generators (+ grid connected inverters) 
• Controller agents (PC with agent software) 
• TCP/IP communications over LAN, WAN and/or the Internet 
• Local control systems (voltage/frequency measurement device + embedded controller) 
• LV/MV Distribution grid 
Consequences 
• A trusted party has to install a reliable server. The question of who will have to take this 
responsibility remains. The server and broadband channel are an extra cost for this 
layout. 
• Attack scenarios are totally different than with the fully distributed approach. DoS attacks 
are very likely, and probably easier to pull off since only a single server/communication 
channel has to be blocked. Identity spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks on the central 
server have a much bigger impact on the system than with the distributed approach. Yet, 
strong authentication with a single certified server is easier than certification and trust 
within a peer-to-peer system. 
• A single algorithm cycle is enough to reach the optimal system state (send parameters to 
server-calculation of optimal settings-replies to clients), while in gossiping approach the 
system will probably be constantly evolving towards a near-optimal point. Bandwidth 
demand is constant in both cases (both approaches send a fixed number of messages 
within a certain time interval). Which of the two has the fastest convergence is dependent 
on the calculation speed of the server, the chosen (in function of bandwidth) intervals 
between algorithm cycles, and the specific bandwidth availability on the communication 
channels. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
This document reports the results of the activities performed in the Work Package 1 
“Identification and description of Control System Scenarios” of the “CRitical UTility 
InfrastructurAL resilience (CRUTIAL)” project, as described in the Annex 1 to the EC contract 
n° 027513. 
The Work Package 1 of the CRUTIAL project was devoted to the identification of critical 
control system scenarios to be used by the other Work Packages of the program.  
The concept of control system scenarios revealed a valuable support for starting the 
discussion on the interdependencies of power and ICT infrastructures during the first year of 
the project running. A lot of information has been acquired and exchanged within the 
consortium allowing to build several cross-references with the other active work packages. 
 
The specification of the (portion of) Electrical Power system that is of interest for CRUTIAL is 
given in the form of natural language with the support of picture with drawings and symbols 
that are commonly used by electrical people, as well as in the form of a collection of UML 
diagrams, a language with whom computer science people are more familiar.  
A set of reference control system scenarios have been identified, covering emerging themes 
involving ICT for Power System bulk and distributed generation, transmission and distribution 
infrastructures, like the following ones: 
• Communication security in the supervision and control systems of grid and generation 
operators  
• Possible breaches caused by interactions between the corporate and the process 
networks  
• Interactions among Transmission, Distribution and Generation ICT systems 
• Possible problems related to the ICT system’s remote maintenance. 
The investigation on the ongoing technological renewal in the regulation and control systems 
of (bulk) power generation, transmission and distribution allowed to derive an integrated view 
of the many ICT systems involved. The control scenarios selected represent examples of 
inter-infrastructure and inter-operator platforms to be further developed in the future project 
studies: different level of protections have to be integrated in the infrastructures of the 
different operators for providing an adequate resilience to the management of the whole 
Electrical Power System. 
Both the computer simulation studies presented in the distributed generation scenarios and 
lab simulations show that this microgrid functions quite well under normal circumstances, 
independent of the fact whether the system is islanded or not. In islanded mode, the 
generator capacity has to be sufficient to feed the loads connected to the distribution 
segment. Automatic balancing by load shedding or load management is not supported yet. 
Although the computer simulations presented here do not account for dynamic electrical 
system behaviour or frequency regulation, they are a useful tool to supplement lab 
experiments in order to simulate a larger environment than is feasible in a lab. Also, doing 
fault injections are somewhat safer in a computer simulation then when using a real 
laboratory set-up. 
The results from these simulation show that the main challenges the current microgrid has to 
deal with are concerned with IT-security issues, certain weaknesses in the overlay network 
protocols and some weaknesses in the generator control loops  (mainly secondary) 
implemented on this overlay network. Further work within the CRUTIAL project will thus look 
into these weaknesses and try to mitigate these. This can be done by implementing best-
practices for security (firewalls, cryptography, certification, strong access control 
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mechanisms, etc.), but also extensions to its current functionality and adaptations of current 
algorithms are envisioned. 
The specification using  UML diagrams has been used in WP1 as a way to elicit information 
from domain experts, as well as a way to communicate domain information to experts of 
computer science with limited knowledge in Electrical Power Systems. The plan is to use the 
UML specification as a basis for completing the initial proposal of the modelling framework in 
WP2 and for the specification of the analysis scenarios to be implemented in WP3 and WP5. 
 
The WP1 material shared within the CRUTIAL consortium forms now a solid common know-
how for the future developments of the project. In the next two years of the CRUTIAL project 
the control system scenarios identified in WP1 will be used as a reference for the analysis of 
interdependencies among ICT and power devices, for the development of the test beds, for 
studying and evaluating the resilience of architectures. 
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8 APPENDIX: UML 
8.1 UML representation of the Electric Power System 
8.1.1 Power System Infrastructure 
Figure 8-1 shows the UML class diagram of the general Electric Power System; the aim of 
this diagram is indicating which are the main subsystems of the electric power system (or 
Power System Infrastructure). The main class is PowerSystemInfrastructure representing the 
whole electric power system; this class is the aggregation of the classes representing the 
main subsystems of the electrical system:  
• PowerGeneration represents the set of power plants for the generation of electric 
power; this class is the aggregation of the class PowerPlant representing the power 
plants; 
• PowerGrid represents the infrastructure used to transport the electric power from the 
power plants to the consumers; this class is the aggregation of these classes: 
o TransmissionGrid represents the grids transferring the electric power from the 
power plants to the distribution grids;  
o DistributionGrid represents the grids transferring the electric power to the 
consumers. 
• Automation&ControlSystem represents the system dedicated to the automation and 
the control of the power grid; this system is considered from the logical point of view 
and from the physical point of view; so the class Automation&ControlSystem is the 
aggregation of these classes: 
o PhysicalAutomation&ControlSystem represents the set of the sites realizing 
the automation and control system by acting on the state of power plants and 
substations; therefore, the class PhysicalAutomation&ControlSystem is the 
aggregation of instances of the class Site which is in turn the aggregation of 
instances of the class PhysicalHost representing a generic device connected 
to the communication network; 
o LogicalAutomation&ControlSystem represents the set of software applications 
performing the automation and control functionalities; therefore the class 
LogicalAutomation&ControlSystem is the aggregation of instances of the class 
Application representing software applications. 
The classes PhysicalHost and Application are associated because an application 
runs on a certain physical host. Moreover, the class Application is associated with the 
class Function because an application performs an automation and control function.  
• ProtectionSystem represents the system preserving the safety of the power grid. 
• Load is the class representing the loads 
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Figure 8-1: Class diagram of the power system infrastructure 
8.1.2 Electric lines 
Figure 8-2 shows the class diagram describing the electric lines and the power grid elements 
connected by electric lines. In the class diagram in Figure 8-2, the class Line represents the 
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electric lines, while the class SubStation and the class Load represents the substations and 
the loads respectively. The class Line is associated with both the class SubStation and the 
class Load because an electric line can connect a substation or a load to the power grid.  
Moreover, the class Substation is specialized in the following classes representing the 
several kinds of substation: 
• PrimarySubStation represents the primary substations transforming the HV electric 
power coming from a HV line, into MV electric power transferred along a MV electric 
line; 
• SecondarySubStation represents the secondary substations transforming the MV 
electric power coming from a MV line, into LV electric power transferred along a LV 
electric line; 
• HVSubStation represents the substations transferring the electric power from EHV 
lines to HV lines. 
The class Load is specialized in the classes LV Load, MV Load and HV Load according to 
the voltage level of the load. The class Line is specialized in the classes LVLine, MVLine, 
HVLine and EHVLine according to the voltage level of the electric power transferred along 
the electric line.  
 
Figure 8-2: Class diagram of the grid elements 
8.1.3 Power Generation and Power Grid 
Figure 8-3 shows the class diagram representing the power generation together with the 
power grid; the power generation consists of the set of power plants, while the power grid is 
the infrastructure necessary to transfer the electric power from the power plants to the 
consumers distributed on the territory.  
The power generation is represented by the class PowerGeneration which is the aggregation 
of the class PowerPlant which represents the power plants for the production of electric 
power. These two classes are already present in the class diagram in Figure 8-1. The class 
PowerPlant is the aggregation of instances of the class Group which is in turn the 
aggregation of the classes Generator and Transformer representing power generators and 
transformers respectively.  The cardinality (1) of the aggregation arcs between Group and 
Generator, and between Group and Transformer, indicates that a group is composed by one 
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generator and one transformer. Moreover, the classes Generator and Transformer are 
associated because a generator is connected to a transformer in order to raise the voltage of 
the produced electric power, to the level used on EHV lines. 
The power grid is represented by the class PowerGrid which is the aggregation of the class 
TransmissionGrid and of the class DistributionGrid representing the transmission grid and 
the distribution grid respectively.  
The class TransmissionGrid is the aggregation of the classes HVSubstation, EHVLine and 
HVLine; these classes are already present in the class diagram in Figure 8-2 and they are 
described in section 8.1.2. The class EHVLine is associated with Transformer due to the fact 
that a transformer conveys the electric power from the generator to the to an EHV electric 
line. The class HVSubStation is associated with both the class EHVLine and with the class 
HVLine because HV substations transform the EHV electric power coming from a EHV 
electric line, into HV electric power transferred along a HV electric line. The class HVLine is 
associated with HV Load in order to represent that a HV electric line is used to connect a HV 
load to the transmission grid.  
The class DistributionGrid is the aggregation of the following classes: PrimarySubstation, 
SecondarySubStation, MVLine and LVLine; these classes are already presented in Figure 
8-2 and they are described in section 8.1.2. The class PrimarySubStation is associated with 
the class HVLine (composing the class TransmissionGrid) because a primary substation is 
connected to the transmission grid by means of a HV electric line. A primary substation is 
instead connected to the distribution grid by means of a MV line (a primary substation 
transforms HV electric power into MV electric power); so, the class PrimarySubStation is 
associated also with the class MVLine.  MVLine is associated also with MVLoad and 
DistributedGenerator because a MV load or a distributed generator is connected to the 
distribution grid by means of a MV electric line.  
A secondary substation transforms the MV electric power into LV electric power; for this 
reason, the class SecondarySubStation is associated with the classes  MVLine and LVLine. 
LVLine is associated also with the class LVLoad and DistributedGenerator because a LV 
load or a distributed generator is connected to the distribution grid by means of a LV electric 
line.  
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Figure 8-3: Class diagram of the power generation and the power grid 
8.1.4 Sites 
A site hosts the ICT infrastructures dedicated to the automation, control and management of 
a portion of the power grid. The class diagram in Figure 8-4 represents a site in terms of 
classes. The main class is Site consisting of an aggregation of the class PhysicalHost; 
moreover the class Site is associated with itself to represent the fact that automation sites 
can communicate exchanging information and orders. The class Site is already present in 
the class diagram in Figure 8-1.  
A site can directly control a substation or a power plant; otherwise a site can control other 
sites. In order to represent this fact, the class Site has been specialized in these classes: 
• SubstationAutomationSite represents the automation sites controlling a substation in 
direct way; for this reason, this class is associated with the class SubStation.  
• ControlCentreSite represents the sites controlling other sites on the power grid; the 
sites of this kind are organized in geographical way, so the class ControlCentreSite is 
specialized in the following classes: 
o NationalControlCentre represents the automation sites monitoring the national 
grid and controlling the regional sites;  
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o RegionalControlCentre represents the sites monitoring a regional grid and 
controlling the area (local) sites;  
o AreaControlCentre represents the automation sites monitoring and controlling 
a local area of the power grid; this class is associated with itself to model the 
possibility for an area control centre to be replaced by another one in case of 
malfunctioning, or the possibility to realize the redundancy in the normal 
functioning of the area control.  
• PowerPlantAutomationSite represents the automation sites controlling a power plant 
in direct way; for this reason, this class is associated with the class PowerPlant.  
The associations between the class NationalControlCentre and the class 
RegionalControlCentre indicate that there is an information exchange between a national 
control centre and a regional one. The same relations hold between the class 
RegionalControlCentre and the class AreaControlCentre. The class ControlCenterSite is 
associated with itself to indicate that a control centre site may be replaced by another one in 
case of malfunctioning. 
 
Figure 8-4: Sites classification 
8.1.5 Stakeholders 
The class diagram in Figure 8-5 refers to the stakeholders in the electric power system. The 
main class is Stakeholder associated to several classes representing the entities in the 
electric power system that a stakeholder may own or manage. For instance, the association 
between the class Stakeholder and the class DistributionGrid indicates that a stakeholder 
may own the distribution grid; in this case, the stakeholder is a distribution company, as 
indicated by the role of the class Stakeholder in the association with the class 
DistributionGrid. In a similar way, the other associations in the class diagram in Figure 8-5 
represent the possible roles of a stakeholder.  
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Figure 8-5: Stakeholders 
8.1.6 Functions 
Activities such as management, monitoring, maintenance and control can be classified as 
functions, where each function can be composed by a set of simpler functions: in the class 
diagram in Figure 8-6 the class Function is specialized in SimpleFunction and 
CompositeFunction where the latter is an aggregation of Function so recursively we can 
define a hierarchical structure of composite functions. In particular, an automation function is 
realized in automatic way. The class Function is specialized in AutomationFunction which is 
in turn specialized in several classes representing the main automation functionalities: 
Protection, Management, Monitoring, Maintenance, Regulation, Teleoperation and Control.  
The class Management is in turn specialized in DataManagement representing the 
management activity concerning the data. The monitoring activity can concern the power 
plants; therefore the class Monitoring is specialized in the class PlantMonitoring. The ICT 
components and the power grid can be object of maintenance, so the class Maintenance is 
specialized in ICTMaintenance and PowerGridMaintenance. Moreover, the class Regulation 
concerning the generic activity of regulation, is specialized in VoltageRegulation and 
FrequencyRegulation modelling the voltage regulation and the frequency regulation 
respectively.  
The teleoperation functions are represented by the class Teleoperation specialized in the 
class GridReconfiguration and the class RemoteCommand; the supervision functions are 
represented by the class Supervision specialized in the classes Plant and ICT.  
Moreover, each function has its own geographical scope: the class Function is associated in 
a biunivocal way with the class Locality which is in turn specialized in Nation, Region, Area 
and Zone classes. In this way we can distinguish, e.g. the state of the regional Teleoperation 
of Lombardia from the state of the regional Teleoperation of Piemonte. 
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Figure 8-6: Class diagram of the functions performed by ICT elements 
 
8.2 Representing the Control System Infrastructure in UML 
8.2.1 ICT Elements 
The ICT elements present in the electric power system are represented in the class diagrams 
in Figure 8-7. The class PhysicalHost represents the generic device connected to the 
communication network. This class is already present in the class diagram in Figure 8-1 and 
can be specialized in two classes: WorkStation (Figure 8-7) and 
Regulation&ControlComponent (Figure 8-8). The class WorkStation represents generic 
computers and has several specializations, one for each role of a workstation: Desktop, 
Server, Firewall, Gateway, Router, Laptop. Moreover, the class Server is specialized in 
DataBaseServer and WebServer.  
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Figure 8-7: Class diagram of the ICT elements  
 
Figure 8-8: Class diagram of the industrial application components 
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8.2.2 Industrial application components 
In Figure 8-8, the class PhysicalHost is specialized in the class 
Regulation&ControlComponent identifying the industrial application components, e.g.: the 
components dedicated to the regulation and control of a node of the power grid; the class 
Regulation&ControlComponent is therefore specialized in IED, MCDTU, SCADAComputer, 
PQR, HMIOperation, AVR, StationComputer, etc.   
8.2.3 ICT Network 
Figure 8-9 shows the class diagram of the ICT Network of a site; the class PhysicalHost is 
present in this diagram and is specialized in WorkStation and 
Regulation&ControlComponent. The class LAN identifies the local networks of a site; LAN is 
the aggregation of instances of PhysicalHost. This class is already present in the class 
diagrams in Figure 8-1, Figure 8-4, Figure 8-7 and Figure 8-8. The connection between the 
local networks of a site, is represented by the class IntraConnection associated with LAN. 
This form of connection is realized by means of gateways, firewalls and routers identified by 
the classes Gateway, Firewall and Router respectively and associated with the class 
IntraConnection. Gateways and firewalls are also connected to the routers of the site; the 
router is the point of connection between the local networks of the site and the external 
network necessary for the communication with other sites.  
The class Router identifies the routers and is associated with Gateway, Firewall and 
InterConnection. The class InterConnection represents the connection of the control site with 
other sites by means of the public network (Internet) or by means of a private network. 
Therefore, the class InterConnection is specialized in Internet and WAN; WAN is specialized 
in DedicatedNetwork and SharedNetwork. The class DedicatedNetwork identifies private 
networks dedicated exclusively to the interconnection of sites; the class SharedNetwork 
identifies private networks used to connect sites, but also used to other purposes. The class 
WAN is already present in the class diagram in Figure 8-5. 
 
Figure 8-9: Class diagram of the networking elements 
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8.2.4 Voltage Regulation 
 
Figure 8-10: Use case diagram of the voltage regulation 
The use case diagram in Figure 8-10 shows the functionalities of the Voltage Regulation 
System. The use case called VoltageRegulation represents the general function of the 
Voltage Regulation System. Such use case is specialized in the use cases Primary, 
Secondary and Tertiary representing the primary, secondary and tertiary voltage regulation 
respectively. The use case Primary is associated with the actor named LocalOperator 
identifying the operator dedicated to the primary voltage regulation on a local area. The same 
use case is extended by the use case named SetupParameters representing the setup of the 
parameters influencing the AVR functioning. The use case SetupParameters extends the use 
case Primary because the parameter setup may be eventually perfomed inside the primary 
voltage regulation. The actor MaintenanceOperator is associated with the use case 
SetupParameters; such actor identifies the operator dedicated to setup the parameters 
concerning the primary voltage regulation.  
The use case Secondary specializing the use case VoltageRegulation, includes the use case 
named Communication; this means that each time the secondary voltage regulation is 
performed, the communication function is exploited (to connect  the regulation components 
involved in the secondary voltage regulation).  
The use case Tertiary includes the following use cases: Communication, GridStateEstimate 
and VoltageLevelOptimization. This means that the tertiary control regulation includes these 
functions: the communication between the components involved in the tertiary voltage 
regulation, the estimate of the grid state and the optimization of the voltage level in the grid.  
The actor TSOVoltageOperator is associated with the use case Secondary and with the use 
case Tertiary; such actor identifies the operator dedicated to the secondary and tertiary 
voltage regulation.  
The structure of the voltage regulation system of the electric power system is represented by 
the class diagram in Figure 8-11 where the main class is VoltageRegulation extending the 
class Regulation identifying the regulation functions. The class Regulation is already present 
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in Figure 8-6. VoltageRegulation is the aggregation of three classes extending the class 
Regulation; such classes reflect the geographical organization of the voltage regulation; they 
are: PrimaryVoltageRegulation, SecondaryVoltageRegulation and TertiaryVoltageRegulation. 
Besides the description of the voltage regulation in terms of functions, the class diagram in 
Figure 8-11 indicates also the components performing each function. The classes NVR, 
RVR, AVR and PQR represent the components realizing the regulation operations on the 
power plants or on the substations. The class NVR models the national voltage regulator 
performing the tertiary voltage regulation: NVR is associated with the class 
TertiaryVoltageRegulation. The class RVR represents the regional voltage regulator 
performing the secondary voltage regulation together with the reactive power regulator 
represented by the class PQR; RVR and PQR are associated with the class 
SecondaryVoltageRegulation. Finally, the automatic voltage regulator performing the primary 
voltage regulation, is represented by the class AVR associated with the class 
PrimaryVoltageRegulation. 
NVR and RVR are associated since the national voltage regulator can send commands to 
the regional voltage regulators, while a regional voltage regulator can send information about 
the state of the corresponding portion of power grid, to the national voltage regulator. 
Similarly, the class RVR is associated with the class PQR because a regional voltage 
regulator can send commands to the reactive power regulator. Finally, the classes PQR and 
AVR are associated because the reactive power regulator sets the reference voltage values. 
The class diagram in Figure 8-11 shows also which elements of the power grid are 
influenced by the components realizing the voltage regulation. The class RVR is associated 
with the class PilotNode because the regional voltage regulator monitors the voltage levels in 
the pilot nodes. The class PQR is associated with PowerPlant since the reactive power 
regulator influences the state of the power plant. The class AVR is associated with the class 
Generator because the automatic voltage regulator influences the state of the generators of 
a power plant. 
The class PowerPlant is already present in the class diagrams in Figure 8-3 and in Figure 
8-4 respectively; Generator is already present in the class diagram in Figure 8-3; the classes 
PQR and AVR are already present in the class diagram in Figure 8-8. 
 
Figure 8-11: Class diagram of the voltage regulation 
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Figure 8-12: Activity diagram of the Voltage Regulation 
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8.2.5 Teleoperation 
 
Figure 8-13: Use case diagram of the Teleoperation system 
In  Figure 8-13 we show the use case diagram of the teleoperation. The use case diagram 
describes with a high level of abstraction who are the relevant users interacting with the 
system, and the services provided by the system. In this type of diagram the focus is on the 
purpose of the service provided not on its implementation. In our case the 
TrasmissionServiceOperator (TSO actor) and DistributionServiceOperator (DSO actor) 
interact with the Teleoperation system in order to coordinate different services: Generation 
Trip, Monitoring Functions, Load Shedding, Shunt Reactance.  
In our case, the TSO interacts with all the provided functions whereas the DSO interacts only 
with load shedding activities because it authorizes the TSO to perform them.  
The structure of the teleoperation system of the electric power system is represented by the 
class diagram in Figure 8-14 where the main class is Teleoperation specialized in 
RemoteCommand. RemoteCommand is the aggregation of three classes extending the class 
Function identifying the functions (Function is already present in the class diagram in Figure 
8-6); these classes reflect the geographical organization of the Teleoperation; they are: 
NationalTeleoperation, RegionalTeleoperation and AreaTeleoperation.  
Besides the description of the Teleoperation in terms of functions, the class diagram in 
Figure 8-14 indicates also the automation components performing each function. The 
classes NTS, RTS, ATS and MCDTU extend the class Regulation&ControlComponent 
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representing the hardware components realizing control operations on the power plants or on 
the substations. The class Regulation&ControlComponent  is already present in the class 
diagram in Figure 8-8.  
The class NTS is associated with the class NationalTeleoperation because NTS represents 
the automation component performing the national Teleoperation; analogously, the class 
RTS is associated with the class RegionalTeleoperation, the class ATS is associated with the 
class AreaTeleoperation. NTS and RTS are associated since the national Teleoperation can 
send commands to the regional Teleoperation, while a regional Teleoperation can send 
information about the state of the corresponding portion of power grid, to the national 
Teleoperation. Similarly, RTS and ATS are associated since the regional Teleoperation 
commands the area Teleoperation, while the regional Teleoperation is informed by the area 
Teleoperation. 
A MCDTU exchanges commands and information also with the regional Teleoperation 
system, so the class MCDTU is associated with the class RTS.  
The class MCDTU is associated with the class ATS because the area Teleoperation system 
collects information from the MCDTU automation components; the class MCDTU is 
associated also with the class SubStation because the automation components represented 
by the class MCDTU influence the state of the substations. 
 
Figure 8-14: Class Diagram of the teleoperation 
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8.2.6 ICT threats 
 
Figure 8-15: Class diagram of function classification 
The class diagram in Figure 8-15 concerns the function classification. The main class in such 
diagram is Function representing the generic function; this class can be specialized in the 
class SimpleFunction and in the class CompositeFunction. In particular, the class 
CompositeFunction is the aggregation of the class Function. In this way, we represent that a 
composite function can be composed by  simple functions or by further composite functions.  
The class Function is associated with the class Component in order to express that a certain 
component provides a certain function. The class Component is specialized in the class 
AtomicComponent and in the class CompositeComponent. Moreover, the class 
CompositeComponent is the aggregation of the class Component; in this way, we represent 
that a composite component can be composed by atomic components or by further 
composite components. 
 
Figure 8-16: Class diagram of Fault-Error-Failure 
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The class diagram in Figure 8-16 represents the Fault-Error-Failure (FEF) chain [Avizienis et 
al. 2004]. The class Fault is associated with the class Error in order to express that a fault 
may cause an error; the class Error is in turn associated with the class Failure because an 
error may cause a failure. The class Failure is associated with the class Fault in order to 
express that a failure may cause another fault. The class diagram in Figure 8-16 shows also 
the elements affected by the FEF chain: a fault affects a regulation & control component, an 
error affects an automation function, a failure affects a system component.  
 
Figure 8-17: Fault classification 
The class diagram in Figure 8-17 represents the fault classification according to [Avizienis]. 
The class Fault represents the generic fault and is specialized in the class HardwareFault 
and in the class MaliciousHumanMadeFault; the class HardwareFault represents the fault 
depending on the hardware characteristics of a component; the class 
MaliciousHumanMadeFault represents the fault due to some malicious attack by a human 
actor. Such kind of fault can be an intrusion attempt or malicious logic fault; the class 
MaliciousLogicFault is specialized in TrojanHorse, LogicBomb, TrapDoor, Virus, Worm; 
these classes represent the several forms of malicious logic faults.  
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Figure 8-18: Collaboration of the communication function  
The diagram in Figure 8-18 shows the classes involved in a generic communication between 
a sender and a receiver, together with the collaborations between such classes. This 
diagram indicates that a sender and a receiver exchange information by means of a 
communication channel. 
The packet delivery in normal conditions is depicted in the sequence diagram in Figure 8-19 
where a packet is sent from the sender to the receiver through the communication channel 
without any delay. In the sequence diagram in Figure 8-20, we represent the situation of the 
communication in case of denial of service with delay in the packet delivery. The sequence 
diagram in Figure 8-21 shows the loss of the packets still in case of denial of service. 
 
Figure 8-19: Interaction fragment of a normal communication 
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Figure 8-20: Interaction fragment of a delayed communication 
 
Figure 8-21: Interaction fragment of a failed communication 
The sequence diagram in Figure 8-22 is the composition of the previous ones showing the 
several stages of the denial of service: initially we are in a normal situation even though in 
parallel way, an attacker is performing the denial of service. When the denial of service 
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begins to influence in a negative way the packet delivery, the communication can be in two 
alternative situations: the case with delayed packet delivery and the case with failed packet 
delivery. 
In the sequence diagram in Figure 8-23, we represent an intrusion in the communication: 
initially we have the normal communication conditions depicted in the sequence diagram in 
Figure 8-19; after the intrusion, the intrusion can send faked commands through the 
communication channel.  
 
Figure 8-22: Sequence diagram of a denial of service attempt 
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Figure 8-23: Sequence diagram of an intrusion attempt 
Figure 8-24 shows the possible states of the interconnection (the class Interconnection in 
Figure 5-11) in case of denial of service according to scenario 1: the interconnection is 
initially Idle and turns to the state Sending when the transmission of packet begins; such 
state contains an inner state machine composed by the states Delivery and Failed Delivery, 
where Delivery is the initial one. The state Delivery represents the situation where the 
packets are delivered, possibly with a delay; the state Failed Delivery represents the situation 
where the packets are not delivered. The state transition from Delivery to Failed Delivery is 
due to the combination of a denial of service affecting the interconnection, and the failure of 
the corresponding countermeasure. The inverse state transition, from Failed Delivery to 
Delivery, is due an action of  recovery from the denial of service.  
The state Delivery contains a further inner state machine composed by the states Normal 
and Delayed; in the state Normal, the packets are delivered without any delay; in the state 
Delayed the packets are delivered on delay. The state transition from Normal to Delayed is 
determined by the begin of a denial of service; the inverse state transition from Delayed to 
Normal is determined by an action of recovery from the denial of service.  
 
Figure 8-24: States of the interconnection in case of Denial of Service 
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8.2.7 UML representation of the Scenario 1 
8.2.7.1 Denial of service 
 
Figure 8-25: States of the Teleoperation and of the Substation local control functions, 
in case of denial of service 
Figure 8-25 shows the states of the Teleoperation and of the local control functions of the 
substation, in case of denial of service according to scenario 1. The state transitions in the 
state machine in Figure 8-25 are determined by the possible states of the interconnection 
shown in Figure 8-24.  
The Teleoperation can turn from the state Normal to the state Partial Loss if the 
interconnection is in state Delayed (see the state machine in Figure 8-24). In the state Partial 
Loss, we have a partial loss of the Teleoperation commands. The inverse state transition, 
from Partial Loss to Normal, occurs if the interconnection turns back to the state Normal (see 
the state machine in Figure 8-24).  
In Figure 8-25, the state transition of the Teleoperation, from Normal to Complete Loss, is 
determined by the state Failed of the interconnection; the inverse state transition is due to 
the state Normal of the interconnection.  
The states Partial Loss and Complete Loss compose the global state Not Normal of the 
Teleoperation. Moreover, inside such global state, a state transition is possible from Partial 
Loss to Complete Loss and is due to the state Failed  of the interconnection.  
The state machine diagram in Figure 8-25 shows also the state of the local control functions 
of the substation; such state is permanent because it is not influenced by the state of the 
interconnection.   
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8.2.7.2 Intrusion 
 
Figure 8-26: States of the Teleoperation and of the Substation local control functions, 
in case of intrusion 
The state machine in Figure 8-26 concerns the Teleoperation and the local control functions 
in case of intrusion according to the Scenario 1. The Teleoperation turns from the state 
Normal to the state Faked_Commands in an intrusion occurs and the corresponding 
countermeasure fails. The inverse transition is due to a recovery action. The state 
Faked_Commands is an internal state of the global state Not Normal already present in the 
state machine in Figure 8-25.  
The local control functions are not influenced by the intrusion, so they keep the Normal state. 
 
8.2.8 UML representation of the Distributed Generation Scenarios 
8.2.8.1 Non malicious Agent 
The state diagram in Figure 8-27 shows the possible states of a non malicious agent. In such 
diagram, the agent is initially in the state Created, then it turns to the state 
UnderRegistration; in this state, the agent has been recently created and its neighbours are 
being informed of its presence. At the end of this process, the agent turns to the Active state; 
in such state, the agent is known by all its neighbours and is performing its activity. If the 
agent decides to leave the overlay network, then the agent turns from the Active state to the 
RemoveRegistration state; during such state the agent is removed by the overlay network by 
informing the neighbours of the agent about the fact that the agent is being excluded from 
the network. At the end of the removing activity, the agent turns to the final state Removed. 
Analysis of new control applications                          Page 178  
 
 
Figure 8-27: State diagram of a non malicious agent 
 
8.2.8.2 Malicious Agent 
Figure 8-28 depicts the possible states of the a malicious agent, i. e. an agent joining the 
overlay network with the aim of performing some kind of malicious attack to the network. 
Such an agent is initially in the state Created, then it turns to the UnderRegistration state in 
order to join the overlay network. When this activity is completed, the malicious agent turns 
to the state Active representing the situation where the agent is performing its malicious 
activity. Actually such state is a super-state whose sub-states represent the possible forms of 
attack that the malicious agent may perform; such sub-states are: VoltageLevelAttack, 
DosAttack, ChangingTopology, ManInTheMiddle. The state ManInTheMiddle is in turn a 
super-state containing the substates PartitionNetworkAttack and EconomicalTampering 
representing the attempt to partition the overlay network and the dispatch of faked 
economical information respectively. Both sub-states are reachable from the state 
ChangingTopology representing the situation where the malicious agent establishes some 
malicious links in the overlay network. This step is necessary to perform both the malicious 
partitioning of the network and the economical tampering.  
When the agent leaves the Active state, it turns to the state RemoveRegistration 
representing the stage where the agent leaves the overlay network. When the agents quits 
this state, it turns to the final state Removed.  
With respect to the state diagram of the non malicious agent (Figure 8-27), the state diagram 
of the malicious agent (Figure 8-28) differs for the malicious activities inside the Active state.  
 
Figure 8-28: State diagram of a malicious agent 
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The possible states of the overlay network are shown in the state diagram in Figure 8-29 
where the state transitions are due to the effects of the activity of a malicious agent (the 
states of a malicious agent are described in Figure 8-28).  
The overlay network is initially in the Normal state, and turns to the state 
SinglePointOfFailure when a malicious agent turns to the state ManInTheMiddle (see the 
state diagram in Figure 8-28). In other words, such state transition occurs when a malicious 
agent is able to partition the overlay network or is able to send malicious economical 
information.  
The overlay network turns from the state SinglePointOfFailure to the state Partitioned when 
the same malicious agent has determined the partition of the overlay network.  
 
Figure 8-29: State diagram of the overlay network 
The possible states of the portion of internet exploited to realize the overlay network in the 
distributed generation, are depicted in the state diagram in Figure 8-30. Actually such states 
concern the consume of the internet bandwidth due to the execution of the distributed 
algorithm necessary to add or remove an agent from the overlay network (the states of an 
agent are indicated in the diagram in Figure 8-28).  
The initial state of the internet portion is Normal where the bandwith is consumed in an 
ordinary way. If the algorithm is executed for an amount of agents exceeding a certain 
threshold, then the internet state turns to the state DelayedDelivery where the packets are 
delivered with a certain delay due to the consume of the bandwith in a not ordinary way. The 
state DelayedDelivery is actually a super-state containing the substates Busy and VeryBusy 
representing two different levels of consume of the bandwith and consequently two different 
degrees of delay in the packets delivery. 
If the number of agents requiring the execution of the distributed algorithm, keeps on 
growing, the internet can turn to the state FailedDelivery where the packets delivery fails.  
If instead the number of agents to add or to remove decreases, the internet can turn back 
from FailedDelivery to DelayedDelivery, or from DelayedDelivery to Normal.  
A possible form of denial of service attack affecting the internet portion exploited to realize 
the overlay network, may consist of generating a huge number of useless agents joining and 
leaving the overlay network.  
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Figure 8-30: State diagram of portion of internet exploited to realize the overlay 
network 
The state diagram in Figure 8-31 shows how the voltage regulation in the distributed 
generation is affected by the attack of a malicious agent (the states of a malicious agent are 
shown in Figure 8-28). According to such state diagram, the primary voltage regulation is not 
affected by the attack (the primary voltage regulation does not change its state). The 
secondary voltage regulation is initially in the Optimal state where no attack has been 
performed. From the Optimal state, the secondary voltage regulation can turn to the state 
Degraded if the overlay network is partitioned by the action of a malicious agent. Otherwise, 
the secondary voltage regulation can turn from the state Optimal to state 
DangerouslyOutOfRange if a malicious agent is negatively influencing the secondary voltage 
regulation by transmitting malicious information about the voltage levels. 
The tertiary voltage regulation is initially in the state Optimal where no attack has been 
performed. From this state, the tertiary voltage regulation can turn to the state SubOptimal if 
a malicious agent performs the partition of the overlay network, or if a malicious agent 
performs the economical tampering. The tertiary voltage regulation turns from the state 
Optimal to the state Abnormal if a malicious agent is negatively influencing the secondary 
voltage regulation by transmitting malicious information about the voltage levels. 
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Figure 8-31: State diagram of the voltage regulation in distributed generation system 
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